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VOLUME 36 SUMMER, 1983 NUMBER 3
PATCHWORK VERDICTS, DIFFERENT-JURORS
VERDICTS, AND AMERICAN JURY THEORY:
WHETHER VERDICTS ARE INVALIDATED BY
JUROR DISAGREEMENT ON ISSUES
HAYDEN J. TRUBITT*
Introduction
Consider a case where D-1 is sued for injuring P-1 in a car accident
allegedly caused by D-l's negligence. Some evidence shows that D-1
was speeding, other evidence that he was drunk; proof of either alone
would establish negligence. Six jurors find that D-1 was speeding, but
not drunk; the other six find that he was drunk, but not speeding.
All twelve agree that D-1 was "negligent," but there is no unanimous
agreement on what D-1 did that constituted negligence. May the jury
return a verdict for P-l?
Consider a similar case by P-2 against D-2 in a jurisdiction that per-
mits nine-to-three verdicts. Some evidence shows that D-2 was speeding,
other evidence that he was drunk, other evidence that he was asleep
at the wheel, and still other evidence that his headlights were not on.
Only jurors one to three find that he was speeding; only jurors four
to six that he was drunk; only jurors seven to nine that he was asleep
at the wheel; and only jurors ten to twelve that his headlights were
not on. All twelve agree that D-2 was "negligent," but on each par-
ticular allegation D-2 has apparently been exonerated by a vote suffi-
cient to entitle him to a verdict. May the jury return a verdict for P-2?
For D-2?
Surprisingly, the question of the validity of such "patchwork
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verdicts"1 has only rarely been confronted directly by the courts, and
even more rarely by the commentators. Yet the question is fundamental
to jury theory and could be raised in a substantial number of cases
today. Thus a clear understanding of the issues involved is essential.
This is particularly so because patchwork verdicts can arise in many
contexts. A few examples are: the defendant in the hypothetical situa-
tions above could be charged with involuntary manslaughter ather than
negligence; jurors might agree upon the amount of damages, each ar-
riving at the figure in a different way; the patchwork verdict might
be among plaintiff's alleged acts of contributory negligence; in a first
degree murder case, some jurors might find felony-murder while others
find premeditated murder; or the jurors might reach the same conclu-
sion but by believing different witnesses. The possibilities are endless.
One might want to hold patchwork verdicts valid in some of these
contexts, but not in others. In each case, the issue will be: to what
degree of specificity must the jurors agree on the issues underlying the
verdict in order for it to be valid? I
This article will first provide a general introduction to jury theory,
focusing on the broad principles of individualism, jury justice, and
incidents of the constitutional right to trial by jury. Then general rules
governing the validity of patchwork verdicts will be presented in the
context of both civil and criminal cases.
I. American Jury Theory
The desirability and the efficiency of the jury system have been the
subject of debate for many years.' For better or for worse, the jury
is so deeply embedded in the American system of justice that it is un-
likely to be discarded. The American system of allocating trial respon-
sibility between judge and jury incorporates several features which many
say make it a superior method of dispute resolution." First, the jury
1. The term was coined in Case Comment, Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues:
United States v. Gipson, 91 HARv. L. REv. 499 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Case
Comment].
2. Most, if not all, of these confrontations will be reported in Part IV, infra, of this article.
3. See generally M. BLOOMSTEN, VERDICT (1968); C. JonER, CIn JUSTICE AND THE JURY
(1962); H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, Tn AMERICAN JURY (1966); A. OSBORNE, THE MIND OF
THE JUROR (1937); R. SIMoN, THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CaRCAL OvERvIEw (R. Simon
ed. 1975); THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SocIm (R. Simon ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as SIMON, THE JURY].
4. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess fully the merits of the jury system as a
method of dispute resolution and as a political institution. Criticisms of the jury include: (1)
high economic and administrative costs; (2) the inability of a jury to understand the evidence
in complex cases; (3) the inability and/or unwillingness of the jury to follow the law; and (4)
[Vol. 36:473
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in the United States is essentially a democratic institution. The jury
is chosen at random from among the electorate with the goal of em-
panelling a representative cross-section of the community.5 Some
observers even claim that the deliberative process is analogous to legis-
lative decision making in that it seeks to draw a consensus from among
the differing viewpoints in the community.6 Also, by allowing direct
participation in the administration of justice, the American jury system
serves an educative function-each juror has the opportunity to discover
his own rights and to gain a practical acquaintance with the law.7 These
democratic features help to account for the popular support enjoyed
by the jury system.'
Second, the American method of allocation of responsibility pro-
vides a system of checks and balances within the trial process itself.
Requiring a certain level of agreement among jury members, rather
than concentrating decision-making responsibility in the person of the
judge, tends to diminish the possibility of corruption and bias.' The
instructions the judge gives to the jury limit the scope of jury delibera-
tion. The jury's power to mitigate the harshness of the law is offset
by the judge's power to set aside unreasonable or unconscionable
verdicts.'I These checks and -balances have the effect of keeping the
judicial system more flexible, ensuring a fairer result and limiting the
participation of the executive branch of government in dispute
resolution." These values are reflected in the two great themes,
individualism and jury justice,'3 running throughout the case law con-
cerning jury verdicts.
a lack of confidence of the general public in the jury system. ANNUAl. CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WAR-
REN CONFERENCE, ROSCOE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN JURY
SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 67-68 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
5. Id. at 71.
6. Sir Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury, Eighth Hamlyn Lecture Series (1956), cited in FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 66.
7. This aspect of the jury system led de Tocqueville to conclude: "[T]he jury, which is
the mosf energetic means of making the people rule, is also the most efficacious means of teaching
it to rule well." De Tocqueville, Trial by Jury in the United States Considered as a Political
Institution, cited in SIMON, THE JURY, supra note 3, at 7. See also JOINER, supra note 3, at 9, 66.
8. JOINER, supra note 3, at 9, 64.
9. Id. at 18-20, 67-68.
10. Id. Yet the judge cannot set aside a jury acquittal.
11. While there is no conclusive evidence that jury decisions are more uniform and predicta-
ble than those of judges, studies conducted in the United States suggest that the range of awards
for damages in similar civil suits is much wider for judges than for juries ($8,000 to $65,000
compared to $20,000 to $60,000) and that individual judges vary markedly in their approaches
to sentencing based on the same presentencing report. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 14 to 109.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 110 to 211.
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The Ideal of Individualism
The theme of individualism focuses on the means by which verdicts
are rendered." Ideally, a verdict is a concurrence of the views of all
jurors, each view representing an individual and independent assess-
ment of the evidence. Therefore, a proper jury verdict is returned only
when each juror in turn can stand up and say"5 : "This is my verdict.
Although I have taken into account the views of my fellow jurors,
this is the verdict I would return if I were a jury of one and my fellows
were no more than my advisers on the facts, which alone are the source
of my judgment."
The commitment to individualism is seen most clearly in the Supreme
Court's treatment of less-than-unanimous verdicts. The Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson v. Louisiana," upholding a 9-3 jury verdict of
guilty in a state criminal case, was necessarily founded on the theory
that the jury is a set of individuals, rather than a collectivity. For if
the jury is thought to be a single holistic entity, the dissent of three
jurors would prevent "the jury" from saying that it had no reasonable
doubt. But if a jury is twelve entities, not one, any one or two or
nine jurors can be personally convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt regardless of the beliefs other jurors may hold. Thus, a 9-3 ver-
dict does not violate the reasonable doubt standard7 and may stand
as long as it performs the traditional buffering function of jury verdicts.
Johnson also presented another argument for not regarding the jury
as a single entity: a hung jury results in a retrial, not an acquittal.'"
If the doubt of one juror were attributed to the entire collectivity, a
deadlocked jury would have to (or would be deemed to) report that
it had reasonable doubt of guilt and that it therefore acquitted. Since
the relevant doubt exists in the minds of one or more of the twelve
separate jurors, however, and not in a single mystical collectivity, there
is no acquittal unless all twelve jurors9 report personal reasonable
doubt.2"
14. In contrast, the theme of jury justice focuses on the substantive fairness of the result
reached.
15. The traditional poll of the jury is a central symbol of our jury system and the very core
of the ideal of individualism. A juror can dissent on poll and destroy the verdict at any time
before the verdict is recorded. Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1301 (1927).
16. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
17. Id. at 359-63. The reasonable doubt standard is discussed further, infra, text at notes
356-370.
18. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972).
19. In a jurisdiction allowing nonunanimous verdicts, acquittal would result if the requisite
majority could report personal reasonable doubt. Unless otherwise indicated, discussion in this
article will be in terms of the unanimous, twelve-member jury.
20. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972). See Note, Smaller Juries and Non.
unanimity: Analysis and Proposed Revision of the Ohio Jury System, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 583,
[Vol. 36:473
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The commitment to individualism can also be seen in the treatment
afforded verdicts not reaching the ideal. Despite the high value placed
on jury verdicts as final resolutions of disputes," certain classes of
verdicts are held to be invalid precisely because the ideal of individualism
has been violated. In the sections that follow, the relationship between
invalid verdicts and individualism is explored.
Verdicts Falling Short of the Ideal of Individualism
The essence of the individualism ideal is that each juror shall make
his own decision on the evidence. Thus it is reversible error for jurors
to delegate this decision-making responsibility. For example, a jury
may not delegate the issue of damages to a committee of three, for
nine jurors will have failed in their duty to bring their individual judg-
ment to bear on the issue.2 2 Similarly, it is impermissible to delegate
the judgment to the hand of chance rather than making a rational deci-
sion on the evidence.3 It is also improper for a jury to agree to adopt
the majority's position, as revealed by an initial vote, as the verdict
for all without further deliberation, for the minority jurors would be
announcing something other than their reasoned beliefs.24
The usual reason why certain juries adopt the above techniques is
to avoid prolonged deliberation. However, this deliberation is crucial
to the ideal of individualism. It is the means by which a true concur-
rence is formed from the differing views of individual jurors. Without
adequate deliberation, the result reached by the jury cannot be called
a verdict.2
589 n.44, 605 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cincinnati Note].
It has not always been as clear as it is today that a hung criminal jury does not involve
the "jeopardy" that prevents a retrial; if it did, the practical effect would be an acquittal whether
or not it was termed one. Compare United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (retrial
permitted) with State v. Mahala, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 532 (1837) (retrial forbidden), and with
State v. Walker, 26 Ind. 346 (1866) (retrial permitted). See also Morano, Historical Development
of the Interrelationship of Unanimous Verdicts and Reasonable Doubt, 10 VAt. U.L. Rv. 223
(1976).
21. It has long been recognized that verdicts must be treated as final decisions in order for
the jury system to function properly. See Kornstein, Impeachment of Partial Verdicts, 54 ST.
JoH, 's L. REv. 663, 669-71 (1980).
22. Memphis & C.R.R. v. Pillow, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 248, 253-54 (1872).
23. E.g., Beakley v. Optimist Printing Co., 28 Idaho 67, 152 P. 212 (1915) (coin flipping).
See Note, Chance and Quotient Verdicts, 37 VA. L. REv. 849, 849-51 (1951) [hereinafter cited
as Virginia Note] (citing cases).
24. Virginia Note, supra note 23, at 850. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 172,
135 S.W.2d 111 (1939).
25. "[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused
and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community's
participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). While the Supreme Court has recognized
1983]
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Compromise Ierdicts and Quotient Verdicts
The compromise verdict is a frontal assault on individualism because
it involves two sets of jurors each surrendering firmly and honestly
held opinions on one issue in exchange for the other set surrendering
different firmly and honestly held opinions, usually on another issue.
For example, a deadlock between jurors for full damages and jurors
for a defense verdict on liability may result in a compromise verdict
of nominal or inadequate damages; a deadlock between conviction and
acquittal may result in a compromise conviction of a lesser offense.
The vice of a compromise verdict is that it does not represent the
independent judgment of each juror on the evidence as he sees it. In-
deed, possibly no juror personally subscribes to a compromise verdict.
Compromise verdicts have received harsh words from the courts. When,
under the prodding of a too-strong Allen charge,2" a jury convicted
only of assault in an attempted murder case where the only defense
was alibi, the court in State v. Bybee" exploded: "A verdict is the
expression of the concurrence of individual judgments, rather than the
product of mixed thoughts .... [F]rom the testimony each juror should
be led to the same conclusion .... Especially is this true in criminal
trials.... [Such a compromise is an] outrage." 28 The compromise is
also sometimes apparent on the face of the verdict in civil cases,29
deliberation as essential to the jury's function, it has been inconsistent in the degree of protec-
tion it has afforded to the deliberative process. In the cases holding that nonunanimous criminal
juries were constitutionally permitted, the Court was willing to assume that jurors would take
their responsibilities seriously and would not reach a verdict without fully considering the views
of the minority. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 361 (1972) (upholding a 9-3 felony convic-
tion); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (upholding nonunanimous state felony
convictions). In disallowing nonunanimous ix-member criminal juries, the Court was not willing
to make that assumption. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978). See also infra note 76.
26. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). An "Allen charge" is an instruction given
to a hung jury before it is sent back for further deliberations. The dissenters are essentially told
to examine their consciences to determine if their disagreement with the majority is reasonable.
It is the universal rule that instructions to a deadlocked jury cannot explicitly authorize com-
promise. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 845, 875 (1972) (civil cases). Compare Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347 (1912) discussed infra in note 28.
27. 17 Kan. 462 (1877).
28. Id. at 467. Accord, State v. Kruger, 60 Wash. 542, 111 P. 769 (1910) (assault with the
intent to rape charged, defense of alibi, conviction for simple assault). Compare Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), where after long deliberations, the jury was unable to agree on
conspiracy charges against four defendants. The judge suggested the possibility of convicting
some defendants and acquitting others, which the jury promptly did. Unlike Bybee, the com-
promise was not apparent on the face of the verdict. The Supreme Court found it "hard to
believe" that there was a compromise; consequently, juror impeachment was disallowed and
the verdict was upheld. 225 U.S. at 383-84.
29. Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912) ($200 for loss of an eye). See James
Turner & Sons v. Great Northern Ry., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W. 489 (1937) (only one-third of
uncontested damages was awarded).
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perhaps more often than in criminal cases, because the compromise
is often evidenced by an incongruous damages award. Where the com-
promise is thus apparent, a new trial will be granted."
However, the compromise is not facially apparent in the usual case.'
Of such cases, Justice Jackson has written: "Courts uniformly disap-
prove compromise verdicts but are without other means than admoni-
tions to ascertain or control the practice."13 2 Juror impeachment of
compromise verdicts is usually not allowed.33 Where the conviction on
a lesser offense only suggests a compromise, state courts tend to say
that lenity is a prerogative of the jury, and that the defendant has
no cause for complaint if the jury chooses to exercise it. 4
A quotient verdict is a form of compromise verdict. A quotient ver-
dict occurs when the jurors each agree to state a position on the damages
or sentence issue," add the 12 figures, divide by 12, and report the
quotient as the verdict of all. In an effort to proscribe such verdicts,
many states try to squeeze them into the definition of a "verdict by
30. See, e.g., cases cited supra in note 29. When a compromise is apparent on the face of
a criminal verdict, some courts acquit rather than requiring a new trial. E.g., State v. Robinson,
12 Wash. 349, 41 P. 51 (1895) (compromise produced legally impossible conviction of manslaughter
where the charge was being an accessory before the fact to murder).
31. Often courts will go to great lengths to avoid seeing a compromise. See, e.g., Fairmount
Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933) (verdict of nominal damages was deter-
mined to be an inconsistent verdict rather than a compromise verdict and, thus, was upheld).
32. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953). See also Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390, 394 (1932). But see United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J.) (apparently saying that compromise verdicts are permissible).
33. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384 (1912). Impeachment of verdicts is discussed
infra, text accompanying notes 76-109.
34. State v. Phinney, 13 Idaho 307, 89 P. 634 (1907) (murder by poison charged, conviction
for manslaughter); State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431 (1956). An argument has
been made that states presuming lenity unwarrantedly assume that the jury found the defendant
guilty of the greater crime charged when, in fact, he was acquitted of that charge. No com-
prehensive study testing this hypothesis has been published. Comment, Compromise Verdicts
in Criminal Cases, 37 NEB L. REv. 802, 813 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Nebraska Comment].
In any event, lenity may only be presumed when an instruction on the lesser offense was given.
Further, the Constitution requires that an instruction on a lesser included offense be given in
capital cases. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). On the other hand, the Constitution pro-
hibits an instruction on lesser included offenses where the death penalty is mandatory for the
primary offense and there is no evidence to support the lesser offenses. Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
Note that after Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (fifth amendment made applicable
to the states), the acquittal on a greater offense that actually or presumptively accompanies con-
viction on a lesser included offense bars retrial on the greater charge even if the conviction is
reversed. Thus, courts may be reluctant to reverse the lesser conviction when the worst that
could befall the defendant is reconviction on that offense. See infra text accompanying notes
72-74. Prior to Green, a defendant appealing a conviction on a lesser offense risked conviction
on the greater offense on retrial. Nebraska Comment, supra, at 816.
35. The jury fixes the punishment in several states. Nebraska Comment, supra note 34, at
818 (listing 13 states).
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lot,"36 and indeed there is a delegation of decision making to a pro-
cess that contains elements other than the individual's personal judg-
ment. But the real vice of quotient verdicts is that they foreclose delibera-
tion and contradict the ideal of consensus through mutual persuasion.7
This is such an important value that quotient verdicts are reversible,
even though it would be logical to assume that the quotient is an ex-
cellent approximation of the figure that the originally split jurors would
finally arrive at after ideal deliberations.8
The courts will not upset an alleged quotient verdict without evidence
that deliberation was actually foreclosed. Thus a quotient may properly
be computed if the purpose is only to use it as a starting point for
discussion and there was no prior agreement to adopt the quotient as
the verdict."9 The verdict is surely valid if it is significantly different
from the original quotient."' However, an invalid verdict cannot be
saved by the jury "ratifying" a purportedly "nonbinding" quotient
if in fact there was a tacit or explicit agreement to abide." Moreover,
the dampening effect on post-quotient deliberation need not be total;
the verdict is tainted if even one juror felt bound by the quotient."
Inconsistent Verdicts
An inconsistent verdict arises when the various issues in a case are
resolved in a way which appears to be logically inconsistent.3 The in-
congruously low damage award, for example, can be viewed as being
inconsistent with a finding of liability, as well as being a compromise.
A more obvious form of inconsistency is where similarly situated par-
ties or parties whose liability is interdependent are treated differently.
The paradigmatic inconsistent civil verdict is a judgment of liability
against only one defendant in a respondeat superior situation." There
36. See National Credit Corp. v. Ritchey, 252 Ark. 106, 477 S.W.2d 488 (1972) (if agreement
is made before the jurors reveal their figures); Comment, Brown v. Commonwealth: The Court
Balks on Quotient Verdicts, 62 Ky. L.J. 243, 249 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kentucky Com-
ment] (in some states, impeachment of a verdict is allowed only where the verdict was by lot).
Accord, Virginia Note, supra note 23, at 858-60.
37. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Marshall's Adm'x, 289 Ky. 129, 139, 158 S.W.2d 137, 143 (1942).
38. Kentucky Comment, supra note 36, at 248.
39. Scheptmann v. Thorn, 272 Ark. 70, 612 S.W.2d 291, 293 (1981); Will v. Southern Pac.
Co., 18 Cal. 2d 468, 116 P.2d 44, 49 (1941); Sheker v. Jensen, 241 Iowa 583, 41 N.W.2d 679 (1950).
40. Cox v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 391, 74 S.W.2d 346 (1934).
41. Kentucky Comment, supra note 36, at 247.
42. See Wright v. Union Pac. R.R., 22 Utah 338, 62 P. 317 (1900).
43. This section refers only to inconsistencies among general verdicts. Conflicts among special
verdicts or interrogatories and conflicts between special interrogatories and the general verdict
are considered below at text accompanying notes 184-86, 196, 198.
44. However, as in all cases of alleged inconsistency, every effort will be made to reconcile
the verdicts. For example, liability of a master and release of the servant will be upheld where
[Vol. 36:473
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are three possible explanations for such a verdict: (1) a mistake of law;
(2) a compromise verdict (i.e., between liability of both and liability
of neither); and (3) a unanimous jury decision that justice would be
better served by not forcing a defendant to pay although he should
be liable under the law. The first two causes are everywhere unaccep-
table; the third is a source of ambivalent feelings, but is generally ac-:
cepted as within the jury's power. 5
It seems impossible to determine from the face of an inconsistent
verdict which of the three causes has been responsible. How a jurisdic-
tion deals with such verdicts is apparently determined by which cause
it chooses to presume has been at work. For example, some courts
will send a jury back to reconcile an inconsistent respondeat superior
verdict," while others will accept such a verdict.7 Similarly, some courts
will accept a verdict reimbursing one plaintiff for payment of an in-
jured coplaintiff's medical expenses when the verdict also denies the
injured coplaintiff recovery for pain and suffering," while other courts
will not."9
It seems unlikely that inconsistent civil verdicts are caused by jury
mistake." The choice of presumptions, then, is between a compromise
verdict (impermissible) and jury lenity (permissible).' A state should
be free to choose either presumption, depending upon, among other
things, its feelings about jury autonomy, the likelihood and desirability
of pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant jury bias, and the likelihood of jury
misconduct (compromise).5 2 The presumption that lenity is the cause
of the inconsistency accords better with the maxim that propriety rather
there is any evidence of independent negligence by the master. Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co.,
104 W. Va. 12, 138 S.E. 749 (1927).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 110-211.
46. Indiana Nitroglycerine & Torpedo Co. v. Lippencott Glass Co., 165 Ind. 361, 75 N.E.
649 (1905); Jakubiec v. Hasty, 337 Mich. 205, 59 N.W.2d 385 (1953); Pangburn v. Buick Motor
Co., 211 N.Y. 228, 105 N.E. 423 (1914).
47. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Myrick, 220 Miss. 429, 71 So. 2d 217 (1954). Cf. United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (respondeat superior.in a criminal case).
48. Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 204 P.2d 430 (1949).
49. Yacabonis v. Gilvickas, 376 Pa. 247, 101 A.2d 690 (1954).
50. Rita Simon argues that the fact that judges and juries agree 79% of the time in personal
injury cases and 80% of the time in criminal cases, with most disagreements explainable by the
closeness of the evidence, indicates that the jury understands what it is doing and does its job
competently. SimoN, supra note 3, at 49-52 (discussing the findings of Kalven and Zeisel in THE
AmmcA JuRY, supra note 3).
51. Note that while compromise verdicts violate the ideal of individualism, jury nullification
does not if each juror independently arrives at the conclusion that practical considerations of
justice outweigh technical liability.
52. Some courts take yet another position and recognize that a compromise verdict is likely
to have occurred, but allow the trial judge to uphold the verdict when the evidence is conflicting
or unclear. See Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955).
19831
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than impropriety should be presumed, but courts that accept such a
rule must sometimes blind themselves to obvious compromise." On
the other hand, lenity may be a less likely hypothesis in a civil case
than in criminal cases;54 accordingly, a jurisdiction could choose to
assume that an inconsistent civil verdict was the result of an imper-
missible compromise and order a new trial.
The possible causes of inconsistent criminal verdicts are the same
as described above in regard to civil cases: mistake, compromise, and
lenity despite unanimous belief of guilt. Here courts are generally of
the belief that lenity, which is permissible, is the cause of inconsistency,
so the conviction is upheld. This seems justifiable as an empirical mat-
ter and because the double jeopardy rule would bar retrial or resub-
mission to the jury on charges and essential issues on which the jury
had inconsistently acquitted.
Inconsistent criminal verdicts typically arise when a single defendant
facing multiple charges is convicted of some and acquitted of others
in such a way that the total verdict is inconsistent on its face." For
example, in Dunn v. United States,16 the leading case, the defendant
was convicted of maintaining a nuisance by keeping liquor for sale,
53. E.g., Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933) (verdict of
one dollar plus costs upheld in contract case).
54. Juries are usually thought to favor plaintiffs, not defendants. Kalven and Zeisel's research
suggests otherwise. See supra note 50. It should be noted that excessive awards of damages are
not viewed as permissible jury lenity but as impermissible vindictiveness, and remittitur or a
new trial is in order. Bickel, Judge and Jury-Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63
HAxv. L. REv. 649, 655 (1950). In any event, additur is forbidden in federal courts. Dimick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
55. As with all inconsistent verdicts, courts will strain to reconcile the apparent inconsis-
tency. E.g., People v. Vanderbilt, 199 Cal. 461, 249 P. 867 (1926) (reconciling an acquittal of
sodomy and conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor by committing sodomy).
Another form of inconsistency occurs when on identical evidence the jury convicts some defend-
ants and acquits others. This rarely occurs because usually there is some distinction among the
defendants, and each is entitled to have his innocence or guilt considered separately from his
codefendant's. But where the situations and characteristics of the defendants are truly in-
distinguishable and one defendant has received no lenity, his complaint that he was the victim
of a compromise verdict becomes somewhat more compelling. Compare Territory v. Thompson,
26 Hawaii 181 (1921) (reversing conviction), with State v. Rush, 129 S.C. 43, 123 S.E. 765 (1924)
(dictum) (would affirm). See generally Comment, Inconsistent Verdicts in a Federal Criminal
Trial, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 999, 999-1001 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Comment]; An-
not. 22 A.L.R.3d 717 (1968). The tendency of the more recent cases is to uphold such convic-
tions. Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 717, 721, 723-24 (1968).
While conviction of two mutually exclusive crimes is also considered an inconsistent verdict,
e.g., Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 42 A.2d 128 (1945) (larceny of and receiving the same prop-
erty), in most jurisdictions the error is cured by entering only one of the two convictions. An-
not., 18 A.L.R.3d 259, 283-84, 295-96 (1968).
56. 284 U.S. 390 (1932). This was Justice Holmes's last opinion; he resigned from the Court
on January 12, 1932, the day after Dunn was announced. Id. at vii.
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but acquitted, on the same evidence, of possession of liquor. The con-
viction was affirmed on two grounds": first, that each count in an
indictment is regarded as a separate indictment, and res judicata (col-
lateral estoppel) does not run from one criminal trial to another; and,
second, quoting Learned Hand,5" "[T]he jury did not speak their real
conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of
the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their
assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise but to which
they were disposed through lenity."5 9 Justice Holmes concluded for
the Supreme Court, "That the verdict may have been the result of
compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But
verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters."6
Dunn is weakened by the fact that the premise of its first ground
was probably not good law even then,6' and certainly is not after Sealfon
v. United States62 and Ashe v. Swenson.63 Sealfon and Ashe give
criminal defendants the benefit of collateral estoppel on issues decided
in their favor in previous criminal trials. Even so, Dunn's first ground
might be salvaged if it were determined that the inconsistent conviction
came first; then there would be no collateral estoppel problem when
the inconsistent acquittal "followed" in the same case. The presump-
tion that the jury acted in this order, rather than in one that violated
double jeopardy/collateral estoppel rights, is justifiable in light of the
general presumption that the jury did not deliberately violate the law."
In any event, the second Dunn ground (the assumption that lenity
was the cause of the inconsistency) is sufficient to sustain the verdict.65
Alexander Bickel wrote that "Dunn represents a sensible compromise
between the necessity of convicting some likable people, or defendants
who have committed a momentarily popular crime, and the tendency
of juries to be reluctant to do So.'"" That is, Dunn allows juries to
fulfill their historic role as ameliorators of the harsh law. 7 Indeed,
the policies of Dunn and of SealfonlAshe are identical: "IT]hey each
57. Id. at 393.
58. Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1925).
59. Id. at 60, cited in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).
60. 284 U.S. at 394.
61. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916) (Holmes, J.).
62. 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
63. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
64. On the other hand, it could be argued that the benefit of the doubt should always go
to the defendant.
65. But note that most courts of appeals followed Dunn primarily on the first ground. Col-
umbia Comment, supra note 55, at 1005 n.24.
66. Bickel, supra note 54, at 652.
67. Id. at 655. See infra text accompanying notes 110-116, 193.
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give the defendant the benefit of any break any single jury may wish
him to have."68
The courts' preference for a presumption of unanimous lenity over
a presumption of compromise as the cause of inconsistent criminal ver-
dicts seems rooted in a fixation on the role of the criminal jury as
a dispenser of honest, rough-hewn community justice. In United States
v. Maybury,"9 Judge Friendly reversed an inconsistent verdict from a
bench trial that he would have affirmed from a jury trial, arguing that
a judge could keep the punishment in line with the crime by lenity
in sentencing, whereas jurors had to acquit on certain counts incon-
sistently in order to attempt to achieve that goal; and that while a jury's
need to make accommodations to reach unanimity might produce an
inconsistent verdict, a judge was under no such compulsion to reach
unanimity with himself.7
It may seem harsh, particularly in criminal cases, to refuse to con-
sider the possibility of compromise when the facial inconsistency of
a verdict is evidence of a compromise. An acceptable rule might be
to presume the cause of the inconsistency is permissible lenity, but to
allow otherwise forbidden impeachment of the verdict by jurors71 on
the ground of mistake" or compromise where an inconsistent verdict
provides "corroboration."
If the defendant is deemed to be the victim of a compromise ver-
dict, his conviction should not be permitted to stand. Yet only a minority
of the states give defendants the benefit of the doubt on this score
and reverse inconsistent convictions, presuming them to be compromises
rather than instances of lenity." Indeed, the minority practice has a
dramatically pro-defendant effect (which is even more striking when
the inconsistent acquittal truly was due to lenity), because the double
jeopardy clause prevents retrial on the counts on which the jury returned
an acquittal.74 Thus, although the theory underlying reversal of com-
68. Bickel, supra note 54, at 652.
69. 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960).
70. Id. at 902-03. Judge Friendly clearly accepts compromise verdicts as an unavoidable evil,
rather than endorsing them. Compare Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (Powell,
J., concurring) (unanimity requirement leads to irrational compromises).
71. See infra text at notes 76-109.
72. See Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546, 337 A.2d 81 (1975) (affirming conviction of use of handgun
in commission of a felony despite acquittal of all relevant felonies, on the theory that acquittals
were due to lenity; impeachment on ground that jury thought it was convicting of "possession
of handgun" not allowed), noted in Recent Decisions, 35 MD. L. REv. 535 (1976).
73. See Columbia Comment, supra note 55, at 1002 n.18 (listing 15 states upholding incon-
sistent criminal verdicts and 10 reveising them); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 259, 274-83 (1968) (citing
many cases).
74. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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promise verdicts is that the jury would have "hung" if it acted properly
and that retrial on all counts is required, reversal of a conviction aris-
ing from a Dunn verdict pattern will foreclose retrial of several counts.
Further, if retrial of issues is precluded under Sealfon and Ashe, con-
viction on any count may be impossible." On balance, then, the general
rule seems preferable.
Practical Treatment of Less Than Ideal Verdicts
There is an obvious tension between the ideal of individualism and
the practical need for jurors to be somewhat open to having their minds
changed so that the jury will not hang unchanged from its original
composition.76 Courts can refuse to instruct that "each juror must be
satisfied in his own conscience as to the facts of this case and should
not compromise or agree with other jurors if his or her determination
differs from that of other jurors." Such language is only half-true and
encourages stubbornness. As one court explained:
Although the verdict to which a juror agrees must of course be
his own verdict, the result of his own convictions, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet it by no means
follows that opinions may not be changed in the jury room. The
single object to be there effected is to arrive at a true verdict, and
this can only be done by deliberation, mutual concession; ... and
a due deference to the opinions of each other.77
The legal rules governing compromise and inconsistent verdicts attempt
to resolve the tension between individualism and the need to reach a
verdict by delineating the proper boundaries of deliberation.
A similar tension is found between the ideal of individualism and
the need for finality of verdicts.78 The resolution of these conflicting
ideals has been a general rule of nonimpeachment of verdicts."
To a cynic it might appear that the end result of many of the legal
75. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60, for the facts of Dunn. A similar position was
taken by Judge Lumbard, dissenting in part, in United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 906-07
(2d Cir. 1960).
76. However, researchers have found that in 90% of the cases, the verdict is the same as
the initial ballot, suggesting that "the real decision is often made before the deliberation begins."
KALVIN & ZEIsEL, supra note 3, at 488 (emphasis in the original). For a general discussion of
research conducted on the question of how a jury reaches a consensus, see SmoN, supra note
3, at 63-70.
77. Parker v. Hoefer, 118 Vt. 1, 22, 100 A.2d 434, 447-48 (1953). Similar cases abound.
78. For a discussion of the competing values of verdict finality and freedom of deliberation,
see Kornstein, supra note 21, at 696-99.
79. As Learned Hand noted, the nonimpeachment rule "offers an easy escape from embar-
rassing choices." Jorgenson v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 764 (1947).
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rules founded on the ideal of individualism is to leave remediless those
litigants victimized by their violation. Improprieties such as compromise
verdicts are presumed not to have occurred.0 Further, the only direct
evidence of the impropriety-affidavits or testimony by the jurors
themselves-is generally barred by the rule that jurors cannot impeach
their own verdict.8 ' Circumstantial evidence that an invalid verdict has
been rendered is often an ineffective weapon with which to challenge
suspect verdicts.a2
Numerous justifications for these limiting doctrines have been made.
The nonimpeachment rule began with Lord Mansfield's opinion in Vaise
v. DelavaPl and has long outlived its original rationale.14 The major
reasons for the rule today are: (1) to eliminate postverdict efforts by
defeated litigants to harass or even corrupt jurors into impeaching the
verdict; (2) to encourage candor in the jury room by promising that
the jurors' statements will never go on public record; and (3) to fur-
ther the general policy of putting an end to litigation, leaving the ver-
dict final between the parties and freeing the courts for other business.5
To these may be added another-perfect individualism is too high an
ideal. As Learned Hand noted regarding the goal of eliminating juror
misconduct altogether:
[I]t is doubtful whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would
stand such a test; and although absolute justice may require as
much, the impossibility of achieving it has induced judges to take
a middle course, for they have recognized that the institution could
not survive otherwise; they would become Penelopes, forever en-
gaged in unraveling the webs they weave. Like much else in human
affairs, [the jury's] defects are so deeply enmeshed in the system
that wholly to disentangle them would quite kill it.86
80. See supra text accompanying notes 43-75.
81. See supra note 33.
82. Copeland v. State, 252 Ala. 399, 41 So. 2d 390 (1949) (calculations for quotient verdict
found in jury room; verdict upheld for lack of evidence of an agreement to abide by the quo-
tient). Contra, International Agricultural Corp. v..Abercrombie, 184 Ala. 244, 63 So. 549 (1913).
83. 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). Before Vaise, juror affidavits for impeachment purposes
were accepted "without scruple." 8 J. WiUmoRu, EvmENcE § 2352, at 696 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
84. Lord Mansfield believed that a witness should not be heard to allege his own moral tur-
pitude. The "Mansfield rule" does not forbid a nonjuror, for example a bailiff, who overhears
jury misconduct from testifying about it. Wright v. Abbott, 160 Mass. 395, 36 N.E. 62 (1894);
Reich v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 577, 142 S.W.2d 486 (1940). However, the courts exclude the
impeaching testimony of an intentional eavesdropper. Leal v. Aluminum Co. of America, 443
S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Acosta v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 608, 72 S.W.2d 1074 (1934).
85. Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule
606(b), 57 NEB. L. REv. 920, 923-24 (1978); Note, To Impeach or Not To Impeach: The Stability
of Juror Verdicts in Federal Courts, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 343, 344 n. 15 (1977) (collecting cases
from various circuits) [hereinafter cited as Pepperdine Note].
86. Jorgenson v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
764 (1947).
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Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, most states
still adhered to a harsh, near-total ban on impeachment.87 A growing
minority of states and the federal courts employed some form of the
"Iowa rule," which forbids impeachment only of matters that "in-
here in the verdict,"'" i.e., those matters that require an inquiry into
the subjective mental processes of the juror to determine why he voted
as he did. Improper grounds for impeachment include: juror mistakes
as to the instruction, the law or the effect of the verdict, illness, use
of drugs or alcohol, and improper remarks by other jurors.8 9 Objec-
tive phenomena such as quotient verdicts, chance verdicts, intrusions
by nonjurors, and use of evidence not presented at trial are appropriate
grounds for impeachment under the Iowa rule.90
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted a compromise
position between the Mansfield and the most liberal of Iowa rules.9'
Rule 606(b) provides that the grounds for impeachment are to be limited
to "extraneous prejudicial information ... improperly brought to the
jury's attention [and] outside influence.., improperly brought to bear
upon any juror." 92 The rule, while somewhat furthering the liberal
trend,93 essentially followed existing case law in the federal courts.94
87. Note, Impeachment of Verdicts By Jurors-Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 Wm. MrrcHELL
L. RE. 417, 419 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Win. Mitchell Note]. But the margin of majority
is apparently shrinking. See Carlson & Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms For Rule
Revision, 1977 Amz. ST. L.J. 247, 250 n.19, 257.
Even the Mansfield rule states the harshness of the rule has ameliorated since the days when
a court said "Such [juror] affidavits, when offered, should only have been received and made
a part of the records of the court, as the grounds of the punishment of the affiants." Mason
v. Russell's Heirs, 1 Tex. 721, 726 (1847). For example, impeachment of chance verdicts is
specifically made permissible by the statutes of more than a dozen states. Virginia Note, supra
note 23, at 858-60. Some of these states allow impeachment for no other misconduct. E.g., Brauer
v. James J. Igoe & Sons Constr., 186 N.W.2d 459, 474 (N.D. 1971); Brown v. Commonwealth,
490 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Ky. 1973).
88. Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1867), gave birth and name
to the rule.
89. See Note, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 258, 264 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Marquette Note]; Win. Mitchell Note, supra note 87, at 420.
90. Win. Mitchell Note, supra note 87, at 420.
91. FED. R. Evw. 606(b), Advisory Committee's Note.
92. FED. R. Evm. 606(b).
93. The Model Code of Evidence Rule 301 (1942) and Uniform Rule of Evidence 41 (1953)
adopted the Iowa approach.
94. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 917 (1976).
Note, though, that under rule 606(b) a juror may not testify in support of his verdict except
on grounds involving extraneous information or outside influence, although this was allowed
under both the Mansfield and Iowa rules. Win. Mitchell Note, supra note 87, at 431. This seems
to be a response to a prior Supreme Court concern that "[f]reedom of debate might be stifled
and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots
were to be freely published to the world." Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (Car-
dozo, J.). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1976) (crime to record or eavesdrop on a federal jury).
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Mattox v. United States" had allowed impeachment based on the ex-
traneous information and outside influence provided by a newspaper's
and a bailiff's comments. However, Hyde v. United States" had dis-
allowed impeachment of a (somewhat obvious) compromise verdict, and
McDonald v. Pless97 had rejected affidavits alleging a quotient verdict.
Thus, the federal courts had never adopted the more liberal versions
of the Iowa rule.
Under rule 606(b), impeachment has been refused in cases allegedly
involving quotient verdicts, mistake, compromise verdicts, compromise
for personal reasons, pressures by one juror upon another, nonunanimi-
ty, ignoring instructions, and sleeping.98 The same can be expected in
alleged cases of drunkenness, intrajury wagers or coercion, and chance
verdicts.9 9 Only such things as clearly within rule 606(b) as unauthorized
jury views or experiments, bribe attempts, and prejudicial statements
by nonjurors are grounds for impeachment.00
Several Supreme Court cases in the past two decades have clouded
the status of the nonimpeachment rule in criminal cases.l' Assuming,
as seems likely, that the nonimpeachment rule will not be wholly dis-
carded, the question remains-how can the nonimpeachment rule be
reconciled with the ideal of individualism? The answer is that the
nonimpeachment rule, in its strict form and as embodied by rule 606(b),
cannot be. The goal of individualism is to achieve jury legitimacy, ac-
curacy, and justice. One function of the nonimpeachment rule is to
deny relief to wronged litigants and to cover up the fact that juries
often, and perhaps inevitably, violate the rule of individualism via com-
promise, quotient, and chance verdicts. Some scholars say, "If it is
true-as it well may be-that few verdicts could withstand a test which
vigorously requires every juryman to perform his function ideally, then
See Marquette Note, supra note 89, at 261, for the genesis of this statute. See also KALvEN
& ZEisEL, supra note 3, at vi-vii.
95. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
96.-225 U.S. 347 (1912).
97. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
98. Mueller, supra note 85, at 936-40 (citing cases).
99. Id. at 930; Win. Mitchell Note, supra note 87, at 427.
100. "The premise on which Rule 606(b) and its common law counterparts seem to be based
is that the jury system must be protected, even at the expense of individual litigants." Wm.
Mitchell Note, supra note 87, at 439. "Generally, it seems better to draw [the line] in favor
of juror privacy; in the heat of juror debate all kinds of statements may be made which have
little effect on outcome, though taken out of context they seem damning and absurd." 3 J.
WEINsTM.N & M. BERGER, WEINsTEIN'S EVIDENCE 606[04], at 606-36 (1978).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 254-258. Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)
(a state's interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders cannot be used to prevent
a defendant from impeaching a witness for possible bias). The Supreme Court has made clear
that the defendant has a right to a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the
evidence before it, and that the defendant must have the opportunity to prove actual bias of
a juror through impeachment. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-18 (1982).
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the system should not be preserved by forcibly concealing that fact."'' 0
This approach assumes that when noble ideals and an imperfect world
conflict, the proper response is to relinquish the ideals. It is difficult
to see what would be gained by acknowledging jury collectivism and
compromise. The foreseeable result would be an emasculation of the
admonitory power of the individualism ideal and an increase in the
incidence of improper verdicts. The net price of less hypocrisy would
be more injustice.
A better approach is to reassess the nonimpeachment rule with the
goal of preserving the ideal of individualism. The nonimpeachment
rule has a legal value (protection of the deliberative process by en-
couraging juror candor) and an extralegal value (finality of verdicts
and preventing post-verdict harassment of jurors). Both values are clearly
promoted by the exclusion of evidence of the thought processes of a
single juror. As the court in Perry v. Bailey'3 explained:
Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the personal con-
sciousness of one juror should be received to overthrow the ver-
dict, because being personal it is not accessible to other testimony.
It gives to the secret thought of one the power to disturb the ex-
pressed conclusion of twelve. Its tendency is to induce bad faith
on the part of the minority, to induce an apparent acquiescence
with the purpose of subsequent dissent; to induce tampering with
individual jurors subsequent to the verdict." 4
However, this rationale is less persuasive when applied to the flaws
in the deliberative process typified by chance, quotient, and compromise
verdicts.05 The hallmark of these improper verdicts is an agreement
among the jurors to delegate decision-making responsibility. The agree-
ment is an objective fact, rather than a subjective state of mind, and
is easily verified or denied by other members of the jury.' 6 Denying
impeachment in these cases in order to protect juror candor is senseless
because the deliberative process has already been subverted. Post-verdict
harassment of jurors can be controlled by the court, either by strictly
limiting the time in which a verdict may be challenged"7 or by requir-
102. F. JAmEs & G. HAZARD, Crvu. PROCEDURE § 7.19, at 310-11 (2d ed. 1977).
103. 12 Kan. 415 (1874).
104. Id. at 419.
105. Case Comment, Avoiding Collateral Estoppel Through Proof of Jury Compromise: Katz
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 MINN. L. REv. 983 (1981), discussing Katz v. Eli Ully & Co., 84 F.R.D.
378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (permitting deposition of a juror to establish compromise verdict and to
avoid use of verdict as collateral estoppel). See also supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
106. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210-11 (1866).
107. The Supreme Court suggested that the defendant's only opportunity to establish juror
bias would be at a hearing immediately after the verdict was rendered. Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
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ing independent evidence that an improper verdict has been rendered
before allowing juror impeachment."8 The remaining value protected
by the nonimpeachment rule, verdict finality, while important, simply
cannot be allowed to overshadow all other competing interests.'09
In sum, both the ideal of individualism and the nonimpeachment
rule are designed to promote the integrity of the jury system. When
the abuses the nonimpeachment rule is intended to prevent can be par-
tially controlled by other.means, the nonimpeachment rule should be
modified to conform to the ideal of individualism.
Jury Justice: Nullification
The second great theme of the theory of the jury is "jury justice,"
or the power of the jury to nullify the law in certain circumstances.
Unlike the ideal of individualism, jury nullification is not concerned
with the way in which verdicts are rendered, but instead is concerned
that they conform to our notions of essential fairness."0 When the
statute or common law rule is harsh, or when the prosecution is unfair
under the circumstances, the jury will refuse to honor the law and in-
stead will mete out justice consistent with community standards.
There is a great deal of sentimentalism in the legal literature for
this secret ameliorative function of the jury, tapping as it does the
American democratic mythos of the splendor of the common man and
mollifying lawyers' fears that the inflexible system of rules they have
created is insensitive to justice. Professor Wigmore explained the func-
tion of the jury as follows:
Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict....
Law-the rule-must be enforced-the exact terms of the rule,
justice or no justice. ... Now this is where the jury comes in. The
jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of
law to the justice of the particular case .... It supplies that flex-
ibility of legal rules-which is essential to justice and popular content-
ment.... The jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are the in-
dispensable elements in popular justice."'
Jury nullification is made possible by the general verdict. As Professor
Moore explained:
108. See, e.g., Farter v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54 (1853). See cases cited in note 82 supra.
109. See supra note 78.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 113-115. The purpose of jury nullification should be
compared to the role of the ideal of individualism. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 21-25, 51.
111. Wigmore, A Program For the Trial of Jury Trial [sic], 12 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 166, 170
(1929). Accord, Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM L. REv. 12, 18-19 (1910).
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[T]he general verdict, at times, achieves a triumph of justice over
law. The jury is not, nor should it become, a scientific fact finding
body. Its chief value is that it applies the "law," oftentimes a body
of technical and refined theoretical principles and sometimes edged
with harshness, in an earthy fashion that comports with "justice"
as conceived by the masses, for whom after all the law is mainly
meant to serve. The general verdict is the answer from the man
on the street.'2
The Supreme Court has often said that the purpose of trial by jury
in criminal cases is to provide a community buffer, "the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment
of a group of laymen. . .""I The jury serves as a safeguard against
arbitrary law enforcement,"" the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor,
the compliant, the biased or eccentric judge,'" and harsh laws.
Historically, the nullification power of the jury has sometimes been
confused with the purported right of the jury to decide issues of law
as well as of fact.'" The nullification power was permanently established
in Bushell's Case,"7 which held that jurors could not be punished for
"unlawfully" acquitting. The "mercy dispensing""' function of the
jury has not been seriously questioned since.'"
The first cases to assert the jury's "right" to nullify the law were
libel prosecutions. Under British law, the jury was not permitted to
return a general verdict but was compelled to return a special verdict
112. 5A J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MoORE's FEDERAl. PRACTICE 49.05, at 2235-36 (2d ed. 1977).
See Editorial Note, Special Verdicts and Interrogatories, 30 U. CIN. L. REv. 208, 210 n.5 (1961)
(quoting language identical to the 1950 edition) [hereinafter cited as Cincinnati Editorial Note].
113. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
114. Id. at 87; Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
115. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968). It has been argued that cases like Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), prove
that the Supreme Court views the jury not as primarily a guarantor of accuracy but rather as
a political actor. Note, Trial By Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 419 (1969).
Defendants cannot be denied their right to trial by jury even if the facts and the law are un-
disputed. "[Tihe jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts."
Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (dictum). Defendants
in such cases "are entitled to hear, if they wish, the verdict from a jury of their peers rather
than from the court and to hope, however irrationally, for acquittal." United States v. Davis,
413 F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1969). A directed verdict of guilty is always improper. United States
v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970).
116. Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 L. & CON-
TEMP. PRoBs. 51, 55-56 (Autumn 1980).
117. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
118. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 116, at 55.
119. Therefore, the right to a jury verdict in a criminal case cannot be denied even when
the facts and the law are conceded. See cases cited in supra note 115.
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on issues like publication, which were usually not contested.'0 The
judge, applying the harsh law of the day, then convicted. This unique
procedure was finally overturned in 1792 in Fox's Libel Act,' 2' which
was much emulated in America. 2
In the early days of the United States, there was no professional
judiciary. Consequently, the jury was universally afforded the right
to interpret the law in criminal cases, but not the right to rule on
evidence or constitutional validity.'23 This right to interpret was im-
plemented unstintingly. In half the states, there could be no reversal
of a jury conviction, contrary to the law or facts, of a felony.'2 In
the first jury case tried before the United States Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Jay instructed the jury on the law, then added, "But it must
be observed that by the same law . . . you have nevertheless a right
to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law
as well as the fact in controversy.'' 2 5
During the nineteenth century, the right to decide questions of law
was, in state after state, taken from the jury and given to the trial
judge.'2 6 The coup de grace to the jury's "right" was applied in the
120. See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 289,
329 (1966).
121. 32 Geo. 3, ch. 60 (1792). See Henderson, supra note 120, at 333.
122. The constitutions and statutes of twenty-three states guarantee the jury's right to judge
both fact and law in criminal libel cases. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No,
45 So. CAL. L. REV. 168, 204,(1972).
123. See the comments of Reps. Smith, Bayard, and Gallatin in the Sedition Law debates,
8 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 2135 et seq. (1798), quoted in Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law,
52 HARv. L. REv. 582, 586-87 (1939). Under the Sedition Law, Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat.
596, "the jury who shall try the cause shall have a right to determine the law and the fact,
under the direction of the court, as in other cases." See also 2 LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
253-55 (C.F. Adams ed. 1856) (diary entry of Feb. 12, 1771), quoted in Howe, supra, at 605.
It has been said that the jury's right to interpret the law was excellent, protecting the citizen
against the judge, whereas the "right" to invalidate statutes constitutionally was unsupportable
because there the antagonist was the legislature. See Simson, Jury Nullification in the American
System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REv. 488, 499-504 (1976). It is probable, however, that
when the jury was bent on letting the defendant off, it cared little under what rubric it did
so. The distinction may have been important when the issue was one of the relevance of evidence
or argument. See in this regard the dramatic story of Samuel Dexter and the case of United
States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614 (D.C.D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). Defying threats of
jail for contempt, Dexter argued the unconstitutionality of the Embargo Act of 1807 to the jury
and gained an "unlawful" acquittal. L. SARGENT ("SIOMA"), REMINISCENCES OF SAMUEL DEXTER
60-61 (1857), quoted in Howe, supra, at 605-06. Joseph Story, the losing attorney, may have
been negatively influenced by this spectacle. See Howe, supra, at 605 n.92. See infra note 126.
124. Henderson, supra note 120, at 325 (citing cases). But a new trial could be ordered in
most (but not all) states where a civil verdict or misdemeanor conviction was contrary to the
law or the facts. Id. at 313-15, 325.
125. Georgia v. Bralsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
126. The process is detailed in Howe, supra note 123, at 590-613. The turning point probably
was marked by United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545)
(Story, Circuit Justice) (charging that the jurors never "have the moral right to decide the law
according to their own notions, or pleasure").
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case of Sparf v. United States27 in 1895. Two defendants convicted
of murder argued that the jury had been improperly instructed when
told by the trial court that jury members had the duty to follow the
law as stated by the court.'28 The Supreme Court, in rejecting the ap-
peal, reasoned that as jurors were not permitted to create crimes or
to increase penalties, they could not reduce penalties or nullify the law.'2 9
The issue of jury nullification then lay more or less dormant until
the 1960s, when the right to a jury instruction on the jury's right or
power to interpret or nullify the law was urged on behalf of political
dissidents and antiwar defendants."'3 The right to such an instruction
was premised on an actual right of the jury to disregard the law in
the appropriate case. The nearly unanimous judicial response has been
to deny the right to the requested instruction on the theory that the
jury has no right to nullify the law, but merely an uncheckable power
to do so."' The jury has a duty to uphold the law and should be so
instructed, say the courts.2
The duty/power distinction seems correct.'13 Certainly, a right can-
127. 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (7-2 on this issue).
128. Id. at 63.
129. Id. at 74.
130. It seems that the goal of this tactic was probably more to capitalize on one or two jurors'
ideological or racial solidarity with the defendant and hang the jury than to convince all the
jurors and gain acquittal.
131. Judge Bazelon believes that the jury can be trusted to act responsibly even when given
a nullification instruction. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 113, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argues that the jurors' sympathy for the
defendant will often be balanced by their needs to see justice done and, therefore, acquittals
will not be excessive. Id.
132. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("D.C. Nine");
United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970);
United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1005-07 (4th Cir.) ("Catonsville 9"), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 910 (1969).
The states are similarly loath to instruct on nullification, even where the state constitution
preserves the jury's right to decide questions of law. Compare LA. CONSr. art. XIX, § 9 (con-
stitution of 1921-no counterpart today) with Slovenko, Control Over the Jury Verdict in Loui-
siana Criminal Law, 10 LA. L. REv. 657, 663 (1960) (typical Louisiana charge was: "While you
are the exclusive judges of both the law and the facts, it is your duty to take the law as I charge
it to you"). Compare IND. CoNsT. art. I, § 19, with Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d
118 (1957) ("We have no intention of extending ... this anachronistic doctrine"; proper not
to charge jury that it has the right to ignore the instructions). Maryland hews more closely to
the spirit of MD. CONST. art. XV, § 5, instructing that the judge's comments on the law are
"not binding upon you," but adding, "We do advise you that you shouldn't apply the law
as you think it ought to be or what it should be, but what, in fact, it is in this case." Hamilton
v. State, 12 Md. App. 91, 277 A.2d 460 (1971), afJ'd, 265 Md. 256, 288 A.2d 885 (1972). The
Indiana and Maryland constitutions are the only ones that still make the jury the judge of the law.
133. See The King v. The Dean of St. Asaph, 100 Eng. Rep. 657, 661 (K.B. 1784) (Mansfield,
L.J.) ("It is the duty of the Judge, in all cases upon general issues, to tell the jury how to
do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter between God and
their own consciences.") (in the context of an attack on jury justice).
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not be said to follow from the mere existence of a power.'34 For exam-
ple, the jury also has the uncheckable power to daydream during the
presentation of the case or to acquit because the prosecutor has an-
noying mannerisms, but no one would seriously contend that the jury
has the right to do so.
More important, jury nullification poses the same problem as that
presented by improper verdicts'35 : the general verdict may legitimize
jury misconduct by disguising it under the cloak of legal forms.' 3 6 That
is, the jury may disregard the law, not from any commitment to a
community standard of justice but from sheer caprice. Distinguishing
between capricious and principled disregard for the law is virtually im-
possible under the general verdict.
Moreover, the appeal of nullification is very much dependent on
which law is being nullified. There is general agreement oday that juries
were right in refusing to enforce harsh libel laws,'37 in finding thefts
of less than forty shillings when greater thefts were punishable by
death,'38 in preventing the British from routing all shipping through
their own ports via colonial shipping acts, 39 or in refusing to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Law.' ° On the other.hand, those laws all had their
supporters, and the verdict of history is not yet in on modern nullifica-
tions of some antidiscriminatory and sumptuary laws.'4 ' The issue seems
to reduce to whose ox is being gored. Finding the relevant "commun-
ity" can also be a.problem, particularly when a law vindicating a broad
national interest is applied against a local favorite' 2 or interest.
Because the jury's power to nullify necessarily rests upon such vague
134. Contra, Scheflin, supra note 122, at 197.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 22-75.
136. See infra text accompanying 149. Without instructions to the contrary, the general ver-
dict encourages patchwork verdicts; special verdicts can prevent patchwork verdicts, improper
verdicts, and jury nullifidation. It should be noted that a jury agreeing in a patchwork manner
that a defendant was "negligent" might decide that community justice dictated a verdict for
plaintiff even if instructed that the law forbade it. See Dudnik, Special Verdids: Rule 49 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 483, 500 (1965); Ginsburg, Special Findings
and Jury Unanimit, in the Federal Courts, 65 CoLTJM. L. RE,. .256, 268 (1965).
137. Rex v. Zenger, 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (N.Y. 1735); J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NAa-
RATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (S. Katz 2d ed. 1972) (verbatim account).
138. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F,2d 1113, 1137 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Slovenko,
supra note 132, at 702. See also KALVEN & ZEtsEt, supra, note 3, at 310-11 (other capital crimes
in England).
139. Scheflin, supra note 122, at 174.
140. Id. at 177.
141. E.g., Title VII or prohibition. See KALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 286-97, 306-10.
142. For example, consider the acquittal of farmer Wayne Cryts of criminal contempt for retaking
his grain in violation of a court order, and the hometown acquittal of former House member
Otto Passman on tax evasion and conspiracy charges. See N.Y. Times, June 3, 1983, A16 col.
6; N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1979, Al, col. 1.
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standards as the individual juror's conscience or the community's sense
of justice,'43 judges are reluctant to upset the delicate and generally
satisfactory balance that has evolved under the no-instruction rule.",
In truly outrageous cases the jury will nullify, but instances of nullifica-
tion are rare enough that the course of law enforcement is not im-
peded. Judge Leventhal warned "the way the jury operates may be
radically altered if there is alteration in the way it is told to operate."'1
4 5
The incidence of jury nullification might increase,'4 6 and the focus at
trial could shift away from an inquiry into the facts and law of the
case to a wrangling over the appropriate community standard.'4 7
In sum, legal theorists believe that both the ideal of indivdualism
and jury justice must be kept secret lest the effectiveness of the jury
be undermined. The difference is that individualism, although approved,
is considered impractical, whereas there is a fundamental ambivalence
about jury nullification for the reasons discussed above. In practice,
the power to nullify is kept secret from the jury and exercise of the
power is masked by the general verdict and nonimpeachment rule.
Devices Limiting Jury Justice
A broad range of restrictive devices is available to judges who fear
the jury's power and inclination to take the law into its own hands.'14
The main importance of these devices to this article is that they have
been the major methods by which patchwork verdict problems, i.e.,
the question of which issues require jury unanimity, have been revealed
in the past. If patchwork verdicts are disapproved, special verdicts and
interrogatories are the most likely means of enforcing the ban on
nonunanimity. '
4 9
143. Jury nullification has been described as "an unworkable and essentially irresponsible theory
... born of anarchy and destructive of democracy and any other form of government with
justice under law." McBride, The Jury Is Not a Political Institution, 11 JUDGES J. 37, 38 (April
1972). For a contrary view, see M. KADISH & S. KADIsH, DiSCRETION To DisoaEY 55-56 (1973).
144. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
145. Id. at 1135.
146. Id. at 1134.
147. If nullification were to become a legitimate issue in a case, evidence relevant to it would
be admissible. This could expand the length of trials enormously because the issue is the morality
of the law in comparison to social reality, as opposed to a relatively narrow point of statutory
interpretation. See Comment, Jury Nullification and the Pro Se Defense: The Impact of Dougherty
v. United States, 21 U. KAN. L. Rav. 47, 63 (1972).
148. For example, instructions on the law; the right to exclude certain evidence; the power
to direct a verdict or grant J.N.O.V. or a new trial; the power to impose a suspended sentence;
and appellate reversal of the judgment.
149. Consider the negligence case posited in the first paragraph of this article. If the jury
had to answer the questions "Was D drunk?" and "Was D speeding?", facts sufficient to give
P the verdict would not be established unless the jury unanimously agreed on a yes answer to
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Special Verdicts
The special verdict, a procedure available in civil but generally not
in criminal cases/s° requires that the jury answer questions about the
facts at issue in the case rather than rendering a general verdict. The
trial judge then determines the law and applies that law to the facts
as found. ' I
Special verdicts are a means of taking the actual determination of
the case away from the jury and giving it to the judge.' In the eigh-
teenth century, the decision to use the special verdict form was made
by counsel,'5 3 but today it is made by the court.'5I Until the last half-
century, special verdicts were not widely used, despite their ancient
lineage and their availability in most jurisdictions,"' because the pro-
cedure was so risky. The common law, which the Supreme Court fol-
lowed, demanded that each and every fact required to support a general
verdict be specially found. Verdicts could not stand if the special ver-
dicts were ambiguous, if conclusions of law or evidentiary facts rather
than ultimate facts were found, or if any key facts were omitted.5 6
Deficiencies in special verdicts could not be cured by the factual find-
ings of the trial court because no formal waiver of trial by jury had
been made on those issues.'"
one of the specifications of negligence. And this is true even if a patchwork verdict on "negligence"
could have been reached in the absence of the special verdicts. On the other hand, a special
verdict question no more specific than "Was D negligent?" encourages or discourages a patch-
work verdict no more than a general verdict would.
150. See infra text at notes 190-192.
151. Special verdicts do not violate constitutional guarantees of trial by jury in civil cases.
Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897); Udell v. Citizens' St. R.R., 152
Ind. 507, 52 N.E. 799 (1899).
152. Special verdicts were originally developed as a means for jurors, sua sponte, to avoid
the risks of penalties for attaint by requiring that the judge make the actual decision in the
case. The Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 30 (1286), codified the common law special
verdict practice. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 257 (1920).
153. Henderson, supra note 120, at 307-08.
154. "With the obsolescence of attaint, the special verdict and the general verdict with special
answers gradually changed from protective devices into tools by which judges could gain more
control over the application of rules of law." Dudnik, supra note 136, at 486. See infra text
accompanying notes 163-171.
155. Special verdicts were known in at least ten of the states and in the federal courts in
the early Republic. Henderson, supra note 120, at 310. For similar devices used in that day
to keep the jury from dealing with questions of law, see id. at 305-06 (special case, or case
reserved); Sunderland, supra note 152, at 255-56 (demurrer to the evidence).
The special verdict eventually spread to every state except Mississippi but was rarely used.
Note, Trial Procedure-The Special Verdict in Civil Cases, 48 Ky. L.J. 440, 441 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Kentucky Note]. It has at times been mandatory, or mandatory upon request, in some
states. See also Staton, The Special Verdict as an Aid to the Jury in Civil Cases, 16 A.B.A.J.
192 (1930) (summarizing the actual state of special verdict practice in twenty-two states).
156. Graham v. Bayne, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 60, 63 (1855).
157. Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 411-12 (1882).
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Before the 1930s, only Wisconsin, Texas, and North Carolina regu-
larly utilized special verdicts.'58 A breakthrough came with the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly rule 49(a).
The rule made the use of special verdicts a matter of discretion for
the trial judge'59 and cleared up most of the pitfalls posed by the com-
mon law. Rule 49(a) provides that all issues not properly found by
the jury are deemed to be found by the judge in such a way as to
support the judgment. Moreover, the parties are deemed to have waived
trial by jury on all issues not covered by the special verdict unless an
objection was made before the questions were submitted to the jury. 6°
Federal judges are given great leeway in deciding whether to request
findings of evidentiary or ultimate fact.'6' Despite rule 49(a), special
verdicts are still relatively rare because of judicial habit and a continu-
ing appreciation for the general verdict. 6"
A number of advantages have been claimed for the special verdict.63
158. 9 C. WRioHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2501, at 485-86 (1971).
But North Carolina's questions were so broad as to produce "little more than a general verdict
whose framework has been laid bare." Kentucky Note, supra note 155, at 449-50. The Texas
system erred in the opposite direction, growing so technical and complex as to cause great
dissatisfaction. See, e.g., Guinn, The Jury System and Special Verdicts, 2 ST. MARY's L.J. 175,
175, 178, 181 (1970); Green, Blindfolding the Jury: 11, 33 TEx. L. REv. 273, 278 (1955). The
Texas system was reformed in the 1970s. See Note, Civil Procedure-Texas Speci'l Issue Practice-
Rule Change Broadens the Permissible Scope of Special Issues, 52 TEx. L. Ray. 376, 376-77
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Texas Note].
159. "There appears to have been no case where a trial judge was reversed for abuse of dis-
cretion in deciding whether to resort to Rule 49.' R. FmD & B. KAPx.AN, CrnL PtOCEDURE
525 (3d ed. 1973). Accord, Wright, Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.1A.D. 199,
203 (1965) (approving leeway). See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 67 (2d Cir.)
(Frank, J.) (a trial judge may refuse "for any reason or no reason whatever" to order a special
verdict), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
The watchword in rule 49 practice is that "in almost every particular of implementation a
virtually unfettered discretion is left in the trial judge." Dudnik, supra note 136, at 506; Dudnik
does not approve. Id. at 518-22.
160. E.g., Columbia Horse & Mule Comm'n Co. v. American Ins. Corp., 173 F.2d 773 (6th
Cir. 1949) (special verdict said only that 34 mules were burned, not 43 as claimed; judge had
power to make finding of willful material misrepresentation and enter defense judgment). But
note that when a jury fails to answer a special verdict question, trial by jury on the issue is
not waived, so the judge can do nothing but send the jury back or grant a new trial. Kentucky
Note, supra note 155, at 452.
161. Dudnik, supra note 136, at 502-03. The distinction among evidentiary facts, ultimate
facts, mixed questions of law and fact, and conclusions of law was always unclear. Id. at 510.
See also Wright, supra note 159, at 203-04; Clark, Pleading Negligence, 32 YALE L.J. 483, 484-85
(1923); Ginsburg, supra note 136, at 259; Cincinnati Editorial Note, supra note 112, at 214.
There is strong sentiment for keeping federal special verdict practice clear of this morass. See
Driver, A More Extended Use of the Special Verdict, 9 F.R.D. 495, 500 (1950); Wright, supra
at 204.
162. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338, 350 (1968); Driver,
supra note 161, at 496-97 (habit only); Wright, supra note 159, at 200-02. The special verdict
seems more popular with appellate courts than with trial courts. See, e.g., Weymouth v. Col-
orado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 93 n.31 (5th Cir. 1966).
163. See generally Dudnik, supra note 136, at 490-99; Kentucky Note, supra note 155, at 443-45.
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First, juries have difficulty understanding the law as given to them
in the instructions. As a result, even the most honest jury will often
decide the case incorrectly.16 4 The special verdict eliminates the need
for instructions and, consequently, the need for the jury to grapple
with the meaning of the law. Second, special verdicts prevent the jury
from deciding the case in an arbitrary or capricious manner 16S by focus-
ing jurors' attention on reporting the facts accurately rather than on
responding to appeals for sympathy.' Even if juries have a fair idea
of the consequences of certain factual findings, the public nature of
the special verdict makes manipulation of the facts more difficult than
manipulation of the general verdict.'67 Moreover, compromise verdicts
are discouraged because it is more difficult to finalize several com-
promises than to reach one all-inclusive compromise.6 As honesty in
fact-finding increases, so does public confidence in the jury system.
6 9
Finally, special verdicts reduce the costs of the judicial system. The
elimination of instructions saves both in-court and out-of-court time.
Also, special verdicts help to pinpoint judicial error. If a mistake is
made in the application of the law to the findings of the special ver-
164. This point is valid even if part of the blame lies with judges who frame or deliver instruc-
tions inadequately. Moreover, some areas of the law are so complex that special verdicts are
all but essential. See, e.g., Finz, Does the Trend in Our Substantive Law Dictate an Expanded
Use of the Special T'erdict?, 37 ALBANY L. Ray. 229 (1973) (discussing Wisconsin-style com-
parative negligence law). Some commentators note that verdicts in algorithmic form help guide
the jury, and that the jury appreciates the guidance and does not feel influenced toward any
particular result. Strawn, Buchanan, Pryor & Taylor, Reaching a Verdict, Step-By-Step, 60
JUDICATURE 383, 388-89 (1977).
165. This is the dark side of jury justice and has been criticized harshly. See, e.g., Skidmore
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948); J. FRANxt,
CouRTs ON TRIAL 130, 132 (1949).
166. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 61-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
816 (1948); McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 27 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'y 84, 88 (1943). "Where contributory negligence is a complete defense, as it is in Kentucky,
there is a strong likelihood that special verdicts will produce more decisions for the defendant
in negligence actions.... [T]he same result should be reached under general verdicts, if properly
rendered." Kentucky Note, supra note 155, at 455 (emphasis in original).
167. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir.) (citing G. Clementson, Special
Verdicts and Findings by Juries 15 (1905)) cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948). Accord, Driver,
The Special Verdict: Theory and Practice, 26 WASH. L. REv. 21, 24 (1951) ("I have reason to
believe also that while many jurors will complacently acquiesce in a general verdict they are
much more hesitant about subscribing to a special verdict fact finding which they think is not
supported by the evidence.").
168. Driver, supra note 167, at 24. But see Dudnik, supra note 136, at 499 (granted that reaching
several compromises is more difficult, failure to do so will result in a hung jury and negate
the efficiency advantages of special verdicts).
169. The general verdict has been called "as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as .,.
the ancient oracle of Delphi" and "the great procedural opiate." Sunderland, supra note 152,
at 258, 262. But see Dudnik, supra note 136, at 497 (opiates and curtains such as the general
verdict are good if they preserve public confidence in the law).
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dict, the law can be properly applied on remand without the need for
costly retrial of the facts.170 If an error is made regarding the evidence,
the special verdict may show the error to be harmless by showing that
the jury found in favor of the aggrieved party on that issue, even though
the case was decided against him on other grounds."'
The major criticism of the special verdict is that the goal of eliminating
jury nullification is undesirable and/or that special verdicts are inef-
fective in reaching that goal. Even if the special verdict is successful
in making the legal system more efficient and scientific, Justice Holmes's
observation is apt: "[I]t is unwise to make the law more scientific,
if, in the process, it becomes less just."'72 The power of this simple
observation is strengthened by the fact that even the staunchest sup-
porters of special verdicts concede that general verdicts and jury justice
are desirable on the criminal side.'73
There is no evidence that concern over public exposure actually in-
duces jurors to respond differently to special verdicts than they would
to a general verdict, or that the ordering of a special verdict removes
the influence of emotion, prejudice, and impatience. '1' If the jury knows
which party it wants to win and the legal effect of its answers, it can
still easily "take the law into its own hands merely by checking off
the answers which will lead to the result it favors.""' This possibility
leads some judges to protect the theoretical purity of the special ver-
dict by keeping the jury ignorant of the effect of its answers.'76 However,
as Chief Judge Brown noted:
In this day and time with advanced education and advocacy of
such a highly developed and demonstrative state, it is little short
170. Error in the instructions preceding a general verdict, on the other hand, would require
retrial. Brown, supra note 162, at 342. The trial judge may also avoid this problem by ordering
special verdicts on each proffered theory of the law, and thus obtain answers that will obviate
any remand or retrial. Id.
171. If a general verdict is used, the error would be presumed to be prejudicial, necessitating
retrial. Id. at 347. See also Texas Note, supra note 158, at 384 n.35.
172. 0. HoLus, CoLLEcTED LEGAL PAPEas 237-38 (1920), quoted in Wright, supra note 159,
at 201. It is worth noting that the major adherents of special verdicts were commentators iden-
tified with the legal realist movement, which was often criticized for valuing efficiency too highly.
See Dudnik, supra note 136, at 488. Compare Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d at
67 (Frank, J.) (special verdicts or interrogatories should be mandatory in every civil case), with
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. 861,
867-68 (1963) (statement of Black & Douglas, JJ.) (to assure jury freedom, rule 49 should be
repealed).
173. See Sunderland, supra note 152, at 260-61. See also Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
167 F.2d 54, 70 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J., concurring), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
174. Dudnik, supra note 136, at 492.
175. Id. at 493.
176. Thedorf v. Lipsey, 237 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir. 1956); McCourtie v. United States Steel
Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 93 N.W.2d 552 (1958). See Dudnik, supra note 136, at 514.
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of insulting to the jurors-more so to the lawyers and most of
all to the Judges who report such Shibboleths-to think that a juror
will not have a good idea of the effect of his answer."'
The situation is worse when a result-oriented jury is mistaken as to
the legal effect and gives recklessly false answers to the detriment of
the party intended to be benefited.178
Special verdicts appear to have no great advantage over the general
verdict in the area of jury justice. Time will tell whether their other
virtues are sufficient to overcome the profession's and the public's
familiarity with and respect for the general verdict.
Special Interrogatories
The use of special interrogatories is a less radical method of achiev-
ing some of the goals of special verdicts. The jury returns a traditional
general verdict, but also makes one or several special findings of fact.
Special interrogatories grew out of the habit of some common law judges
of quizzing juries returning unexpected verdicts about their reasons.79
Today, the order to answer interrogatories is given before, not after,
the general verdict is returned, and is authorized in most states and
in the federal courts.80 The judge can pose as few or as many inter-
rogatories as he wishes. No objection can be made about a judge's
failure to submit an issue to the jury for special findings because, in
contrast with the special verdict, trial by jury is not thereby lost on
the issue. The general verdict is deemed to include findings on all facts
necessary to support the judgment.'
Special interrogatories can, like special verdicts, prevent patchwork
verdicts by demanding that the jury unite on a single theory.' 2 A prob-
lem arises when the jury returns a general verdict but hangs on the
interrogatories. Usually, the verdict will not be accepted because it ap-
pears to show on its face a disregard for the law. However, if the
unanswered interrogatories are immaterial (i.e., if a patchwork verdict
is acceptable), the general verdict will stand.1 3
177. Brown, supra note 162, at 341.
178. Dudnik, supra note 136, at 494.
179. See, e.g., Note, Special Verdicts and Interrogatories to Jury, 12 Wyo. L.J. 280, 281 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Wyoming Note].
180. Comment, Special Findings and General Verdicts-The Reconciliation Doctrine, 18 U.
Cm. L. REv. 321, 323 n.10 (1951) (authorized in 32 states; mandatory to some extent in 7)
[hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment]. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 49(b).
181. Wyoming Note, supra note 179, at 282. But some state statutes require interrogatories
on all ultimate facts.
182. See supra note 149.
183. Annot., 155 A.L.R. 586, 587, 590, 595 (1945). See also Recent Developments, Discretion
of a Federal Trial Judge to Writhdraw Special Interrogatories, 14 STAN. L. Ray. 395 (1962) (im-
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One argument made in support of special interrogatories is that they
retain the institution of the general verdict but "test" the verdict to
detect abuses.'4 In the event of an irreconcilable conflict between the
general verdict and the interrogatories, the judge will enter judgment
on the interrogatories, ignoring the general verdict.'85 However, judges'
ingenuity in reconciliation has had the effect of curtailing the testing
effect of special interrogatories.' At one time, the testing function
of the special interrogatory was believed to require findings of ultimate
fact. The technicalities and risk involved in using interrogatories have
largely been eliminated in federal practice.'87
Like special verdicts, interrogatories focus the jury's attention on
the important factual issues and its duty to decide the case according
to those facts and the law. Thus, interrogatories imply a middle posi-
tion on jury justice-the general verdict is retained, but the procedure
followed tends to reduce prejudice and emotion in the decision-making
process. As with special verdicts, the effectiveness of special inter-
proper to withdraw from deadlocked jury if material).
A determination that the unanswered interrogatories were material can be restated as a finding
that a patchwork verdict was not permissible on the issue. The validity of a patchwork verdict
was squarely in issue, but not decided, in Arkansas Midland R.R. v. Canman, 52 Ark. 517,
13 S.W. 280 (1890). The jury hung on all interrogatories inquiring about particular acts of
negligence, but reported a patchwork verdict and general verdict of "negligence." Civil patch-
work verdict cases are discussed infra in notes 276-321 and accompanying text. Examples of criminal
patchwork verdicts are: Borum v. United States, 284 U.S. 596 (1932); Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546,
337 A.2d 81 (1975) (described supra in note 72).
184. E.g., Dudnik, supra note 136, at 501.
185. This is only done if the general verdict and the interrogatories are totally irreconcilable.
See Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) (reconciling findings that defendant
was negligent and that the injury was unforeseeable; judgment for plaintiff affirmed); Mayer
v. Petzelt, 311 F.2d 601,603 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 936 (1963); Theurer v. Holland
Furnace Co., 124 F.2d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1941).
If the jury finds the facts truly, its general verdict will be upheld if it applies the law correctly.
It will be overturned by the judge if it applies the law incorrectly and the findings conflict with
the general verdict. This is fundamentally no different than the treatment afforded to special
verdicts when the facts are found correctly; there, the judge correctly applies the law to the
findings and enters judgment accordingly. However, because courts go to great lengths to recon-
cile inconsistencies between interrogatories and the general verdict, the presence of a general
verdict could create a difference in final outcome in some unusual cases.
186. Chicago Comment, supra note 180, at 329, referring to McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry.,
152 Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138 (1949) (reconciling finding that the strain and excitement of
the driving conditions caused decedent's death with general verdict for defendant in workmen's
compensation case). See supra note 185 (citing cases).
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) has given the trial judge great leeway in his choice of the form
of interrogatories. They need only present an "issue of fact," which covers not only ultimate
facts but also evidentiary facts and mixed questions of law and fact. Cincinnati Editorial Note,
supra note 112, at 224-25. See Kissell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Elevator Div., 367 F.2d
375 (1st Cir. 1966) (mixed-question interrogatory proper). And note that rule 49(b) contemplates
posing overlapping interrogatories the answers to which might "test" each other for consistency
or conflict. Dudnik, supra note 136, at 517. This is improper in some states.
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rogatories in reducing jury lawlessness depends on the jury's willingness
to dissemble on direct questions and its knowledge of the effect of
its findings of fact."'8
The main advantage of the special interrogatory is its flexibility. The
retention of the general verdict allows the jury to apply the law. As
the judge has the discretion to determine the number and form of the
questions to be posed, he can control the impact the interrogatories
are to have in each case.
18 9
Special Findings in Criminal Cases
Whatever the merits of special verdicts and interrogatories in civil
cases, it is widely agreed that special verdicts are improper in criminal
cases9" and that special interrogatories must be used with great cau-
tion there. While it may be desirable, or at least tolerable, to minimize
the jury's nullification power in civil cases,'9' our traditions demand
that the power not be impaired in criminal cases.'92 Thus the same
courts that refuse to instruct on the power/right to nullify insist on
the pure general verdict in criminal cases. Apparently the ratio of nulli-
188. See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
189. There is a surprising lack of agreement as to when special findings are most appropriate.
Most authorities say that they are most helpful in complex cases. Wilson v. Homestead Valve
Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 792, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1954) (interrogatories helpful in complex case), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 916 (1955); Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F.2d 950, 959-60 (1st
Cir. 1952) (special verdict would have been helpful); Morris v. Pennsylvania RR., 187 F.2d
837, 841 (2d Cir. 1951) (interrogatories of "more doubtful value" in simple case); Cohen v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1943) (special interrogatory would not be helpful
where only one issue). Contra Driver, supra note 167, at 25; Pentz, Special Findings or Special
Verdicts, 60 DIcK L. REv. 67, 70 (1955). Compare Morris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 187 F.2d at
843-44 (Frank, J., concurring) (special findings are desirable even in a simple case); Ginsburg,
supra note 136, at 267 (interrogatories are relatively better in more complex cases; special ver-
dicts relatively better in simpler cases).
190. Although special verdicts were used in some early American criminal cases, the practice
has virtually died out. See 5 L: ORrmw, CVE.NAL PROcEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES §
31:4 (1967).
191. Professor Sunderland argued that it was proper for criminal juries to perform the political
function of ameliorating the too-harsh decisions of the legislature or the prosecutor, "but in
civil cases, which should be treated as essentially business controversies, such political meddling
by the jury is.. .out of place." Sunderland, supra note 152, at 260-61. Accord, United States
v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969). It is said that the fact that many civil cases are
tried without juries suggests that there is no essential role for jury justice in civil cases. Finz,
supra note 164, at 238. (Judge Finz argues that the lack of a jury in equity cases leads to the
same conclusion. Id. But equity rules are sufficiently flexible and discretionary that hard cases
can be ameliorated in equity without a jury.) At any rate, Alexander Hamilton concluded: "The
excellence of trial by jury in civil cases appears to depend on circumstances foreign to the preser-
vation of liberty." Id., quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (A. Hamilton) (e.g., the risk that judges
might be corrupted).
192. See generally supra text accompanying notes 110-147. Note especially that the jury's
power to nullify can never be destroyed by a directed verdict of conviction.
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fying verdicts to law-abiding verdicts under present practice is con-
sidered ideal, and no one wants to tinker with the formula.'93
A few states are still somewhat receptive to special verdicts or inter-
rogatories in criminal cases."' The federal courts, claiming reverence
for the general verdict tradition' and lack of authorization,'96 have
been far more wary. Generally, interrogatories are allowed in federal
cases only to establish the overt act in treason prosecutions,'97 or to
determine the dates or goals of a defendant's participation in a con-
spiracy when necessary to determine the statutory penalty. 98 In any
event, special interrogatories are employed only if they benefit the de-
fendant in some way. 99
It is said that special findings cannot be ordered over a federal criminal
defendant's objection. Gray v. United States,2"' a case often cited for
this proposition, is not wholly on point, although it found impermis-
sible the "innovation" of requiring more than "one general response
from a criminal jury.""'' The defendant was accused in one count of
193. See generally supra text accompanying notes 143-147.
194. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744, 752 (1977) (inter-
rogatory whether brain death occurred before or after respirator plug was pulled), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1039 (1978); State v. Ellis, 262 N.C. 446, 137 S.E.2d 840 (1964) (special verdict in
prosecution for criminal nonsupport); State v. Tugas, 37 Wash. 2d 236, 222 P.2d 817 (1950)
(interrogatory whether defendant was insane; per statute).
195. But this special reverence in criminal cases can cut against the defendant as well. The
Supreme Court has stated that where an interrogatory answer conflicts with a general verdict
of guilty, defendant is not empowered to have judgment entered on the interrogatory as in civil
cases, but is entitled only to a new trial "at best." Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407
U.S. 385, 400 n.11 (1972). This rule seems erroneous, for the general case described seems to
be that of a forbidden "bad-man conviction," and the finding on the interrogatory should in
any event be collateral estoppel at the retrial by implication from Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957) (retrial on greater offense on which jury acquitted is forbidden even when incon-
sistent conviction on lesser offense is reversed and retried), Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S.
575 (1948), and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (collateral estoppel for defendant from
one criminal trial to another), on the theory that whatever break the first jury chooses to give
a defendant is binding on all future juries. Compare supra note 68.
196. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165,
180 (1st Cir. 1969); Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
848 (1949). But see FED. R. CRIN. P. 57(b) ("If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule,
the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any ap-
plicable statute.").
197. See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641 n.l (1947) (the purpose is to enable review
as to whether the overt act for which the jury convicted had sufficient evidentiary support and
warranted a finding of treason). See also Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 137 (1st Cir. 1950).
198. See United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 329 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 857 (1963); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 274-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd without
discussion sub nom. United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
968 (1958).
199. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969).
200. 174 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949).
201. Id. at 923.
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shipping a misbranded drug in violation of three separate, statutory
subsections.10 His objection that the count was duplicitous was prop-
erly overruled on the ground that only a "single offense" was charged.203
But then the trial judge gave the jury a verdict form requiring a general
verdict for each of the three violations. The jury convicted on the first
violation only. Defendant argued that this form of verdict was "in
the nature" of unauthorized special verdicts and interrogatories and
invited compromise. He prevailed on appeal, although in light of these
facts and his earlier duplicity objection, he really had no cause for
complaint.04
Today the leading anti-interrogatory case is United States v. Spock.2 1
The Spock defendants were charged with a conspiracy to counsel, aid,
and abet registrants to avoid the draft. The interrogatories inquired
separately about counselling, aiding, and abetting.206 To the Court of
Appeals of the First Circuit, the issue was the propriety of seemingly
innocuous interrogatories in derogation of the general verdict, con-
sidered both as an abstract question and in the context of this politically
charged case.2 7 The First Circuit panel was adamant that no fetters
could be placed upon the jury's nullification power: "In the exercise
of its functions not only must the jury be free from direct control in
its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure.' 208
Although the court was concerned that public exposure of their in-
termediate conclusions might sway the jurors on those issues, it was
even more concerned about the "direct effect that answering special
questions may have upon the jury's ultimate conclusion," for "the
202. The defendant was charged in one count of shipping a misbranded drug by three separate
methods: violating 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (false statements in accompanying letter); § 352(e) (true
name of drug not on label); and § 352(f) (inadequate directions for use).
203. For a general discussion of duplicitous counts, see iqfra text accompanying notes 420-431.
204. The form of verdict invited compromise no more than a general verdict would have;
indeed, it served the additional function of preventing a patchwork verdict. Moreover, the true
effect of what Judge Nordbye did was merely to (unnecessarily) grant that the three methods
were actually three separate offenses-which was the basis of defendant's duplicity objection-
and remedy the duplicity by splitting the one count into three.
205. 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
206. Id. at 180.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 181. The court added that interrogatories could not be saved by an instruction
not to consider them until a general verdict was reached; the jury would just disobey the instruc-
tion. Id. at 183. However, the court suggested that the jury could have returned a general verdict
and then have answered the interrogatories (assuming it convicted). This procedure would not
decrease the likelihood of nullification and the interrogatories could protect the defendant from,
among other things, patchwork verdicts. But the court never considered the possibility of patch-
work verdicts; rather, its theory was that interrogatories might reveal that the ground on which.
the jury had convicted could not support conviction. Id. at 183 n.42. See infra text accompany-
ing note 502. See also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641 n.l (1947) (overt acts of treason).
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jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to look
at more than logic."209 Interrogatories induce the jury to make a ra-
tional, legal decision rather than a conscientious, nullifying one. A juror
wishing to acquit may be forced to convict by the inescapable logic
of the interrogatories.210 Therefore, the defendants' convictions were
reversed. However, as in Gray, it is not apparent that the procedure
used by the district court in Spock harmed the defendants.21'
Constitutional Overview
Right to Jury Trial
The right to trial by jury in federal criminal cases is guaranteed by
article III, section 2 of, and the sixth amendment o, the Constitution.
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 2 1  the Supreme Court found that the right
to trial by jury extended to state criminal proceedings by virtue of the
incorporation of the sixth amendment into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
The seventh amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in federal
civil cases at common law where more than twenty dollars is at stake.
Although this amendment has never been held applicable to state
trials, 13 all states provide for juries in such cases. In recent years the
209. 416 F.2d at 182. Interestingly enough, some observers believe that the Spock decision
was itself merely a means to the end of freeing the defendants-an example of "appellate court
nullification."
210. Id. at 182. One Spock juror said afterward, "I knew they were guilty when we were
charged by the judge. I did not know prior to that time-I was in full agreement with the de-
fendants until we were charged by the judge. That was the kiss of death!" Scheflin, supra note
122, at 184.
211. Since the jury's duty is to follow the law, it seems that no individual defendant is prejudiced
by measures that ensure a law-abiding verdict. "A defendant has no 'right' to either an irrational
verdict or a hung jury.. . . He has only the right to have the jury speak without being coerced."
United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341 (4th Cir. 1970). The interest vindicated in Spock
would be better thought of to be that of the legal system as a whole, which any defendant is
nonetheless entitled to assert. See also supra note 204.
212. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The right to trial by jury does not apply to petty offenses in either
federal or state proceedings. See generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and
the Constitutional Guarantee of Trial By Jury, 39 HAiv. L. REV. 917 (1926). At one time the
grave/petty distinction seemed to be based on whether the offense was malum in se. Compare
District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930) (30 days or $100 for the first offense of reckless
driving: grave) with District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (90 days or $300
for operating a business without a license: petty). Today the distinction seems to be based on
the severity of the penalty. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (federal cutoff is
six months and $500). A defendant might successfully argue for a jury trial right if conviction
of a "petty" offense would expose him to extraordinary stigma or a recidivist statute.
213. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211 (1916). This amendment, almost alone among the Bill of Rights, has not yet been
"incorporated." Even if it had been incorporated, the constitutional status of civil jury trial
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Supreme Court has vigorously enforced the civil jury trial right. The
Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of equitable clean-up jurisdic-
tion cannot be used to deprive a party of trial by jury on a legal issue,
even when equitable issues predominate or an equitable remedy is
sought.2'14 Moreover, where an issue is relevant to both a legal and
an equitable claim, the legal issue must be decided by a jury before
the equitable issue may be addressed by the judge.2" Any action seek-
ing a monetary recovery is "legal," even if the equitable device of
accounting is utilized2" 6 or historically the action is equitable."7 Fur-
thermore, Congress cannot withhold trial by jury for the vindication
in court of newly created rights, such as those arising under Title VIII
of the Civil .Rights Act of 1968,28 when the rights are legal (e.g.,
remedied by damages) and. certain other requirements are met.2 9
However, the expansion of the right to trial by jury is not without
limits. Certain issues otherwise susceptible to trial by jury could be
tried by a bankruptcy court pursuant to its summary jurisdiction under
the Bankyuptcy Act of 1898.220 In vindicating statutorily created "public
rights" (i.e., those imposing fines on violators rather than authorizing
private causes of action for victimized individuals), an administrative
body may make factual determinations without running afoul of the
seventh amendment.22' Also, federal courts may in certain situations
allow offensive use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect
to factual findings in previous nonjury trials.222
Incidents of Trial by Jury
At the same time the Supreme Court was vigorously preserving and
expanding the right to trial by jury, it decided that several historical
incidents of the right to jury trial had no constitutional stature.223 At
the turn of the century, it was well-settled that all federal trials, civil
incidents would probably be no different than it is today. "This is so for two reasons: 1) the
general historical reasoning of Williams and Apodaca is generally applicable to juries in civil
cases; and 2) there is less concern with arbitrary governmental action in civil trials than in criminal
trials." Cincinnati Note, supra note 20, at 591. See also infra note 236.
214. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 505 (1959).
215. Id. at 508.
216. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
217. Id.; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (stockholder's derivative suit).
218. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
219. Id. at 196-97.
220. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
221. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
222. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
223. See infra text accompanying notes 227-232.
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and criminal, required twelve-member juries and unanimous verdicts.224
As neither the sixth nor the seventh amendment was considered to apply
to the states at that time, these incidents were not required in state
courts."5
Even after the sixth amendment was held to extend to the states,
226
six-member juries in state criminal trials have been upheld, as have
nonunanimous verdicts.227 The Supreme Court has, however, imposed
some limitations on jury size and nonunanimity in state criminal pro-
ceedings. State criminal trials may be tried by no fewer than six jurors,228
and when a six-member jury is used, the verdict must be unanimous.
229
State civil cases have never been subject to any federal constitutional
strictures regarding jury size or unanimity.
In the federal courts, twelve-member juries and unanimous verdicts
remain the norm for criminal trials, but not as a matter of constitu-
tional principle. Jury size and unanimity continue to be governed by
the federal rules of procedures, within constitutional limits. 2 ° The Court
has determined that the sixth amendment does not require twelve-
member juries, 2 ' and has also approved the use of six-member federal
juries in civil cases without the parties' consent.23 2
The deconstitutionalization of size and unanimity requirements ap-
pears desirable.2"' In many countries, trial by jury is considered a
224. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (requiring twelve-member jury); American
Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897) (requiring unanimity).
225. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (eight-member criminal jury).
226. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury for serious offenses
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth
amendment right to counsel first extended to state capital cases).
227. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) less than unanimous twelve-member jury);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (same); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-
member criminal jury).
228. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
229. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
230. FED. R. Camm. P. 23 (requiring a unanimous jury of twelve, unless the defendant stipulates
otherwise in writing); FED. R. Cirv. P. 48 (requiring stipulations of the parties as to nonunanimous
juries or juries of less than twelve members). As of 1978, eighty of ninety-five federal district
courts had promulgated rules reducing the size of juries in civil cases. Kaye, And Then There
Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court, and the Size of the Jury, 68 CA11.F.
L. REv. 1004, 1006 n.13 (1980).
231. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-man federal criminal jury permissible).
232. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). FED. R. Civ. P. 48 allows federal civil juries
of any number less than twelve if the parties consent.
233. Deconstitutionalization of jury trial incidents is also occurring in state courts. Even before
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), several states allowed smaller juries in civil cases. See
Zeisel .... And then There Were None: the Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. Cm. L.
REv. 710, 710 n.5 (1971) (listing fifteen states whose constitutions explicitly authorize juries of
less than twelve in some circumstances). The Supreme Court's determination that twelve-member
juries were not constitutionally required encouraged state courts to find that the word "jury"
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cumbersome method of dispute resolution. Many nations "know juries
only for trials of a small number of major crimes, and never had a
jury in civil cases. The jury in civil trials has now become almost an
American specialty."23 ' In England today, trial by jury has virtually
been eliminated in civil cases235 and unanimity is no longer required
in criminal cases.236 Certainly, the Framers appeared to be uncommit-
ted to any particular form of jury, and state practice at the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted varied significantly.23" Also, so long as the
basic function of the jury is preserved,238 flexibility can be maintained
by allowing states to discard institutions that prove to be unnecessary
and wasteful.
Major criticisms of the jury system include: the high economic cost
to both courts and citizens;239 the amount of time required to reach
a verdict;20 the waste resulting when juries hang; and the propensity
of jurors to ignore the law.2 ' To facilitate verdicts, many states have
provided for smaller juries and nonunanimity.
found in their state constitutions did not mean "jury of twelve." Cincinnati Note, supra note
20, at 593 n.69. For example, after Williams, Ohio adopted rules allowing eight-member criminal
juries despite Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 297 (1853) (state constitution requires twelve because
less than twelve is not a "jury"). Of course, Supreme Court construction of the Federal Con-
stitution does not require that state constitutions be interpreted the same way. Cincinnati Note,
supra note 20, at 595-96.
234. Zeisel, Twelve Is Just, 10 TRIAL. 13, 15 (Nov./Dec. 1974). Accord, Skidmore v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.) ("ours is the only country in the world where
[the jury] is still highly prized"), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948). "[U]p to the year 1860,
none of the nations of Europe adopted the trial by jury in any civil case, but nearly all adopted
it in criminal cases, and all rejected the English common law idea of unanimity." I A. BRIClWOOD,
SAcKETr ON INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES 202 (3d ed. 1908).
235. Cincinnati Note, supra note 20, at 583 n.3. The Administration of Justice Act of 1933,
23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 36 § 6, made jury trial discretionary with the court in the Queen's/King's
Bench Division. Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REv. 442, 443 n.4 (1971).
236. Mossman, Justice and Numbers, 10 TRIAL 22, 23 (Nov./Dec. 1974) (the Criminal Justice
Act of 1967, ch. 80, § 13, allows nonunanimous verdicts after two hours of deliberation); Johnson
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 377 (1972) (Powell, 1. concurring) (same). Even before this, English
juries were not instructed on the need for unanimity, probably to avoid encouraging stubborn
holdouts. G. WiLIAms, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TIIAL 322
(3d ed. 1963). Most European countries permit a 9-3 verdict in criminal cases. Mossman, supra.
For even more extreme examples, see WLUA5As, supra, at 320-21.
237. See Henderson, supra note 120, at 290-99 (showing by "legislative history of the seventh
amendment and contemporaneous tate practice that the amendment did not constitutionalize
any particular incidents of jury trial").
238. The function of the jury is to prevent government oppression and to find the truth. Brown
v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 330, 330-34 (1979). See also Henderson, supra note 120, at 336-37.
239. In 1979, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration estimated that $200 million
per year was spent on jurors' fees. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1979, at B5, col. 2.
240. See generally JOINER, supra note 3 at 71; FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 67 (quoting
Dean Griswold that juries are "inherently wasteful").
241. See, e.g., Thompson, Six Will Do!, 10 TRIAL. 12 (Nov./Dec. 1974). The pros and cons
of jury nullification are discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 110-147.
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Nonunanimous civil verdicts have been allowed in about half of the
states for some time.2 Before Burch v. Louisiana,"3 in 1978, six states
allowed nonunanimous criminal verdicts.24" Although it is insisted that
jurors will deliberate fully and fairly even if they are not required to
convince all their fellows,""5 the obvious objective of nonunanimous
verdicts is to prevent dissenters from hanging the jury. Adherents of
majority verdicts like to portray such dissenters as unreasonable. A
law school dean wrote that Idaho's 5/6 verdict "certainly does save
time and expense. . . . [W]ith six jurors a verdict may be given by
five who agree, and that leaves room for one stubborn fool to hold
out against the others.
24 6
A number of empirical studies have been made in recent years con-
cerning the effect of jury size on verdicts.24 7 Most have been found
to have serious methodological flaws. One study that has not been
challenged on methodological grounds48 found no correlation between
jury size and the acquittal or conviction rate. In any event, as one
researcher suggests: "Flaws aside for the moment, the preponderence
of negative findings within the entire set of studies suggests that jury
size effects are by no means 'robust' phenomena, if they exist at all."249
242. See Recent Statutes, 37 CoLum. L. REv. 1235 (1937) (23 states); Use of Majority Verdicts
in the United States, 33 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 111 (1949) (27 states); Comment, Vote Distribution
in Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 27 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 360, 361 n.6 (1970) (28 states).
In many states majority verdicts are provided for in the state constitution. E.g., MoNT. CONST.
art. III, § 23 (2/3 vote). Seven western states (Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Utah) have had nothing but nonunanimous civil juries from their inception
(but nonunanimity was unknown in the thirteen original states until New York went over in
1937). Recent Statutes, supm.
243. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
244. Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas. Comment, The Unanimous
Jury Verdict: Its Valediction In Some Criminal Cases, 4 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 185, 185 n.2 (1972).
245. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1972); id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring)
(criminal context).
246. Acting Dean W.J. Brockelbank of the College of Law at Boise, 1947 letter quoted in
Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 Mtss. L.J. 185, 199 (1950). The possibility
of a hung jury increases if by scientific jury selection methods either side or both succeeds in
empaneling a partisan. Mossman, supra note 236, at 25. Or a single juror could simply be biased
or corrupt on his own account. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1979, Al, col. 5; id., Feb. 5, 1979,
at D8, col. 5 (lone holdout prevented conviction of Congressman Daniel Flood on charges of
bribery, conspiracy, and perjury).
247. See generally Grofman, The Slippery Slope, L. & PoL. Q (July 1980), at 291-300 (survey-
ing various studies) and 302-04 (bibliography); Vollrath & Davis, Jury Size and Decision Rule
in StmoN, Tim JURY, supra note 3, at 73-103 (assessing the reliability of various studies) and
103-05 (bibliography); Comm. on Jury Standards, ABA Judicial Admin. Div., STANDARDS RELATINo
To JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT 157 (Tentative Draft July, 1982) (citing many sources).
248. A. Padawer-Singer, A. Singer & R. Singer, "An Experimental Study of Twelve vs. Six
Member Juries under Unanimous vs. Nonunanimous Decisions" (1977) discussed in Vollrath
& Davis, supra note 247, at 75.
249. Vollrath & Davis, supra note 247, at 75.
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It is probably true that smaller or nonunanimous juries serve as well
as traditional juries in providing a barrier between the citizen and the
law.2" On the other hand, it is also likely that a unanimous verdict
by twelve jurors is more likely to correspond to "the truth,"' 25' or at
least that the general public believes that it does so. The resolution
of the conflict between accuracy and efficiency might well be deter-
mined by balancing the probability of error, the costs of various alter-
natives, and the nature of the harm resulting from error in the par-
ticular class of case.25" Since the empirical data suggests that accuracy
is sacrificed only to a slight degree when there are departures from
the traditional jury form, the Supreme Court was probably correct in
allowing those states that value efficiency highly to experiment with
jury size and unanimity.211
Other Constitutional Principles
Aside from the right to trial by jury, several other constitutional
provisions may affect the validity of incidents of the jury system. Most
notable are the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments and the right of confrontation embodied in the sixth amend-
ment. The confrontation clause, in certain criminal cases, provides an
exception to the nonimpeachment rule that cloaks the deliberations of
the jury. In Parker v. Gladden,214 a bailiff's comments to the jury
made him a "witness" against the defendant. Because the defendant
had no opportunity to cross-examine, his right of confrontation was
violated and he was deprived of due process. The Court allowed im-
peachment by a juror, but said nothing regarding a right to prove the
violation by affidavits.2" Although the issue may be moot in federal
cases after the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), such
250. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 374 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Cincinnati
Note, supra note 20, at 599-600.
251. Zeisel, supra note 234. But see Jacobsohn, Unanimous Verdict: Politics and the Jury
Trial, 1977 WAsH. U.L.Q. 39, 53-54 (jurors may have to compromise with dissenters to reach
a unanimous verdict, and "decisions based upon the honest perceptions of nine jurors may be
more principled than unanimous verdicts that do not connote honest agreement"); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring) (same).
252. Thus many more states allow majority verdicts in civil cases than in criminal cases, and
no state has abandoned the unanimity requirement in capital cases. Note, in this regard, State
ex rel. Smith v. Sawyer, 263 Or. 136, 501 P.2d 792 (1972) (one reason for allowing nonunanimity
in Oregon criminal cass was to make it easier to obtain convictions).
253. One of the major values of federalism is that the states are free to experiment with various
methods of solving social problems. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
254. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
255. The Federal Rules of Evidence, subsequently enacted, permit impeachment based on such
"extraneous prejudicial information."
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a right to impeach would appear to be constitutionally required. Holding
that juror discussion of a prejudicial, nonrecord newspaper article could
constitute a violation of the confrontation clause, the Fifth Circuit ac-
cepted the testimony of a jury member to determine the likelihood of
prejudice.56 Some state courts have held that a defendant has a con-
stitutional right to present juror evidence to impeach his conviction'
when jurors made unauthorized visits to the scene of the crime.2" This
step seems inevitable in light of Parker; the question remains whether
the right to impeach verdicts will be extended to other sixth amend-
ment violations.258
II. Patchwork Verdicts: Civil Cases
Maxims
In the introduction to this article, several situations were described
in which a sufficient majority agreed upon a general verdict, but no
majority agreed upon the underlying facts or legal theory.5 9 The follow-
ing rules regarding the acceptability of such patchwork verdicts in civil
cases are proposed:
Rule 1. Patchwork verdicts are, in general, valid and proper.
Rule 2. Patchwork verdicts are not acceptable, however, where the
"patched" grounds are not part of a sole transaction, do not have
a common focus of injury, or do not call for exactly the same remedy.
256. United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 1970). However, the jurors
could not testify on the subjective issue of whether they were prejudiced. Id. at 1030. Cf. United
States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1970) (revelation of nonrecord infor-
mation from personal knowledge did not per se render juror sixth amendment witness against
defendant).
257. Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 229 S.E.2d 465 (1976); People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d
275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
258. Chance verdicts (right to trial by jury), verdicts infected by bias (right to impartial jury),
and perhaps compromise or even quotient verdicts (right to unanimity, buttressed by a constitu-
tionalization of the ideal of individualism) seem likely targets. This potentiality casts doubt on
the claim of United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), that patchwork verdicts
violate the sixth amendment because that case vigorously insisted it was reviewing only the in-
structions and suggested that it would be most unwilling "to breach the shroud surrounding
jury deliberation." Id. at 457. See also United States v. Pavloski, 574 F.2d 933, 936 (7th Cir.
1978) (willing to consider protest of potential patchwork verdict at level of instructions, but not
at level of actual jury verdict; no mention of unconstitutionality). If patchwork verdicts indeed
violate the sixth amendment right to a unanimous verdict, how can a defendant be prevented
from presenting the only kind of evidence that could vindicate his constitutional rights?
259. Unless otherwise stated, patchwork verdicts will be presumed to have been reached by
a jury of twelve members in a jurisdiction that requires unanimity. For a discussion of the par-
ticular problems that arise when nonunanimous verdicts are permitted, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 329-354.
It should also be noted that usually the problem of patchwork verdicts will only arise when
general verdicts are used. See supra notes 149 and 183 and accompanying text.
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Theory
The question of the acceptability of patchwork verdicts in civil cases
reduces, in the absence of guidance from any statute, to a debate about
the applicability of the rule of individualism. Consider a 4-4-4 patch-
work verdict for plaintiff among three alleged negligent acts by defend-
ant. Plaintiff would argue that each of the twelve jurors is independently
convinced from the evidence that he is entitled to recover. Defendant
would respond that a majority of the jurors has found him blameless
on each alleged act of negligence; no more is required to avoid liability.
There is force to defendant's argument, but it seems that the rule
of individualism requires that plaintiff win.2 60 Defendant sees the jury
as a single entity,2 1 so that all 8-4 configurations seem indistinguishable.
However, jury theory insists a jury consists of twelve entities, and in
a patchwork verdict all jury members concur on a "verdict" on the
"dispositional issue" of liability or liability and damages, even if they
disagree on some precedent questions.
Patchwork verdicts are mandated, rather than forbidden, by the rule
of individualism even though they in some ways resemble forbidden
compromise verdicts. In both patchwork and compromise verdicts, the
twelve jurors stand up and announce identical legal conclusions, hiding
the differing views of the case they individually hold. The distinction
is that in compromise verdicts two sets of jurors each surrender some
conscientiously held convictions, dickering over the fate of the parties
and arriving at a conclusion that perhaps no juror would call his own.
In a patchwork verdict, no juror sacrifices a conscientious belief about
any issue or announces a legal conclusion different from the one he
would reach if he were the sole judge of the case. Thus, the vice, if
any, of patchwork verdicts is not that associated with compromise
verdicts.
The "problem" with patchwork verdicts is that there is no unanim-
ity among the jurors about what actually happened as a matter of
historical fact (rather than of legal conclusion). This uncertainty raises
some doubts about the validity of imposing liability.162 Such uncer-
tainty, however, need not be fatal to a plaintiff's recovery.263
260. Few commentators have considered the question of civil patchwork verdicts. Ginsburg,
supra note 136, at 268, favors them, while Dudnik, supra note 136, at 500, suggests that they
are improper.
261. See Ginsburg, supra note 136, at 268.
262. For a discussion of uncertainty in terms of the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 360-369.
263. For the sake of convenience, patchwork verdicts are presumed to favor the plaintiff.
However, a state's position should be the same whether the patchwork verdict favors the plain-
tiff or the defendant. In the paradigm patchwork verdict case of the first paragraph in this arti-
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In res ipsa loquitur cases, for example, the plaintiff need not
demonstrate nor even hazard a guess as to what precise acts of negligence
caused his injury. Indeed, the crux of the doctrine is that plaintiff can-
not be expected to know. Yet, in various states the doctrine raises an
inference of negligence,264 creates a presumption in plaintiff's favor,
or even shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.26 5 Similarly, in
the majority of jurisdictions, plaintiff may establish a products liabil-
ity claim by presenting circumstantial evidence without proving a specific
defect.2"' In many states, the burden of proof of negligence shifts to
the defendant when a common carrier or a bailee of goods is sued.
26 7
From the defendant's point of view, these effects are similar to or even
more oppressive than the effects of permitting patchwork verdicts.
Plaintiffs in patchwork verdict negligence cases may also make an
argument from tort policy. There is evidence that the defendant has
committed several different acts of negligence. By hypothesis, at least
one impartial juror is convinced as to each act. Tort policy might sup-
port the conclusion that plaintiff should recover on such a patchwork
verdict because the defendant is, more likely than not, a careless per-
son and such people should be deterred from committing future acts
of carelessness. This would be a fairly small procedural step to take-
less than creating an inference of negligence, less than creating a
presumption of negligence, less than shifting the burden of proof.
cle, the issue is whether an apparent plaintiff's verdict will be validated or treated merely as
a hung-jury mistrial. Suppose every juror had instead found for defendant on one or another
of plaintiff's essential elements or defendant's affirmative defenses (negligence, lack of contributory
negligence, proximate cause, etc.), but there was no unanimity for defendant on any particular
element or defense. All twelve jurors voted for defendant, and the question is whether the ap-
parent defense verdict will be validated or treated as a hung-jury mistrial. Jury theory seems
to supply no reason why there should not be consistency in states' rules regarding plaintiff patch-
work verdicts and defense patchwork verdicts.
As a practical matter, the plaintiff would probably not want the jury instructed that defense
patchwork verdicts are impermissible (assuming that they are) because it would be a tactical
error to suggest to the jury that plaintiff might not be able to carry a single juror.
The only known defense patchwork verdict case (other than a patchwork verdict among various
acts of contributory negligence) is Anderson v. Penn Hall Co., 47 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1942)
(contributory negligence and lack of negligence of defendant; the defense verdict was upheld).
Incidentally, Anderson apparently is the only federal civil patchwork verdict case, and even it
does not really grasp the issue.
264. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 328D, comment b (1965).
265. Id., comment m. See also Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (where
either of two careless hunters might have fired the shot that hit P, burden shifted to them; both
held liable).
266. See, e.g., Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (Pennsylvania law);
Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972) (admiralty law);
Gillespie v. R.D. Werner Co., 71 111. 2d 318, 375 N.E.2d 1294 (1978); Holkestad v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 288 Minn. 249, 183 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Jagmin v. Simonels Abrasive Co., 61
Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810 (1973).
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A comment b (1965).
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Obviously, this tort policy would only be available in tort cases. It
would not apply, for example, where the patchwork grounds for re-
jecting a will were mental incapacity and formal defects in witnessing.'6"
However, where no substantive or procedural statute requires the
opposite conclusion, jury theory, and in particular individualism, is
sufficient justification for allowing patchwork verdicts.6 9 No added
support from tort policy or other substantive law is needed, nor has
it been relied upon in the cases upholding patchwork verdicts.
270
The foregoing discussion in favor of patchwork verdicts assumes that
there is some considerable nexus among the plaintiff's claims other
than that they are all against the same defendant. Certainly a patchwork
verdict upon totally unrelated claims should not be valid, even if liberal
joinder rules allow the claims to be heard together.27" The rule of in-
dividualism is not coextensive with the rules permitting joinder of causes.
Allowing a patchwork verdict among insufficiently related claims denies
the due process, trial by jury, and individualism rights of the disadvan-
taged party to an independent jury verdict on each claim. Which claims,
then, are sufficiently related?2 72 As stated in rule 2, above, the claims
must: (a) be part of a single transaction; (b) have a common focus
of injury; and (c) call for the same remedy.
If plaintiff brings actions in libel and false imprisonment, and six
jurors think he should recover for libel and the other six for false im-
prisonment, surely plaintiff should recover nothing. The jurors' deci-
sions on the two claims will be treated as separate verdicts. None of
the major nexi between claims are present: (a) the claims involve wholly
different transactions; (b) they involve wholly different foci of injury;
and (c) the claims are probably for different amounts of damages.
268. However, substantive testamentary law could affect a court's decision on patchwork ver-
dicts. For example, a jurisdiction's policy of requiring strict compliance with the formal condi-
tions for making a valid will might mitigate against patchwork verdicts in such a jurisdiction.
Substantive contract policy might similarly influence a jurisdiction's attitude toward patchwork
verdicts. For example, the policy of validating contracts whenever possible might lead a jurisdic-
tion to accept a patchwork verdict among adequate consideration and detrimental reliance.
269. The principle of individualism represents a policy choice as to the way in which verdicts
ought to be reached. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21. It requires that each juror make
up his own mind on the evidence and thus supplants the fiction that a jury is a "single mind."
When the ideal of individualism is met, the foundation is laid for the jury to reach a consensus.
Absent strong countervailing policies, the ideal of individualism should be enforced as the means
most likely to allow the jury to fulfill its traditional "community buffer" function. See supra
notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
270. Cf. Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953) (effec-
tively forbidding patchwork verdicts in negligence cases, for no better reason than that to break
with precedent would disconcert the negligence bar).
271. See FED. R. Crv. P. 18.
272. See infra text accompanying notes 378-409, 507-509 (discussing the "single offense" in
criminal cases).
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In contrast, the examples given in the first two paragraphs of the
introduction to this article possess all the nexi. Only one transaction
is involved-the accident leading to plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiffs claims
for injury remain the same, regardless of which of defendant's alleged
acts of negligence are found to have caused them.
Each nexus can exist in the absence of the others. Two distinct claims
could arise out of the same transaction, with no other nexus. For ex-
ample, while pushing a man down (battery), the defendant knowingly
and falsely accuses him of murder in a bystander's presence (slander).
It is apparent that no patchwork verdict could be permitted in this
situation.
Even if the claims arise from different transactions, they might in-
volve the same focus of injury. For example, plaintiff may claim that
in May the defendant intentionally shot him in the leg and that in June
he carelessly ran him over, injuring the same leg. Similarly, a contest-
ant could claim that a will is invalid because one of the witnesses was
not qualified and also because ten years later the will was revoked by
a subsequent will. Also, of course, a plaintiff could easily have unrelated
negligence or contract actions against the same defendant. In none of
these cases would a patchwork verdict be appropriate.
Finally, suppose a case like Hawkins v. McGee2" went to the jury
on both tort and contract claims. The case would involve one transac-
tion and one focus of injury. But if six jurors found liability only on
the tort theory and six only on the contract theory, the resultant dif-
fering measures of damages would prevent the jury from returning a
complete verdict.27" If the tort and contract remedies were the same
in such a case, a patchwork verdict for the plaintiff should be proper.
Similarly, it seems that in a products liability case a patchwork verdict
between strict liability in tort and liability for breach of warranty should
be credited. Further, patchwork verdicts should be proper between con-
version and breach of contract claims against a larcenous bailee, and
between common law battery and section 1983 civil rights claims.275
273. 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929) (operation on hand not only produced results that fell
short of doctor's warranty, but actually worsened the hand; held: expectation damages were
proper in a contract action).
274. See also People v. Hicks, 287 N.Y. 165, 38 N.E.2d 482 (1941) (statute required jury
to recommend death penalty or life imprisonment in murder cases, but only if jury found felony-
murder rather than premeditated murder. This statute had the unintended effect of preventing
patchwork verdicts).
275. See also Danker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 249 Iowa 327, 86 N.W.2d 835 (1957) (in
condemnation case, the court found that it was immaterial that some jurors found one value
for the property before and another value after taking, while the remaining jurors found dif-
ferent before and after values, so long as all jurors found the same differential between before
and after values).
19831
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On the other hand, it is not impossible that wholly unrelated claims
might be for identical amounts of money, and no patchwork verdict
between such claims could be countenanced.
Cases involving claims that, although apparently not arising from
a single transaction, obviously involve a single focus of injury and
measure of damages, would appear to merit patchwork verdict treat-
ment and yet are disqualified by the proposed patchwork verdict rules.
In some of these cases, what appear to be two transactions can be
shown to be one; thus a patchwork verdict would be proper. For ex-
ample, if the plaintiff claimed that he suffered lung damage because
he inhaled asbestos in the city hall on May I and May 9, in fact only
one "transaction" is involved-the presence of asbestos in the roof
of the city hall. Therefore, the jury need not agree unanimously on
which date plaintiff inhaled the asbestos. The same result will occur
whenever a plaintiff claims he was victimized by a scheme, plan, or
condition of the defendant that manifested itself on different occasions.
But if the transactions from which the claims arose were truly distinct,
a patchwork verdict for a plaintiff is probably only evidence of a general
jury sympathy for the plaintiff, an emotion that should not be translated
into a verdict without a legal reason. Consider a patchwork verdict
in a will case where a contestant claims fraud in the inducement, a
flaw in witnessing, and a subsequent revocation. What excuse does
the plaintiff have for failing to convince all the jurors to agree on a
single one of his theories?
Inevitably, there will be situations where it is a close question whether
two claims arise from the same "transaction" for patchwork verdict
purposes. This fact, and the unavailability of any strict definition or
bright-line test of what constitutes a "transaction," have the potential
to create unfortunate uncertainty in the application of the rules pro-
posed in this article. It is suggested that jury-theory considerations,
as well as substantive law policy alluded to above, favor finding a com-
mon "transaction" in close cases.
Patchwork Verdict Cases
The issue of patchwork verdicts is rarely presented squarely to an
appellate court. This is true for several reasons. First, where only a
general verdict or a broad special verdict finding or interrogatory is
returned, the nonimpeachment rule and the opacity of the verdict usually
make it impossible to learn whether the verdict was patchwork. When
the subject matter of special verdicts is particular acts, a patchwork
verdict will result in the jury hanging as to each act. The jury's report
of its failure to agree on the answers will not indicate that each juror
found negligence of some sort and would have voted for plaintiff had
[Vol. 36:473
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a general verdict been requested. The case must be treated as a normal
hung jury case; a new trial will be ordered, and no one will ever know
that a patchwork verdict had occurred. When a jury is entitled to vote
a general verdict of negligence and does so, but then hangs on each
interrogatory, there are three possibilities:
(1) The jury will have been instructed that it can simply report that
the verdict is patchwork. No jurisdiction currently allows this practice.
27 6
(2) The jury's limited, but truthful, report of its nonunanimity on
the interrogatories will be interpreted as proof of juror impropriety
and the verdict will not be accepted.2 7
(3) The jury will discover the results of its nonunanimity and return
a result-reaching, compromise verdict for plaintiff on one of the specific
acts.
In sum, courts are not forced to consider the propriety of patchwork
verdicts, unless they go out of their way to interpret the jury's votes
in situation (2) above as reflecting one.
Also, pleading rules in civil cases are not calculated to expose patch-
work verdicts. The plaintiff has traditionally been allowed to allege
several acts of negligence in a single count if they are related to a single
injury and are not repugnant inter sese.271 The modern trend toward
notice pleading exempts plaintiff even from specifying acts of
negligence.279 Under either system of pleading, a patchwork verdict
will be masked.
Finally, the ambiguities of the English language make it less than
certain that a challenged instruction will raise the issue of patchwork
verdicts on appeal. For example, does the language "You must all agree
that he did one or the other of the acts alleged" instruct for or against
patchwork verdicts? The appellate court can avoid the issue by stating
that the aggrieved party had no cause for complaint because the in-
struction was given in accord with his view of the case, and therefore
the correctness of the instruction need not be determined.
280
Despite these difficulties, several appellate courts have considered
the propriety of patchwork verdicts. The earliest known case, Parrott
v. Thacher,28' was decided in 1830 by the Massachusetts Supreme
276. It has recently been re-recommended in Ginsburg, supra note 136, at 269-70. The tech-
nique was used in Arkansas Midland R.R. v. Canman, 52 Ark. 517, 13 S.W. 280 (1890).
277. See Annot., 155 A.L.R. 586 (1945).
278. 61A Am. JuR. 2d Pleading § 118 (1981); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 187(15) (1966).
279. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); id., Appendix of Forms, Form 9 (Complaint for Negligence)
("defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff").
280. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946) (criminal case) (instruc-
tion similar to one in the text). See also United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324 (2d Cir.
1975) ("if you find that the proxy statement was false in either of these two respects, that is
sufficient to support a conviction"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
281. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 425 (1830).
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Judicial Court. In dictum, Chief Justice Parker stated:
I do not see how their verdict can stand, unanimity being required.
If there are three distinct grounds upon which an action can be
maintained, all independent of each other, and four only of the
jury agree upon each, I do not see how they can amalgate their
opinions and make a legal verdict out of them.28"
The patchwork verdict was between the reasons for finding authority
in a ship's master to order rum on the owner's account: industry custom
and acceptance of the benefits. The judgment was reversed for lack
of evidence on the latter issue, a problem to which most courts are
far more sensitive than they are to patchwork verdicts.
283
In 1841 an English judge reached the opposite conclusion about patch-
work verdicts, also in dictum. Referring to a possible patchwork ver-
dict on the grounds alleged to render a patent invalid, Judge Maule
wrote:
It is not necessary, nor indeed is it reasonable to expect, that twelve
jurors should arrive at the same conclusion by following the same
course of reasoning. There is no rule that a verdict cannot be just
unless every juryman arrives at the same conclusion, and by the
same road.
2
11
The issue then lay dormant until the 1880s, when three American
cases from major states held civil patchwork verdicts proper. In New
York, a jury agreed in its general verdict that plaintiff could not recover
under a life insurance policy because the decedent died while engaging
in a violation of the law. The decedent was shot by a man he assaulted.
The jury hung on interrogatories asking if the shooting was intentional,
in self-defense, or by accident during the decedent's retreat. In affirm-
ing the general verdict, the court stated: "The point to be determined
by the jury was whether the insured died in, or in consequence of,
a violation of law. .. [The verdict cannot be impeached by showing
that a part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation and a part
upon the other. ' 285 Indeed, since all the jurors found that the assault
was a but-for cause of the death, the interrogatories seem immaterial.
In a Michigan case that smacks of res ipsa loquitur and "negligence
282. Id. at 432.
283. See, e.g., Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1980); Davison v. Flowers,
123 Ohio St. 89, 174 N.E. 137 (1930); Woodmansee v. Stoneman, 133 Vt. 449, 344 A.2d 26
(1975). Note that the Supreme Court will reverse a criminal conviction when one of the jury's
grounds for conviction is unconstitutional. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
284. Walton v. Potter, 133 Eng. Rep. 1203, 1217 (C.P. 1841). This is the only known English
civil patchwork verdict case.
285. Murray v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 96 N.Y. 614, 622 (1884).
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in the air," plaintiffs mare was killed when defendant's stallion, at-
tempting to mate, entered the mare's rectum. An interrogatory asked,
"Was defendant's groom negligent; if so, how?" Chief Justice Cooley,
a foe of unanimity requirements in general, reversed the defense ver-
dict because the interrogatory suggested to the jury that it "must be
able to specify and agree upon the particular act or omission of the
groom from which the injury resulted. But this would be error."'286
He reasoned: "The jury might have been satisfied of a want of care,
deducible from all the circumstances, without being able particularly
to describe or define it .... [If so,] the plaintiff was entitled of right
to [a] general verdict.
' 287
In Illinois, patchwork verdicts, particularly as to the specific acts
showing plaintiff's due care, were upheld in Chicago & Northwestern
Ry. v. Dunleavy,211 a wrongful death case. The specific-act inter-
rogatories on which the jury hung were ignored as immaterial on the
ground that only findings of ultimate fact, rather than mere evider!-
tiary facts, could upset a general verdict. The court explained:
The common law requires that verdicts shall be the declaration of
the unanimous judgment of the twelve jurors. Upon all matters
which they are required to find, they must be agreed. But it has
never been held that they must all reach their conclusions in the
same way and by the same method of reasoning. To require
unanimity, not only in their conclusions, but in the mode by which
those conclusions are arrived at, would in most cases involve an
impossibility. To require unanimity, therefore, not only in the result,
but also in each of the successive steps leading to such result, would
be practically destructive of the entire system of jury trials.288
This explicit endorsement of patchwork verdicts was influential. The
Arkansas court gave Dunleavy lip service a year later when a patchwork
verdict apparently violated a state policy requiring that interrogatories
be answered.80 Iowa adopted the Dunleavy rule in 1902, quoting the
opinion at length.28' West Virginia also cited Dunleavy and supported
patchwork verdicts in a wrongful death case.292 A lower Missouri court,
286. Peer v. Ryan, 54 Mich. 224, 225-26, 19 N.W. 961, 962 (1884).
287. Id.
288. 129 Ill. 132, 22 N.E. 15 (1889).
289. Id. at 144, 22 N.E. at 17-18.
290. Arkansas Midland R.R. v. Canman, 52 Ark. 517, 13 S.W. 280 (1890). See infra notes'
320-321 and accompanying text.
291. Morbey v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 116 Iowa 84, 89 N.W. 105 (1902). Accord, Danker v.
Iowa Power & Light Co., 249 Iowa 327, 86 N.W.2d 835 (1957) (damages); Ipsen v. Ruess, 241
Iowa 730, 41 N.W.2d 658 (1950) (will contest).
292. Brogan v. Union Traction Co., 76 W. Va. 698, 86 S.E. 753 (1915). West Virginia's ac-
ceptance of patchwork verdicts was later confirmed in Emery v. Monongahela West Penn Pub.
Serv. Co., 111 W. Va. 699, 710, 163 S.E. 620, 625 (1932).
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reasoning independently, upheld the trial court's refusal to give an anti-
patchwork instruction regarding the theories of negligence. The court
argued that even if the jury split 4-4-4, "would not the twelve find
the defendant was negligent as alleged in the petition? The action was
based on negligence, not on the way in which it was committed. '293
In 1910 a countertrend began. Oregon echoed the Parrott dictum
in dictum of its own, arguing that a set of unanswered interrogatories
regarding specific acts of negligence "leaves an unpleasant doubt" that
there may have been a patchwork verdict, so no verdict should be ac-
cepted in such circumstances.29 ' Kansas held that a patchwork verdict
was reversible impropriety, and that the defendant was entitled to in-
terrogatories about specific theories of negligence as a protective
device.
295
The major opposition to patchwork verdicts came, however, from
Texas and Wisconsin, the only two states that had adopted a policy
of taking detailed special verdicts in civil cases as a matter of course.
2 96
In 1915 the Supreme Court of Texas struck down a general verdict
of negligence whose patchwork nature was made explicit by the jury,
as required by the trial judge's instructions.297 Seven years later, plain-
tiff's decedent in a wrongful death action was accused of five separate
acts of contributory negligence.291 Over the defendant's objection,
299
only a single omnibus special verdict question was asked. The Supreme
Court of Texas reversed for violation of a state rule entitling a party
to a special verdict question on each factual issue which, if proved,
would control the case. The court stated that the same rule would apply
to questions regarding defendant's negligent acts.
293. Holden v. Missouri R.R., 108 Mo. App. 665, 680, 84 S.W. 133, 138 (1904).
294. Russell v. Oregon R.R. & Navigation Co., 54 Or. 128, 141, 102 P. 619, 624 (1909).
295. Barker v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 89 Kan. 573, 132 P. 156 (1913).
296. The policy of routinely taking detailed special verdicts in civil cases and an antipatchwork
policy go hand in hand for detailed special verdict findings can communicate only jury disagree-
ment, but not the fact that the configuration of the nonunanimity was that of a patchwork
verdict. Interestingly, recent changes in the law of both states regarding the specificity of special
verdict findings have resulted in a novel theoretical acceptance there of patchwork verdicts. With
respect to North Carolina's practice, see supra note 158.
297. Trinity & B.V. Ry. v. Geary, 107 Tex. 11, 172 S.W. 545 (1915).
298. Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
299. A procedure enabling a patchwork verdict on contributory negligence favors a defendant
in that respect, but this defendant apparently felt that there was more to be gained by confront-
ing the jury with specific factual allegations and thus decreasing the chances of a lawless sym-
pathy verdict. Alternatively, defendant's purpose may have been to try to hide from the jury
the legal effect of its answers. At any rate, it seems that tactical considerations quite often induce
a party to request a type of special verdict that would tend to hurt him in the event of a pat-
chwork verdict. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth v. Lee, 143 Tex. 551, 186 S.W.2d 954 (1945)
(same as Fox, moreover, plaintiff demanded separate special verdict questions on her theories
of defendant's negligence).
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In practice, the Texas rule was followed only in negligence cases."'
Broad special verdict questions were approved that encompassed several
acts of cruelty in a divorce case,3"' or fifteen building defects tending
to prove that a building was a fire hazard.10 In 1953 the court in Roosth
& Genecov Production Co. v. White"3 squarely faced the divergence
and admitted that the rule made patchwork verdicts invalid in negligence
cases and valid in all others.30 4 Nonetheless, the court continued its
insistence on detailed questions in negligence cases, while allowing courts
discretion to ask broad questions in every other kind of case despite
the lack of a principled distinction.30 5
This situation was not remedied until 1973, when amendments to
the Texas rules of civil procedure gave judges in all cases discretion
to use either broad or detailed special verdict questions.30 6 Under the
new rules, it has been held that a broad negligence question is proper
despite defendant's objection that it permits a patchwork verdict.30 7
It must be concluded that in Texas today the patchwork verdict is either
actually permissible or, at worst, tolerated. However, it is disquieting
that the trial judge can control whether patchwork verdicts will be pos-
sible by formulating questions broadly3°s or in great detail. A uniform
rule seems preferable.
Patchwork verdicts have undergone a somewhat similar development
in Wisconsin. In 1907 a special verdict question paraphrasable as "Did
town officials have actual notice or constructive notice of highway
disrepair?" was found to be reversible error because it permitted a
patchwork verdict. 9 After some vacillation,10 it was finally established
300. See generally Pope, Broad and Narrow Issues, 26 TEx. B.J. 921 (1963).
301. Howell v. Howell, 147 Tex. 14, 210 S.W.2d 978 (1948).
302. City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871 (1949).
303. 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953).
304. Id. at 627-28, 262 S.W.2d at 104. Geary was not mentioned.
305. Id. at 628, 262 S.W.2d at 104.
306. Texas Note, supra note 158, at 377, 381-82.
307. Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
308. Texas Note, supra note 158, at 384. The author argued that one favorable characteristic
of broad questions is that they allow patchwork verdicts, and recommended that a pro-patchwork-
verdict instruction be given when broad questions are used. For a differing view, see Spradley,
The Global Issue: Outlaw of the Special Issue Practice, 18 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1980).
309. DuCate v. Town of Brighton, 133 Wis. 628, 114 N.W. 103 (1907).
310. In Nelson v. A.H. Stange Co., 140 Wis. 657, 123 N.W. 152 (1909), the court conceded
the general antipatchwork rule but upheld a patchwork verdict on proximate cause as among
three acts of negligence, stating, "Reflection must disclose that such a [no-patchwork] rule car-
ried to its logical conclusion would defeat all general verdicts and most special verdicts." Id.
at 664, 123 N.W. at 154-55. In Matuschka v. Murphy, 173 Wis. 484, 180 N.W. 821 (1921),
a broad special verdict question permitted a patchwork verdict among acts of malpractice. The
court criticized patchwork verdicts but chose to reverse the judgment on another ground.
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that broad special verdict questions and patchwork verdicts were revers-
ibly improper.3 '
However, when the special verdict statute was changed in 1961 to
permit broad "ultimate fact" questions,312 patchwork verdicts also
became more acceptable. Upholding a broad negligence question in
1964, the Wisconsin court argued that "the ultimate fact verdict per-
mits the jury to do better what it most practically does, namely, look
at the overall negligence of the parties and attach the blame accord-
ingly without being trapped by technicalities and inconsistencies when
considering the negligence of the parties piecemeal."3 '3 Such language
certainly invites patchwork verdicts, even if it fails to authorize them
explicitly.
After the 1961 revisions, the Wisconsin position on special verdict
questions was similar to Texas's current position.2 ' But in 1976 the
statute was revised again,3" 5 this time to insist on broad questions in
all nonnegligence cases. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has apparently
interpreted the revised statute as allowing the trial judge discretion to
pose either broad or detailed questions in negligence cases, thus creating
a situation similar to pre-1973 Texas practice. In 1979, in Meurer v.
ITT General Controls,"6 the Wisconsin court found a broad question
as to a party's negligence to be appropriate when the party might be
found negligent in several respects. 7 Thus, patchwork verdicts are still
311. Devine v. Bischel, 215 Wis. 331, 254 N.W. 521 (1934) (negligence); Fontaine v. Fontaine,
205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410 (1931) (proximate cause; necessarily overruling Nelson); Gherke
v. Cochran, 198 Wis. 34, 222 N.W. 304 (1928) (contributory negligence). See also Scipior v.
Spinks, 252 Vis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 194 (1948).
312. The rule was amended by court order, at 11 Wis. 2d v (1961), to give the trial court
discretion to ask broad or detailed questions, and in particular authorized broad negligence ques-
tions. For a full history of the amendment, see Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d 593, 146 N.W.2d
433 (1966).
313. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 23 Wis.
2d 662, 666, 128 N.W.2d 12, 14 (1964).
314. The Wisconsin practice has not been altogether predictable. In an eminent domain case,
Besnah v. City of Fond du Lac, 35 Wis. 2d 755, 151 N.W.2d 725 (1967), the court unqualifiedly
stated that two special verdict questions, on value before and after the taking, should be asked.
Previously, the number of questions to be presented to the jury on diminution of value had
been left to the discretion of the trial court. Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Grant County, 200 Wis.
185, 227 N.W. 863 (1929). Contrast Danker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 249 Iowa 327, 86
N.W.2d 835 (1957) (expressly stating that the jurors need not find the same before-values and
after-values as long as they all find the same differential). Danker is apparently the only case
discussing a patchwork verdict regarding damages.
315. See 67 Wis. 2d at 702, 760 (1976), reporting the repeal of Wxis. STAT. § 270.27 and its
replacement by a new provision. Wis. STAT. § 805.12(1) (1977) provides in pertinent part: "The
[special] verdict shall ... relat[e] only to material issues of ultimate fact.... In cases founded
upon negligence, the court need not submit separately any particular respect in which the party
was allegedly negligent."
316. 90 Wis. 2d 438, 280 N.W.2d 156, 160 (1979).
317. Id.
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available in Wisconsin even in negligence cases, albeit at the trial judge's
discretion.
From the above discussion, it is apparent that Texas's and Wiscon-
sin's positions on patchwork verdicts tend to follow from their posi-
tions on special verdict questions and shift to reflect changes in special
verdict policy. A state's position on patchwork verdicts may be predict-
able from or even caused by its preference for broad or detailed special
verdict questions and interrogatories. Most states that restrict special
questions to inquiries about "ultimate facts" hold that the ultimate
fact is the broad question of culpability, rather than specific acts.3 '"
However, Ohio takes the opposite position in its interrogatory prac-
tice, and, consistently, has explicitly condemned patchwork verdicts.""
Nonetheless, one cannot necessarily extrapolate safely from special ver-
dict and interrogatory cases into the patchwork verdict field. It cannot
be assumed that a court has taken into account the patchwork verdict
issue in formulating its policy on special questions unless it has ex-
plicitly stated that it has. For example, in Arkansas Midland R.R. v.
Canman,3 20 the Arkansas court was reduced to confusion when a jury
hung on specific-act interrogatories and explicitly returned a patchwork
verdict on negligence.32' Whatever the reason, it is apparent that the
general weight of authority in the states that have considered the issue
supports patchwork verdicts in civil cases.
Implementation
How a state is to enforce its policy on patchwork verdicts raises
several interesting questions. A patchwork verdict surely "inheres in
the verdict" and thus cannot be impeached by the jurors.22 If the state
318. Sunderland gives an example of a special verdict inquiring about specific acts of negligence.
Sunderland, supra note 152, at 264. He believed that special verdicts should inquire only about
ultimate facts, which he noted were identical with the facts properly pleaded. 1d. at 263. It is
not clear what his position would be today in light of the modern practice of notice pleading.
319. Bradley v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc., 154 Ohio St. 154, 162-63, 93 N.E.2d 672, 677
(1950), overruled on another issue Bahm v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R.R., 6 Ohio St. 2d 192,
217 N.E.2d 217, 221 (1966). However, the Ohio rule that broad negligence interrogatories cannot
be asked unless coupled with a detailed interrogatory may have been undercut in 1970 by new
Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b) ("The interrogatories may be directed to one or more deter-
minative issues whether issues of fact or mixed issues of fact and law.").
320. 52 Ark. 517, 13 S.W. 280 (1890).
321. The court was torn between its theoretical acceptance of patchwork verdicts and its feel-
ing that juries should not be permitted to return special verdicts unanswered. Finally, it refused
to rule on the question and reversed on another ground. If indeed patchwork verdicts were proper,
it seems the interrogatories were immaterial and failure to answer them should not vitiate the
general verdict. For other cases raising or discussing Canman-like problems, see supra note 183;
supra notes 281-321 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
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prohibits patchwork verdicts, the most effective preventive measure
would be a special verdict with detailed questions. Without a general
verdict, a patchwork verdict is simply not possible if the special ques-
tions are sufficiently detailed. If the state is too committed to the general
verdict to allow special verdicts, interrogatories can be used either in
the form of detailed questions or in the form of a broad question
followed by a yes-no checklist of all specific acts the jury is entitled
to consider.32 1 Or, as there is no necessary connection between special
verdict policies and patchwork prohibiting policies, the court could
simply instruct the jury to return a general verdict that must not be
patchwork.
Of these options, the broad interrogatory with checklist would seem
the most appropriate."4 The broad question, in addition to the general
verdict, allows the jury its traditional freedom while discouraging patch-
work verdicts. Interrogatories also have the added advantage of pin-
pointing harmless errors." ' Moreover, even in states prohibiting patch-
work verdicts, some details are so clearly trivial that the jury need not
agree on them. 6 Checklists indicate that patchwork verdicts are pro-
hibited only on the itemized issues, but are allowed on all others. This
distinction might be rather difficult to convey in instructions.
On the other hand, detailed special verdict questions would be taboo
in states that (correctly) permit patchwork verdicts. Detailed inter-
rogatories or a checklist might confuse a jury in those states into thinking
it must unanimously answer every question. This confusion could be
alleviated either through appropriate instructions or by including a space
on the verdict form in which the jury could indicate that it is unanimous
as to liability, but divided as to which acts establish such liability. "7
If a pro-patchwork state prefers a more traditional form of verdict,
it would be consistent with the policies of individualism and jury
freedom simply to submit a general verdict or a broad special verdict/in-
terrogatory question and instruct the jury that it need not be unanimous
323. A general verdict or an answer to the broad interrogatory, accompanied by an inability
to reach unanimity on the detailed interrogatories or the checklist, would reveal the patchwork
verdict.
324. This device is available in the states. See, e.g., Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572
S.W.2d 273, 278, 282 (Tex. 1978). Note the same effect can be obtained by an interrogatory
asking, "Was defendant negligent; if so, how?" See Peer v. Ryan, 54 Mich. 224, 19 N.W. 961
(1884). The checklist garners the same information without requiring any answers other than
yes or no, and thus avoids complications. Checklists are also used in federal courts. See lacurci
v. Lummus Co., 387 U.S. 86 (1967); Schiller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 192 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 170, 184-186.
326. See infra text accompanying notes 388-392 (immaterial detail in the criminal context).
327. This device was recommended by Ginsburg, supra note 136, at 269-70. See also the Can-
man and Geary cases, discussed in the text accompanying notes 320-321 and 297, respectively.
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on subsidiary issues. Or, perhaps, the trial judge might simply refuse
to instruct on the issue at all. The natural tendency of juries may be
to see no problem in patchwork verdicts; if so, the state's pro-patchwork
policy would be vindicated in most cases. If a patchwork jury refused
to return a verdict, that might well indicate that the jurors in that case
were particularly concerned that their versions of what actually occurred
were so divergent. In such a case, imposing liability under a patch-
work verdict might work a substantive injustice. As with nullification,
it can be argued that present practice reaches a happy mix of results
and that one should not tinker with the formula."'
III. Patchwork Verdicts in Jurisdictions Permitting
Nonunanimous Verdicts
The decision of many jurisdictions329 to permit nonunanimous ver-
dicts poses interesting problems in patchwork verdict theory and in
related areas.330 The following solutions to these problems are proposed:
Rule 3. Except as indicated to the contrary in the following rules,
rules 1 and 2 3 ' apply in jurisdictions that permit nonunanimous verdicts.
Rule 4 (The "Same-Jurors" Rule). If two issues are both essential
to a party's case, he may not establish them nonunanimously with dif-
ferent voting configurations unless the two configurations involve the
requisite number of individual jurors voting in his favor on both issues.
(In other words, the same group of jurors must support the party on
both of the essential issues.)
Rule 5. Rule 4 is inapplicable if the two issues involved are so
unrelated that they can appropriately be deemed to call for the return
of "separate verdicts."
Rule 6. If by a requisite majority (taking into account rules 4 and
5), a defendant establishes a complete defense or establishes the con-
trary of an essential element of his opponent's case, the defendant is
entitled to a defense verdict.
In considering the application of these rules, it is essential to under-
stand the distinction between the patchwork verdict problem and the
nonunanimous vote configuration problem. In a patchwork verdict,
all the jurors (or, in a state permitting nonunanimity, a requisite ma-
jority of the jurors) reach the same legal conclusion, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. In cases raising nonunanimous vote configuration prob-
328. See supra text accompanying notes 143-147.
329. Approximately half of the states have long allowed nonunanimous verdicts in civil cases.
See supra note 242.
330. For a discussion of nonunanimity and jury size in the constitutional context, see supra
text accompanying notes 223-253.
331. See supra text following note 259.
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lems, there are legal conclusions on two different issues; on neither
are all the jurors agreed, and the problem is whether a party can win
the case when less than the requisite number of jurors is convinced
he should prevail on both essential issues.
For example, in a state permitting nine-to-three verdicts, jurors one
through nine might find that the defendant was the man driving the
car that struck the plaintiff, while jurors three through twelve find
that the collision was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Although plaintiff might assert that his nine-to-three victories on the
two issues are each adequate under state law, defendant can correctly
point out that six individual jurors could not stand up, in the fashion
of the ideal of individualism, and say that they found the plaintiff
had established both of these legal prerequisites of liability (ultimate
facts). These jurors could not individually render a verdict for plain-
tiff; by contrast, each juror involved in a patchwork verdict could.
Jury theory requires that plaintiff be able to marshal at least nine jurors
who could render such an "individual" verdict in his favor, so plain-
tiff does not win. In this way, the "same-jurors" rule reflects the ideal
of individualism.
The "same-jurors" rule is honored in most American jurisdictions
that permit nonunanimous verdicts.332 Through 1968, the rule held sway
in every state that had considered the question.33 The rule was generally
enforced by having every juror concurring in the answer to a special
finding sign that answer on the verdict form. Unless nine jurors could
be found who each had voted for the victor on every issue essential
to the verdict, the verdict was defective.
In 1969 and 1970, the courts of three states-Arkansas, New Jersey,
and New Mexico-took the opposite position. The Arkansas court held
that each special verdict finding was a separate "verdict," and all that
332. The question seems never to have been raised in a criminal case, perhaps because the
issue has been hidden by the traditional singleness of the criminal general verdict. In states where
the jury also sets the criminal punishment, though, there could be said to be two "verdicts"
or "dispositional issues" between which the same-jurors rule is arguably inapplicable. The argu-
ment for the same-jurors rule appears strongest in criminal cases, both because it is in criminal
cases that the interest in correct factual determinations is greatest and because the social stigma
of conviction should not be attached to a defendant except by the consent of a requisite number
of jurors who each stand up and pronounce the judgment of guilt based on a personal considera-
tion of all the facts in the case.
333. Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921); Baxter v. Tankersley, 416
S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1967); Plaster v. Akron Union Passenger Depot Co., 101 Ohio App. 27, 137
N.E.2d 624 (1955), app. dismissed, 165 Ohio St. 325, 135 N.E.2d 61 (1957); Clark v. Strain,
21Z Or. 357, 319 P.2d 940 (1958); Devoni v. Department of Labor & Indus., 36 Wash. 2d 218,
217 P.2d 332 (1950), overruling sub silentio Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 108 Wash.
413, 184 P. 641 (1919); Dick v. Heisler, 184 Wis. 77, 198 N.W. 734 (1924). Wisconsin has codified
the rule. Wis. STAT. § 207.25(1) (1977).
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was required by the state constitution was the agreement of any nine
jurors on each "verdict." ' 4 The New Jersey court demolished that
argument by pointing out that the framers and the legislature must
be assumed to have "realized that 'a verdict' is a single final decision
of a jury on all the factual issues submitted to it by a court for
determination.'" 33" The court then inexplicably went on to hold that
since the legislature failed to so provide explicitly, it must have been
referring to conclusions on particular issues when permitting a "ver-
dict" to be rendered by ten jurors. 36 The court also suggested that
this interpretation would discourage hung juries, thus furthering the
policy that underlies nonunanimous verdicts.3 7 The New Mexico court
agreed with the latter rationale.38
Subsequently, the "same jurors" rule has been vindicated in two
new states, Minnesota and Texas,339 and has been rejected in Idaho.
3
1
0
The Idaho case, it should be noted, involved different sets of jurors
finding two respective defendants not negligent; under rules 5 and 6,
the "same-jurors" rule would not have been applicable in this situa-
tion anyway.
In three other states, the "same-jurors" rule has also been rejected
recently where the issues involved were liability and damages-
Oklahoma, New York and California." '4 Each of these three states per-
mits bifurcated trials of liability and damages; this procedural device
creates the appearance that liability and damages are two "separate
and distinct verdicts" to which the "same-jurors" rule need not apply.
342
334. McChristian v. Hooten, 245 Ark. 1045, 1053, 436 S.W.2d 844, 849 (1969).
335. Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super. 351, 353, 258 A.2d 379, 380 (1969), citing Andres
v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948).
336. 107 N.J. Super. at 353, 258 A.2d at 380.
337. Id. at 356, 258 A.2d at 381.
338. Naumburg v. Wagner, 81 N.M. 242, 465 P.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1970). The policy of in-
dividualism should outweigh the policy of minimizing the number of hung juries. New Mexico's
nonunanimity statute, which specifically provides for polling the jurors in the classic fashion
of individualism, seems to indicate that Naumburg was wrongly decided. See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-1-l(48)(b) (1953).
339. Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976); State
Hwy. Dep't v. Pinner, 531 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (per explicit state rule of civil
procedure).
340. Tillman v. Thomas, 99 Idaho 569, 585 P.2d 1280 (1978).
341. Juarez v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 759, 647 P.2d 128, 183 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982); Forde
v. Ames, 93 Misc. 2d 723, 401 N.Y.S.2d 965 (trial term 1978); Fields v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976). With regard to the position of Minnesota, see infra text accompany-
ing note 354.
342. Fields actually involved two separate trials and two separate verdicts. 555 P.2d at 55.
The court in Forde reasoned that since New York law permitted bifurcation, and liability and
damages could be found under that procedure without the same-jurors rule, the rule need not
apply even in a unitary case. A preferable approach, supported by New York authority, would
be to use the same-jurors rule in unitary trials but not in bifurcated trials. Murphy v. Roger
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If the "same-jurors" rule applies as between liability and damages,
jurors who find no liability are disenfranchised on the vote as to
damages.3 This is proper if liability and damages together constitute
but a single verdict, but if they are indeed "separate verdicts" then
the "same-jurors" rule would deprive the parties of their state-
constitutional right to a jury of twelve on the damages "verdict." 44
This appears to be a matter which a state legislature could decide either
way. Until the legislature expressly declares the contrary, courts should
presume that all issues in a case inhere in a single verdict."'
Finally, rule 6 makes the alignment of the parties immaterial to the
rules discussed here. At least one court, however, has recently fallen
into an elementary violation of rule 6.346
It merits notice that the substantive law of comparative negligence
may affect courts' views on the "same-jurors" rule.347 For example,
a "pure" comparative negligence state such as California has concluded-
that the "same-jurors" rule does not apply between a finding that plain-
tiff was negligent and a finding that the defendant was negligent48
because plaintiff may recoveragainst a defendant who has caused his
injuries regardless of the degree of plaintiff's comparative fault. 49 In
Sherman Transfer Co., 62 Misc. 2d 960, 310 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Term 1970) (rule applied in
unitary case).
The California court took a different approach in Juarez. The court reasoned that once the
same majority of jurors agreed as to negligence and proximate cause, any majority of jurors
was acceptable on the issue of damages; otherwise, the jurors dissenting on negligence and causation
would be denied the right to further participate and the parties would be deprived of their right
to have all members of the jury deliberate on all issues. 31 Cal. 3d 759-68, 647 P.2d 128, 133,
183 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857. Contrast the approach taken by the Minnesota court on the issues of
negligence and apportionment of liability, infra text accompanying note 354.
343. Juarez v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 759, 768, 647 P.2d 128, 133, 183 Cal. Rptr. 852,
857 (1982).
344. Id.
345. If the answers to the special interrogatories accompanying a general verdict are "ver-
dicts," then what is the general verdict-a "superverdict?" Despite the linguistic similarity, the
answers to special verdict questions (sometimes themselves called "special verdicts") are not ver-
dicts but merely findings of fact. "Technically, the term ['special verdict'] indicates merely that
the jury will find only the facts, and does not refer to specific findings." Recent Cases, 26 WAsii.
L. REv. 56, 57 (1951). And it should not be inferred from a statute permitting special verdicts
that the legislature intended to undermine the rule of individualism in fact-finding; such statutes
reflect only doubts about the jury's ability or willingness to apply the law to the well-found facts.
346. Collin v. Connecticut Valley Farms, Inc., No. 2 Civ. 63726, 82 L.A. D.J. Daily App.
Rep. 3137 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1982). See Tillman v. Thomas, 99 Idaho 569, 585 P.2d 1280
(1976).
347. For an analysis of the effect of substantive negligence law on a state's policy regarding
patchwork verdicts, see supra text accompanying notes 264-268.
348. United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 31 Cal.
3d 765, 169 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1980).
349. Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
For a listing of those jurisdictions adopting a pure comparative negligence system, see V. ScHWARTZ,
Coso'ArE NEGUGENCE § 3.2 (1974 and Cum. Supp. 1982).
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other words, plaintiff's conduct does not affect the defendant's liability
so long as the defendant has been the partial cause of plaintiff's in-
juries. In contrast, "modified" comparative negligence states deny plain-
tiff recovery when his comparative negligence equals50 or exceeds"'
that of the defendant .3 Thus, Minnesota applies the "same-jurors"
rule when the two issues are negligence and the apportionment of
"fault ' 313 but might not apply the rule when the two issues are
negligence and damages.
35 4
The interplay between the foregoing voting configuration rules and
the patchwork verdict rules is theoretically instructive, although no
reported case has yet dealt with the interrelationship between the two.
For example, as in the hypothetical situation in the second paragraph
of the introduction to this article, it is theoretically possible that all
twelve (or, for that matter, nine of twelve) jurors might agree that
defendant was guilty of some negligent act or other, while at the same
time the jury could also be shown to have voted, as to each particular
alleged act of negligence, nine-to-three that defendant was not negligent.
Although both plaintiff and defendant would claim a victory, plaintiff
would be entitled to judgment on his patchwork verdict. None of the
four issues on which defendant prevailed was sufficient, standing alone,
to enable him to claim immediate victory in the case (rule 6), and as
a result of the "same-jurors" rule, he could not group the four votes
to create a "verdict" of nonnegligence.
In contrast, consider an action to contest a will. The contestant offers
four grounds for invalidity: purported revoking wills dated 1960, 1965,
1970, and 1975, respectively. Assume that all jurors believe the original
will has been revoked, but assume that they split evenly as to which
subsequent will was valid (i.e., no more than three jurors agree upon
350. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (Supp. 1982). For a listing of those states requir-
ing that plaintiff's negligence be less than that of the defendant, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 349,
at § 3.5.
351. See, e.g., 23 OKLA. STAT. § 13 (1981). For a listing of those states allowing a plaintiff
to recover if his negligence is less than or equal to the defendant's, see SCHWARTZ, supra note
349, at § 3.5.
352. Some jurisdictions compare plaintiff's negligence to that of each defendant independently,
while others compare plaintiff's negligence to the combined negligence of the defendants. See
generally McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative
Negligence-A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.19 (1979). An added complexity is
the question of whether plaintiff's negligence should be compared to that of all tortfeasors or
only to that of parties in the case. See generally McNichols, The Complexities of Oklahoma's
Proportionate Several Liability Doctrine of Comparative Negligence-Is Products Liability Next?,
35 OKLA. L. REv. 193, 210 n.67 (1982).
353. Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190, 196 (1976).
The court reasoned that the issues of causal negligence and apportionment of comparative fault
were "integrally related in determining ultimate liability." Id., 239 N.W.2d at 196.
354. Id.
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any one subsequent will). The verdict should be in favor of the de-
fendant. If the four purported revocations are considered to be "separate
transactions," the contestant cannot rely upon the patchwork verdict;
if they are deemed "one transaction," he can. The defendant, on the
other hand, can claim victory despite the "same-jurors" rule only if
it appears that the case calls for four "verdicts" rather than one. It
seems that four verdicts are indeed required because each valid subse-
quent will revokes all earlier wills, so the jury should be required to
determine which of the subsequent wills were valid.
If a case were somehow held to involve separate "transactions" and
a single "verdict," neither side could claim a victory; the jury would
be deemed to hang. No examples of this situation come to mind.
IV. Patchwork Verdicts: Criminal Cases
Theory
Much of what was said about patchwork verdicts and voting con-
figuration problems in civil cases also applies to criminal cases. The
major differences stem from two facts: (1) although jury theory sup-
ports patchwork verdicts in both areas of law, tort and other civil law
policies support patchwork verdicts or are neutral, while criminal law
policies are at war with patchwork verdicts; and (2) criminal offenses
are defined by statute, rather than by the common law, so the per-
missibility of criminal patchwork verdicts will more often be governed
by considerations of substantive law than in the case of civil patchwork
verdicts.
One major criminal law policy is the reasonable doubt standard. A
patchwork verdict indicates that the government has to that extent,
and at that level of detail, failed to establish to the jury's unanimous
satisfaction exactly what happened as a matter of historical fact. As
a matter of jury theory this would not prevent any one juror (or nine,
or twelve) from having the requisite lack of reasonable doubt,"' but
criminal law policy might see a threat to community confidence in jury
judgments in such a situation.'5 6 Because of this concern, close ques-
tions of statutory construction might be resolved in favor of a finding
of "separate offenses," in which case patchwork verdicts are forbidden.
It is important to note that a patchwork verdict dispenses with the
need for jury unanimity only at a given level of specificity. A patch-
work jury will, of course, always agree on the legal conclusion that
355. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
356. Compare Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 374 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (9/12
verdict entitled to, community respect). See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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the statute has been violated, and, if the patchwork verdict is arguably
proper, one will always find that the jury has also agreed on at least
one concrete historical fact relating to the crime.17 Thus the actus reus
and corpus delicti requirements will be formally satisfied. However,
such minimal compliance does not satisfy the reasonable doubt standard.
The jury is valued not only as a community buffer between the ac-
cused citizen and oppressive, overzealous law enforcers,358 but also as
a guarantor that the stigma of conviction will not be attached except
on clear proof of specific conduct.359
As the Supreme Court stated in In re Winship36 : "IT]he Due Pro-
cess Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."36 In other words, the reasonable
doubt standard applies to findings of facts as well as to legal conclu-
sions of guilt because:
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to com-
mand the respect and confidence of the community in applications
of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.1
62
Within broad limits, the legislature has the power to declare how
few facts must be found in order to convict the accused. It is technically
the unanimity rule, not the reasonable doubt standard, that is diluted
when six jurors in an involuntary manslaughter case find beyond a
357. If there is no such single historical fact on which unanimity can be reached, then the
alleged acts must constitute two."separate offenses" that cannot be commingled in a patchwork
verdict. For example, if some jurors find the defendant robbed in Buffalo while other jurors
find that at that moment he was killing in the Bronx, no fact is unanimously found. The offenses
are clearly separate and there can be no patchwork verdict.
In State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595, 308 P.2d 182 (1957), election was not required and a patchwork
verdict was allowed between second degree murder and second degree felony-murder (all felonies
except designated ones) because only "one crime" was involved-"killing ... with a pistol."
In United States v. Lennon, 246 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1957), defendant was accused of understating
income and claiming false deductions under a statute condemning "any person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax." The court affirmed the conviction despite
a duplicity challenge; because a historical fact was impliedly charged and necessarily unanimously
found, the offense was single. "The felonious act in issue ... was the willful filing of a false
and fraudulent income tax return." Id. at 27. Yet the statute made no mention of the act of
filing. If the court had chosen to speak directly to the patchwork-verdict point, it might have
said that legislative intent did not authorize a court to require unanimity on the means of evasion.
358. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
359. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962) (conviction for status offense unconstitutional).
360. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
361. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
362. Id.
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reasonable doubt that the defendant was speeding, and the other six
find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was drunk. Yet the communi-
ty's doubts of guilt, and each citizen's fear that he may someday face
unjust conviction, may not be assuaged. The fact that was found ("driv-
ing without due care") is so general that one might doubt whether,
as a matter of historical fact, defendant did any culpable thing. After
all, six jurors. found the accusation of speeding unproved; six found
the accusation of intoxication unproved. On the other hand, if all twelve
jurors found that defendant was intoxicated, there is no justifiable
reason to require unanimity as to his precise blood-alcohol level or
as to the brand of liquor consumed. At this level of specificity, the
average person's doubts would have been sufficiently assuaged.
It is not the average citizen's doubts that set the benchmark, but
the judgments of legislators. If the statute clearly states that the only
fact that need be found unanimously is "negligence," and only one
"transaction" is under consideration, the discussion is ended. If,
however, the statute is ambiguous, it should be interpreted to require
unanimity (that is, to forbid patchwork verdicts) down to the deepest
level of specificity that is both demanded by popular epistemology and
arguably authorized by legislative intent. For example, if a statute read,
"Thou shall not ill by driving negligently, e.g., by speeding or D.U.I.,"
a court might properly interpret it to forbid a patchwork verdict of
guilt between findings of speeding and drinking.
Two further points about reasonable doubt and patchwork verdicts
should be made. First, as society's moral interest in avoiding a factually
erroneous judgment increases, the criminal justice system responds by
trying to decrease the possibility of factual error.63 For instance, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required in criminal but not in civil cases;364
a 5-1 verdict is sufficient in civil but not in criminal cases;3 6 criminal
trial by jury is required only where six months' imprisonment can be
imposed;36 and no state permits a nonunanimous conviction in a capital
case.167 Accordingly, all other things being equal, patchwork verdicts
should be least acceptable in capital cases and increasingly acceptable
in felony, misdemeanor, and civil cases.
Second, the risk that a patchwork verdict will be unjust as judged
by historical fact is exacerbated by the likelihood that a patchwork
363. Id. at 363.64. For these purposes, society regards the stigma of a criminal conviction
as more onerous than any civil penalty or judgment, so it places great moral value on not wrongly
stigmatizing any criminal defendant.
364. Id.
365. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
366. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
367. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 138-43 (1970) (appendix to opinion of HarlanJ.).
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jury will cut its deliberations short instead of thrashing out disagreements
about the historical facts. The Supreme Court asserted in Johnson v.
Louisiana3 68 that where nonunanimous (9-3) verdicts are allowed, the
supermajority will not rush to judgment roughshod over the dissenters'
objections . 69 Even if this is true, there may be considerably less incen-
tive, even for dutiful jurors, to deliberate at length when every juror
is personally convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course,
the greatest danger to the kind of full, robust deliberation that prevents
conviction of the innocent exists in jurisdictions permitting verdicts
that are simultaneously nonunanimous (9-3) and patchwork (among
the nine).
Another important policy in criminal jurisprudence is the protection
of the jury's deliberative process and nullification power.37 One prac-
tical result of this policy is that although a patchwork verdict in favor
of the prosecution can be held improper and interpreted as a hung-
jury mistrial, a patchwork verdict in favor of defendant will operate
as an acquittal. For example, if a state criminal fraud statute precludes
patchwork verdicts between affirmative misrepresentations and material
omissions, and the jurors are evenly divided between the findings, then
the jury would be deemed to have hung, even if all twelve jurors voted
to convict. Contrast the treatment of a similar state fraud case in which
all twelve jurors voted to acquit, but only six jurors disbelieved the
materiality of defendant's false statement and only six jurors disbelieved
the falsity of the statement. The symmetry apparent in civil cases37'
would suggest that this should be treated as a mistrial, rather than
as an acquittal. In criminal cases, however, there is no procedural device
available to enforce such treatment.
The jury will be instructed that the state must prove every element
of fraud; the reasonable doubt standard predisposes the jury to give
effect to any patchwork verdict in defendant's favor. For valid tacti-
cal reasons, neither the defendant nor the prosecution is likely to re-
quest an instruction to counter this predisposition.3 72 There can be no
special verdict or interrogatory on such matters, over defendant's ob-
jection, in a criminal case.37 3 Moreover, there can be no impeachment
of a patchwork verdict because it is the result of the jury's internal
368. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
369. Id. at 361.
370. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir. 1969).
371. See supra note 263.
372. The prosecution, with its heavy burden of proof, will not want the jury to hear an in-
struction that suggests that the prosecution will not be able to carry its burden. The defendant
will not want an instruction whikh lessens his chances for acquittal.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 190-211.
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deliberations."4 Finally, the double jeopardy clause prevents impeach-
ment or appeal of an acquittal."5 In short, it will be implicitly sug-
gested to the jury that a defense patchwork verdict is proper; the jury
will not be instructed to the contrary; and the resulting patchwork ver-
dict cannot be discovered or corrected. In practical effect, a patchwork
verdict in defendant's favor is permitted.
This result is not as paradoxical or perverse as it might appear because
there is no reason to expect symmetry in criminal patchwork verdict
rules. Civil actions are often based on the substantive common law,
which typically does not address the issue of patchwork verdicts. Thus,
patchwork verdict rules, based on general procedural considerations,
are widely applicable. Since criminal actions are always statutory, the
questions of statutory construction that govern criminal patchwork ver-
dicts may depend on considerations relevant only to a particular statute.
Thus, under a particular criminal fraud statute, pro-prosecution patch-
work verdicts on scienter may be permitted, but not pro-defendant
patchwork verdicts; or pro-defendant patchwork verdicts may be al-
lowed, but not those favoring the prosecution; or patchwork verdicts
may be available to neither party, or to both. The permissibility of
patchwork verdicts will depend upon an interpretation of the particular
statute, and not necessarily upon general patchwork verdict rules govern-
ing all criminal cases. In contrast, the same patchwork verdict rule
can be expected to apply to most major issues in most civil cases within
a state. 376
Maxims
Four general principles are available to aid in determining whether
a particular criminal statute allows patchwork verdicts and under what
circumstances:
Rule 7. A patchwork verdict of guilt among various methods of com-
mitting a "single offense" is proper.
Rule 8. A patchwork verdict of guilt among several "separate of-
fenses" is improper.
Rule 9. Legislatures have broad power to define proscribed conduct
so as to involve only a single offense.
Rule 10. When legislative history, statutory form, and rules of in-
terpretation do not indicate legislative intent, the courts should con-
strue a statute as creating separate offenses.
374. For a general discussion of the no-impeachment rule, see supra text at notes 83-109.
375. See supra note 72.
376. But see supra text accompanying notes 264-299.
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The power to define crime in our system of government is allocated
to the legislative branch; therefore, legislative intent controls in deter-
mining whether a statute creates a single offense or multiple offenses.
For there to be a conviction of any particular offense, the requisite
number of jurors must find that the defendant is guilty of that offense
to the requisite degree of factual specificity.
The "Single Offense"
Under Rule 7,377 the crucial question in determining whether a criminal
patchwork verdict is appropriate, is whether a single offense has been
charged. In most cases, this will simply be a matter of determining
legislative intent. The leading "single offense" case, United States v.
UCO Oil Co., 7s listed four major factors that must be examined:
(1) the statutory language itself, including all matters of form and
structure;
(2) legislative history and statutory context;
(3) the degree of conceptual difference between the proscribed con-
ducts; and
(4) the appropriateness of double punishment.
Different courts have emphasized different factors from the UCO list. 79
It seems that often the statutory form itself will reveal the required
degree of factual specificity." If so, rules 7 and 8 apply. For exam-
ple, the statute may prohibit negligent homicide, thus requiring unanim-
ity on the "ultimate fact" of negligence but allowing nonunanimity
377. See supra text following note 354.
378. 546 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding single offense in duplicity context, with eye on
patchwork verdict), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
379. Statutory language (Congress concerned with the result, not with the conduct): United
States v. Lennon, 246 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1957) (tax evasion by understating income and claiming
false deduction; single offense); United States v. Lubomski, 277 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1967)
(offering, promising, and giving a bribe; single offense). Statutory history: People v. Nor Woods,
37 Cal. 2d 584, 233 P.2d 897 (1951) (theft consolidation statute; single offense). Conceptual
difference: UCO itself (gasoline fraud; single offense); United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453
(5th Cir. 1977) (housing and marketing a stolen vehicle; separate offenses); United States v. Starks,
515 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1975) (conspiracy to extort and attempt to extort; separate offenses); State
v. Arndt, 87 Wash. 2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976) (welfare fraud: single offense). Double punish-
ment: United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978 (7th Cir.) (cocaine or chemical equivalent;
single offense), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977); United States v. Ricciardi, 40 F.R.D. 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (receiving and agreeing to receive bribe; single offense).
380. For example, the legislature's intent might be revealed by whether it said (1) "Thou shalt
not traffick in stolen vehicles"; (2) "Thou shalt not house or market stolen vehicles"; (3) "Thou
shalt not traffick in stolen vehicles, which means housing or marketing them"; or (4) "Thou
shalt not house stolen vehicles" and "Thou shalt not market stolen vehicles." These examples
are suggested by a critical reading of United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
See generally infra text accompanying notes 448-488.
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as to which of the defendant's specific acts constitute negligence. Thus,
under rule 7, a patchwork verdict among defendant's alleged acts of
negligence should be permissible.8' When a statute prohibits a number
of specific acts without establishing a general rubric, it essentially sets
the degree of specificity at the level of "evidentiary facts." Under rule
8, a patchwork verdict of guilt at this level of specificity would be
prohibited.
Statutes frequently contain language prohibiting conduct in both
general and specific terms. It is often unclear whether the legislature
intended to prohibit a broad clsss of conduct and merely provided ex-
amples of the types of conduct encompassed within the class, or in-
stead intended to prohibit a number of specific acts.2 Rule 10 states
that when a statute is ambiguous, the latter interpretation is preferred
for the criminal law policy reasons discussed above.3 Accordingly,
separate offenses are more often found to have been charged in pros-
ecutions under multi-act federal statutes38 than in prosecutions for com-
mon law crimes.38 1
381. See infra note 385.
382. In England, courts have looked overwhelmingly to statutory form to determine whether
an offense is single (for duplicity purposes):
[E]very disjunctive used in the definition of the offense created a separate of.
fence.... Parliamentary counsel can evade the duplicity rule by drafting the offence
in single terms and then defining the words of the offence with multiple possibilities.
Since the duplicity rule does not operate upon the defining clause, a charge in terms
of the verbally single offence will be good.
Williams, The Court and the Duplicity Rule, 1966 CRit. L. REv. 255, 259, 265 (in England).
On rare occasions, the British courts will find that a disjunctive statute creates a single offense.
Id. at 261.
There is some logic to the English position, but it cannot be the end of the inquiry, especially
in the patchwork verdict context. The goal is to determine legislative intent; thus full investiga-
tion is required.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 356-376.
384. See United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) (housing and marketing a
stolen vehicle); United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975) (conspiracy to extort and
attempt to extort); People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703, 265 P. 914 (1928) (duties created under
state hit-and-run law).
385. Different acts of negligence in driving have consistently been held to be merely methods
of committing the "single offense" of involuntary manslaughter. People v. Rewland, 335 I11.
432, 167 N.E. 10 (1929); Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252, 115 N.E. 943, 946 (1917); Schluter v.
State, 153 Neb. 317, 44 N.W.2d 588, 593 (1950). Accord, State v. Souhrada, 122 Mont. 377,
204 P.2d 792 (1949) (in context of a patchwork verdict). Cf. State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357,
68 P.2d 176 (1937) (in context of a patchwork verdict; no clear majority position).
Premeditated murder and felony-murder are usually held to be merely methods of committing
the "single offense" of first degree murder, rather than separate offenses. Cases discussing this
issue in an explicit patchwork context will be considered infra in the text accompanying notes 467-
487; the following cases squarely hold in other decision-state contexts that the two forms of
murder involve only a "single offense": Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 910-11 (Alaska 1970);,
State v. Richmond, 112 Ariz. 228, 540 P.2d 700 (1975); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss3/2
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On a more obvious level, the legislature has clearly exercised its power
to define offenses as separate when the offenses are set out in separate
statutes. The problem of interpretation to which rule 10 applies3 6 only
arises when a single statute prohibits several acts. Similarly, where more
than one instance of the identical type of criminal act is alleged or
proved, the courts hold that the case involves "separate offenses" and
thus, a patchwork verdict is prohibited.3 8 (Where several instances of
conduct clearly make up part of a "continuing offense" or general
scheme or plan, however, a patchwork verdict is proper.388)
(Iowa 1977); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 141 N.E.2d 269 (1957); Rhea v. State,
63 Neb. 461, 88 N.W. 789 (1902); State v. Osborne, 40 Ohio St. 2d 135, 359 N.E.2d 78, 85 (1976).
In the District of Columbia, the offense apparently is single at the punishment stage but separate
at the decision stage. See, e.g., Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969). In Maryland the offense is single, but after State
v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 393 A.2d 1372 (1978), the jury will nonetheless be told to indicate on
which method it based its decision. (Defendant there was convicted of robbery and of first degree
murder generally. Because the state could not show that the murder conviction was based on
premeditation, it was presumed to be based on felony-murder, and the robbery conviction merged.)
386. Rule 10 is set out supra in the text in Part IV, "Maxims."
387. This issue often arises in sex crime cases. People v. Rogers, 21 Cal. 3d 542, 579 P.2d
1048, 146 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1978); People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 165, 65 P. 323 (1901); State v.
Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1957); Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1961); Smith v. State,
20 Okla. Crim. 124, 201 P. 663 (1921); State v. Ewing, 174 Or. 487, 149 P.2d 765 (1944).
The same rule has been applied to prosecutions for nonsexual crimes. United States v. Mangieri,
694 F.2d 1270, 1279-81 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dictum) (false statements on loan application); Claiborne
%. United States, 77 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1935) (perjury); People v. McRae, 256 Cal. App. 2d
95, 63 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1967) (perjury); People v. Hatch, 13 Cal. App. 521, 109 P. 1097 (1910)
(embezzlement); Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C. App. 1982) (possession of mari-
juana); State v. Jackson, 242 Mo. 410, 146 S.W. 1166 (1912) (possession of two gambling devices);
State v. Washington, 242 Mo. 401, 146 S.W. 1164 (1912) (possession of two gambling devices);
State v. Frazier, 40 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. App. 1931) (simultaneous possession of several kinds of
liquor); State v. Geist, 196 Mo. App. 393, 195 S.W. 1050 (1917) (two sales of liquor; dictum
that if only one sale had been alleged, patchwork verdict as to the buyer's identity would have
been proper).
At least one state even has standard anti-patchwork jury instructions for this situation. See,
e.g., CALJIC (California Pattern Jury Instructions) No. 17.01.
388. E.g., United States v. Pavloski, 574 F.2d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating general rule
regarding embezzlement); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 981 (1978) (rule lOb-5); People v. Ewing, 72 Cal. App. 3d 714, 140 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1977)
(child abuse). Cf. United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
934 (1976) (disfavoring patchwork verdict where accountants made two knowingly false statements
in proxy statement; but note that Securities Exchange Act § 32(a) and rule 14a-9, unlike rule
lOb-5, prohibit only falsehoods rather than schemes to defraud). Compare United States v.
Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981). A municipal judge was convicted on a RICO charge.
Numerous instances of ticket fixing were alleged to be the overt acts necessary to prove the
conspiracy. The court found that the alleged acts were within a single conceptual grouping, the
acts were not distinguishable in any meaningful sense, and the evidence as to each was essentially
the same. Held: the jury need not be unanimous as to which overt acts constituted the basis
of their conviction. Id. at 1202. Note that the court's holding is contrary to the general unanimity
requirements for overt acts of conspiracy. See infra text accompanying note 491.
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On the other hand, it is important to note four situations in which
patchwork verdicts are always appropriate without reference to any
analysis of legislative intent. Foremost among these situations is jury
disagreement over some inconsequential detail relating to a clearly single
offense. Even though a patchwork verdict on that detail indicates that
the prosecution has failed to convince the jury of the historical facts
at that level of specificity, and to that extent a theorist might say there
is doubt whether any version portraying defendant as culpable is true,389
the courts generally dismiss such details as immaterial, without reference
to legislative intent. The policy is judicial and is founded on the in-
conceivability of administering an effective jury system under any other
rules. As one court incredulously asked, "What difference did it make
to the deceased, or to society and the law, whether the deceased was
killed by a steel or a leaden bullet... ? Absolutely none."3 90 In Borum
v. United States,39' three joint defendants were charged with four counts
of capital murder, all identical except that the first three charged each
defendant in turn with holding the pistol and the fourth stated that
it was not known who held the pistol. The defendants were all acquit-
ted on the first three counts and convicted on the fourth. The jury
clearly had no idea which one of the gang held the gun, but the Supreme
Court's affirmance of the convictions indicated that this detail was
immaterial.19
Second, courts do not insist that the jurors reach their conclusions
based on identical opinions about every piece of evidence for the same
reason they do not require unanimity on every factual detail: such a
requirement would make conviction impossible. Therefore, jurors may
reach their joint conclusions even if some jurors are convinced only
by Exhibit A and others only by Exhibit B.193 Similarly, if three witnesses
tell the same story but there is evidence that each was at another place
and, thus, one or more may be lying, no court has suggested that it
would be improper for different groups of jury members to believe
different witnesses. Nor is it improper for jurors to base their individual
389. See supra notes accompanying 373-388.
390. Reed v. State, 94 Fla. 32, 44, 113 So. 630, 635 (1927) (not in patchwork verdict context).
See also State v. Bell, 21 Del. (5 Penne.) 192, 62 A. 147 (1901) (0. & Term.) (not a material
variance if alleged that murderer held pistol in right hand and proved that he held it in left hand).
391. 284 U.S. 596 (1932) (per curiam).
392. The Supreme Court treated the case as an inconsistent-verdict case, but surely the result
would not have been worse for the government if the jurors had hung on the first three counts
rather than acquitting on them.
393. Yet Ginsburg, supra note 136, at 270-71, suggests that this is a live issue. Cf. State v.
Hall, 286 S.E.2d 552, 557-59 (N.C. 1982) (brushing aside patchwork verdict possibility as harmless
error when same witness testified to closely related robberies).
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beliefs in a witness's credibility on different indicia of reliability. 94
Although requiring actual, rather than patchwork, unanimity on such
matters would decrease the likelihood of a factually erroneous convic-
tion, it would also disastrously decrease the likelihood of any convic-
tion at all.3"
Third, and in the same vein, there is much to be lost and little to
be gained by making the jury reach actual unanimity on one of several
legal conclusions when all the conclusions are synonymous and have
the same legal effect of establishing a single offense. In such a situa-
tion a patchwork verdict reveals only semantic confusion or obstinacy
rather than any real disagreement about the important historical facts.
In such cases, a patchwork verdict is permissible.396
Sometimes one legal conclusion, although not synonymous with
another, does completely subsume it, so that any juror finding the
"greater offense" necessarily finds the "lesser," whether he realizes
it or not. Thus a patchwork verdict between the "greater" and "lesser"
conclusions is not really patchwork or nonunanimous at all; there must
be actual unanimity on the "lesser" conclusion but semantic confu-
sion has obscured this fact. In such cases, the lesser finding must be
credited. Thus, all jurors who find a defendant was driving a car on
a joyride also find he was riding in the car;3 97 all jurors who find tor-
ture as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a murder
also find the requisite depravity of mind;39' and all jurors who find
that the defendant possessed an "explosive" also find that he possessed
a "destructive device.
'399
These principles must also be extended to cases where the competing
legal conclusions are not formally synonymous but become so under
the facts of the particular case, or where the facts create a situation
where one legal conclusion unexpectedly subsumes another. Thus, there
is little difference between making a false statement and omitting a
394. Jurors may base their decisions as to the credibility of a witness on his appearance (well-
dressed, slovenly, obese, etc.) or demeanor (steady gaze, dry palms, etc.).
395. Moreover, it would unnaturally fetter the jury's deliberative process.
396. See Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637 (1977) (aggravating circumstances for
capital murder-"outrageously vile," "wantonly vile," "horrible," "inhuman"). Cf. United
States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1977) (within the two groupings of receiving/con-
cealing/storing and bartering/selling/disposing of, the acts are "not conceptually distinct," and
distinguishing among them "presents characterization problems"). Actually Gipson seems best
supported by the observation that "receiving" and "disposing of" are subsuming "greater"
conclusions as described in the next paragraph of text.
397. State v. Medley, 11 Wash. App. 492, 524 P.2d 466 (1974).
398. Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637 (1977). See also Clark v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
399. People v. Heideman, 58 Cal. App. 3d 321, 333, 130 Cal. Rptr. 349, 355 (1976).
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material fact when it is the omission that makes the statement false,400
and when it is established that a second criminal was present while
a crime was committed, all jurors who find that a defendant participated
enough to be a principal necessarily also find him guilty as an aider
and abettor.0 1 In such cases of constructive synonymity or subsump-
tion, no court has refused to accept a patchwork verdict.
402
Finally, patchwork verdicts are always held proper in one other class
of cases, again not as a matter of statutory construction but as a mat-
ter of the preservation of the jury process. Even if a fact issue is highly
material, the state need only obtain patchwork unanimity for convic-
tion if it could not be expected to produce objective evidence that would
conclusively prove one or the other theory with regard to that issue.
The classic issue in this class of cases is the defendant's mens rea, when
any of several states of mind would suffice for conviction. Since no
one can know another's state of mind, even an eyewitness to the com-
mission of the crime would not be able to determine the defendant's
actual state of mind. No evidence can be produced that would con-
clusively prove the defendant's type of mens rea. Thus, it should be
sufficient for the state to obtain a patchwork verdict that the defend-
ant had some sufficient form of mens rea, although the jurors do not
agree upon the defendant's actual state of mind. Otherwise, no con-
viction would be possible when the defendant's type of mens rea is
an element of the crime.
For example, the jury in a first-degree assault case need not decide
whether the attack was made intentionally or with wanton indiffer-
ence.03 If the jury agrees there was a breaking and entering with the
400. See United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976) (falsehoods on gasoline
price-control forms), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); State v. Arndt, 87 Wash. 2d 374, 553
P.2d 1328 (1976) (welfare fraud), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816,
639 P.2d 1320 (1982).
401. See People v. Burgess, 67 Mich. App. 214, 240 N.W.2d 485, 488, reh. denied, 397 Mich.
830 (1976); State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974); Holland v. State, 91
Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980).
402. See, e.g., State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1981), where the defendant was charged
alternatively and conjunctively with burglary of a marina and burglary of a boat in the marina.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant appealed on the ground that these were
separate offenses and that to be convicted, the jury must unanimously find guilt on one or the
other charge, but that the form of the verdict made a patchwork verdict likely. The court upheld
the conviction, stating that these were alternative means of committing a single crime and unanimity
was not required as to the means of commission. Id. at 523. It is clear that burglary of a marina
and burglary of a boat can constitute the same crime only under the facts of this case, i.e.,
when the boat is in the marina. See also Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C. App.
1982) (possible patchwork verdict as to which bag of drugs defendant possessed is immaterial
when jury finds, on another count, that defendant possessed one of the bags).
403. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1978).
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intent to commit a felony, it need not agree which felony the burglar
intended." ' Similarly, the jury need not determine whether an explosive
was possessed in a public place recklessly or maliciously.4"" Finally,
when the defendant is tried for the murder of one person, the jury
need not agree whether he intended to murder the decedent or another
individual because malice toward either would suffice.
4 0 6
This class of cases also can include disputes over more objective facts.
For example, a sailor might beat a shipmate mortally and then throw
him overboard, and no autopsy can be performed to determine the
cause of death.0 7 If the jury reaches a patchwork verdict between
murder by beating and murder by drowning, it is sufficient. Even if
the jury members had been eyewitnesses to the incident, they could
not have discerned the moment when, as a medical fact, the decedent
died.
To state a slightly weaker case, the jury should not be required to
determine unanimously whether a controlled substance is 1-cocaine (the
natural product of the cocoa plant) or a chemically equivalent syn-
thetic.400 If the substances are equally contraband, look the same, and
are chemically distinguishable only by the most sophisticated testing,
how could the jury be expected to reach a unanimous opinion on which
substance it is? It does not seem unreasonable to relieve the govern-
ment from the requirement of proving this fact to the jury's unanimous
satisfaction.
In sum, patchwork verdicts are permissible without reference to
legislative intent among (1) immaterial details; (2) the persuasive powers
of different pieces of evidence; (3) actually or constructively synonymous
or inclusive legal conclusions; and (4) facts, particularly regarding mens
rea, that cannot be conclusively proved by objective evidence.
When the patchwork issue does not fall in one of these categories,
reference should be made to legislative intent to determine whether
the acts involved are separate offenses or merely methods of commit-
ting a single offense.409
404. People v. Failla, 64 Cal. 560, 414 P.2d 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1966).
405. People v. Heideman, 58 Cal. App. 3d 321, 130 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1976).
406. State v. Flathers, 57 S.D. 320, 232 N.W. 51 (1930).
407. Brown v. State, 205 Ind. 385, 5 N.E. 900 (1886); Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 295, 321 (1850) (Shaw, C.J.) (dictum); State v. Baker, 63 N.C. 276, 281 (1869) ("The
killing is the substance, the mode is the form ... and it is not to be tolerated that the crime
is to go unpunished, because the precise manner of committing it is in doubt."). Accord (by
implication), Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481 (1898); St. Clair v. United States, 154
U.S. 134 (1894); Page v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1958).
408. See United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977).
409. See supra text following note 381.
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The Single Offense in Other Areas of Law
Historically, the question of whether an offense is single has arisen
most often in the context of attacks against alleged duplicity in a count.
However, it also arises in the contexts of multiplicity, election, double
conviction, verdicts upon counts, double punishment, and double jeop-
ardy. The relevance of this question in these various contexts is briefly
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Duplicity and Multiplicity. The duplicity rule requires that no more
than one single offense be pleaded in a count, although the various
methods by which the offense may have been committed may be listed
in the count.10 If, however, the various methods are unnecessarily
pleaded in separate counts under the misconception that they are really
separate offenses, the multiplicity rule will be violated.4 ' Thus, duplicity
and multiplicity are simply opposite sides of the same coin.
Election; Double Conviction. State practice on election between
separate offenses varies widely. Historically, jurisdictions that disap-
proved of joinder for trial of separate offenses, especially if the of-
fenses arose out of different transactions, forced the prosecutor to elect
before submission of the case to the jury which offense he would rely
upon.4 12 Today, particularly if the offenses are inconsistent or arise
from the same transaction, some jurisdictions require the jury to "elect"
and convict on only one offense.4'3 The general modern view is that
the jury may convict, count by count, on both offenses," with the
judge in some situations choosing which conviction to enter to avoid
a forbidden double conviction.15 Of course, if all that has been alleged
410. 1 C. WvRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 142 (1969). See FED. R. CRIM. P.
7(c), 8(a). The traditional reason for prosecutors to plead a large number of methods of commit-
ting the crime was to cover every possibility and thus avoid an embarrassing variance. See 8
J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.0312] (2d ed. 1978 rev.). The variance
rule is toothless today, see infra note 423, but prosecutors continue to allege as many methods
as possible, perhaps from habit. There is no risk in filling an indictment or even a single count
with alleged methods, for "the general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an
indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is suf-
ficient with respect to any one of the acts charged." Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398,
420 (1970).
411. 1 C. WRIHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 142 (1969).
412. E.g., People v. Pelinski, 293 I11. 382, 127 N.E. 678 (1920).
413. Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); State v. Tritz, 164 Mont. 344, 522
P.2d 603 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); State v. Bozeyowski, 77 N.J. Super. 49,
185 A.2d 393 (1962).
414. This is the logical consequence of permitting joinder of the separate charges for trial.
The requirement of verdicts-upon-counts is similar to the practice of taking special findings,
and sometimes merges into it. See cases discussed infra in note 445.
415. E.g., State v. Botta, 27 Ohio St. 2d 196, 271 N.E.2d 776 (1971) (convictions of auto
theft and receiving the same vehicle found formally separate but a single offense "in substance
and effect"). Compare Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970), discussed infra in note 445.
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are various methods of committing a single offense, no election is
required."6
Verdicts Upon Counts; Double Punishment. If the methods of com-
mitting a single offense are charged in multiple counts, the jury need
not return a separate verdict on each count, but can simply return a
single general verdict." 7 (Whether there are one or several counts, a
patchwork verdict among the methods of committing the "single of-
fense" is permissible.) The judge will then apply the verdict to one
of the counts that the evidence supports'4 1  and a single punishment
will be imposed.
Although the term "single offense" is used in all of these contexts,
should it mean the same thing in all of them, given the different underly-
ing purposes of the various rules? The rules and policies divide into
three categories: pleadings stage, decision stage, and post-verdict stage.
What is a "single offense" for the purpose of one may not be for
another.4t 9
The pleadings stage includes the rules of duplicity and multiplicity.
The main policies underlying the duplicity rule are provision of notice
to the defendant of the accusations against him and perfection of defend-
ant's double jeopardy defense for possible future prosecutions.," To-
day, the danger to defendants in these areas is so slight that these policies
cannot be afforded any substantial weight. If the problem is too many
allegations per count (or, in the event of multiplicity, too many counts
per offense), the defendant will not be put on better notice by rear-
rangement of the allegations and counts. The defendant must be
prepared to meet all of the allegations, regardless of their arrangement
in the indictment. If the defendant does not understand the factual
basis for the charges, his best remedy is to request a bill of particulars.
416. Crane v. People, 91 Colo. 21, 11 P.2d 567 (1932); People v. Rowland, 334 II. 432. 167
N.E. 10 (1929); State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1977); Commonwealth v. Devlin,
335 Mass. 555, 141 N.E.2d 269 (1957); Candy v. State, 8 Neb. 482, 1 N.W. 454 (1897); State
v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St. 2d 135, 359 N.E.2d 78 (1976); State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595, 308 P.2d
182 (1957); State v. Flathers, 57 S.D. 320, 232 N.W. 51 (1930).
417. State v. Richmond, 112 Ariz. 228, 540 P.2d 700 (1975); State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa
228, 46 N.W.2d 20 (1951) (by implication); Commonwealth v. Desmarteau, 82 Mass. (16 Gray)
1 (1860); State v. Pace, 269 Mo. 681, 192 S.W. 428 (1917); Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88
N.W. 789 (1902); State v. Baker, 63 N.C. 276 (1869); Southern v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 144,
29 S.W. 780 (1895); State v. Montifoire, 95 Vt. 508, 116 A. 77 (1922).
418. State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St. 2d 135, 359 N.E.2d 78 (1976); State v. Adair, 155 Tex.
Crim. 377, 235 S.W.2d 170 (1951) (denying rehearing); Southern v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 144,
29 S.W.2d 780 (1895). See Wells v. Brown, 97 Cal. App. 2d 361, 217 P.2d 995 (1950) (civil).
419. Contra, State v. Arndt, 87 Wash. 2d 374, 379 n.1, 553 P.2d 1328, 1331 n.1 (1976) ("single
offense" means the same thing in patchwork verdict context as it does in duplicity context),
rev'd on other grounds, State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982).
420. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962).
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As to double jeopardy, apparently no prosecutor has ever attempted
to retry a defendant after conviction or acquittal on a duplicitous indict-
ment.42 1 In any event, the Supreme Court's current interpretations of
the double jeopardy clause would be likely to prevent such a retrial.422
The duplicity rule seems to be a vestige of early judges' practices
of freeing defendants on procedural technicalities to avoid subjecting
them to the harsh criminal law.4 23 With no grounding in sound policy,
duplicity cases show inconsistencies. Various methods of committing
an offense can be alleged in a single count424 if they are joined by
the conjunctive "and, 4 21 but not if they are joined by the disjunctive
"or. 4 26 The distinction is worse than meaningless because, under cur-
rent practice, only one method must be proved.427 The cases are also
inconsistent as to what constitutes a "single offense" for duplicity
purposes.42'
Accordingly, the duplicity rule has been devalued, at least in the
federal courts. Defendant can no longer move for the first time after
verdict to dismiss a count (and conviction) for duplicity; the motion
is deemed waived if not made prior to trial.4 29 Even when the motion
is made at the appropriate time, the remedy is election, not dismissal.430
421. Williams, supra note 382, at 264.
422. United States v. Henry, 504 F.2d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
932 (1975). See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970) (prior case's findings must be con-
strued liberally, not "with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading
book").
423. See Case Note, Criminal Law-Information-Demurrer For Duplicity, 37 YALE L.J. 522,
522 (1928) (duplicity rule "is one of the safeguards created in the early seventeenth century to
offset the many disabilities then imposed upon the accused").
The criminal law is fast outgrowing those technicalities, which grew up when the
punishment for crime was inhuman, and when it was necessary for the courts to
resort to technicalities to prevent injustice from being done. Those times have passed,
for criminal law is no longer harsh or inhuman, and it is fortunate for the safety
of life and property that technicalities to a great extent have lost their hold.
People v. Cohen, 303 II1. 523, 525, 135 N.E. 731, 732 (1922) (discussing the variance rule and
the sufficiency of the description of the property stolen). The once-vigorous rule against variance
was based on policies of notice and double jeopardy, just like the duplicity rule. Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 83 (1935). Variance is ignored today in the absence of actual prejudice to
the defendant. Id. See also R. FiELD & B. KAPLAN, Crviv PRocEDUREc 360 (4th ed. 1978) (state laws).
424. Note that if the methods could not be included in a single count and had to be set out
in separate counts, the rule against multiplicity would be violated.
425. Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 635-36 (1896).
426. State v. Albarty, 238 N.C. 130, 76 S.E.2d 381 (1953) (Ervin, J.).
427. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970).
428. See Williams, supra note 382, at 261 (British practice); Orchard, The Rule Against Duplicity,
1973 N.Z.L. REV. 468, 469-70 (same).
429. United States v. Untiedt, 493 F.2d 1056, 1059 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
862 (1975). But see Williams, supra note 382, at 258-59 (English practice).
430. United States v. Goodman, 385 F.2d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
930 (1961). See 8 J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE 8.0411 (2d ed. 1978
rev). See also State v. Digman, 121 W. Va. 499, 5 S.E.2d 113 (1939) (duplicity cannot be attacked
by demurrer).
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Moreover, the erroneous denial of the motion is likely to be considered
harmless error by an appellate court."3'
The rule against multiplicitous counts is said to protect against the
possibility that a jury would assume that a defendant accused of many
charges must be guilty of something, or that double punishment would
be imposed.32 These problems are easily avoided by the careful draft-
ing of instructions and judicial alertness. Multiplicity has not been heard
from in some time.
433
Because the policies underlying the duplicity and multiplicity rules
are weak,4'34 the courts have been liberal in defining "single offense"
at the pleadings stage.35 Consequently, these determinations may not
be helpful in deciding what is a "single offense" for patchwork ver-
dict purposes because they fail to take into account the policy of pro-
tecting public confidence in the accuracy of convictions through the
use of the reasonable doubt standard.'"
Similarly, rules developed in post-verdict situations are not control-
ling in determining the singleness of an offense for patchwork verdict
purposes. "Double punishment" is appropriate only if the jury has
found that two offenses have been committed, and each offense re-
quires proof of a fact that the other does not.4 37 Thus, the focus on
appeal from an alleged imposition of double punishment is the elements
of the offenses charged. Double punishment cases most often involve
convictions on mutually exclusive offenses""8 or convictions on two of-
fenses, one of which is a lesser included offense of the other.439 Thus,
431. E.g., United States v. Henry, 504 F.2d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 932 (1975). See United States v. Pavloski, 574 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978).
432. 1 C. WRIOHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 142 (1969).
433. Id. (multiplicity permitted, although not encouraged).
434. United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1975). The court also stated as
duplicity policies: the avoidance of prejudice from the admission of evidence as to one offense
that would be inadmissible as to the other; learning the ground of conviction for sentence and
parole purposes; and avoidance of patchwork verdicts. The first is a joinder problem, not a
duplicity problem; the second is an election problem; and the third would not be solved at the
duplicity stage without a follow-up at the verdicts-upon-counts stage.
435. See, e.g., People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1955), aff'd, 354 U.S.
476 (1957) (crediting a count alleging all nineteen acts prohibited by a statute).
436. Recently three federal appeals courts have explicitly mentioned the possibility of a patchwork
verdict as a factor they considered in deciding a duplicity question. One stated in dictum that
the acts alleged were separate offenses. United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 116-17 (3d Cir.
1975). See also United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977). The second held that
the offense was single. United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 966 (1977). The third did not address the single-offense issue but hinted that it would
disapprove any case where it suspected a patchwork verdict. United States v. Pavlovski, 574
F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978).
437. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
438. State v. Botta, 27 Ohio St. 2d 196, 271 N.E.2d 776 (1971).
439. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
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the issue of the singleness of an offense in a double punishment case
is quite different from that in patchwork verdict cases.4 0
The issue of whether a second prosecution is barred under the dou-
ble jeopardy clause as trying the "same offence" tried in an earlier
prosecution theoretically could involve problems similar to those en-
countered in patchwork verdict cases. For example, a statute might
prohibit two acts; the defendant might be tried for the commission
of one act in one proceeding and for the second in a second proceeding.
If the statute only created a single offense, the second prosecution would
be barred. However, the double jeopardy policy of preventing multi-
ple trials' might influence a judge to find the offense "single" in
this context where he would not in a patchwork verdict context.4'
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the single offense deci-
sions most helpful in the patchwork verdict context are probably those
arising at the decision stage of the trial, i.e., those involving the issues
of election and verdicts-upon-counts,443 rather than those arising at
the pleadings or post-verdict stages. The effect of a decision to force
election or severance444 of charges and then to require a separate vote
on each count is similar to providing a special interrogatory or special
verdict for each separate offense." Although the goal of election or
440. Even where Congress has the power to impose double punishment, the courts will as
a matter of statutory construction presume that Congress opted for lenity and only a single punish-
ment. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955). Resolution of patchwork verdicts issues
requires no such presumption.
441. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1976).
442. Cf. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1977) (the test of singleness for double jeopardy
begins with the Blockburger test of singleness for double punishment, see supra text accompanying
note 437, but also extends to other situations when justice requires).
443. Cases involving the rule against double conviction are based on the repugnancy of the
convictions or the states policy against joinder of criminal charges, and thus yield results that
cannot be transferred to the area of patchwork verdicts. See generally supra note 438.
444. Simply splitting a duplicitous count into two and forcing a separate vote on each count
seems far more sensible than the kind of election where the allegation chosen to be excised is
not tried at all. See Orchard, supra note 428, at 470 (New Zealand practice); Note, United States
v. Gipson: Duplicity Denies Right to Unanimous Verdict, 1978 DEr. CoiL. L. REv. 319, 333-34
(state practice) [hereinafter cited as Detroit Note].
445. In Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949),
the court required a verdicts-upon-counts regarding the methods of committing a "single offense."
Because the. offenses were not separate, the reviewing court decided that this interrogatory-like
procedure should not be used.
Recently some states have chosen to reach this result by interrogating the jury. In State v.
Jackson, 331 A.2d 361 (Me. 1975), the trial judge was allowed to ask the jury whether it con-
victed of receiving or concealing stolen property, although only a "single offense," was involved.
In State v. McDermott, 135 Vt. 47, 373 A.2d 510 (1977), the court allowed the state to charge
two offenses in one count, but authorized conviction on that count only if the jury found both
acts or submitted a special response as to which one it did find. In Gray v. State, 463 P.2d
897 (Alaska 1970), more than one conviction on an indictment containing counts of premeditated
murder and felony-murder was procedurally impossible. However, a general verdict would be
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severance is to prevent convictions resting on grounds that are not sup-
ported by the evidence,'4 4 6 the practical effect will be to prevent a patch-
work verdict among the acts. Therefore, election and verdict-upon-
counts cases probably are helpful in predicting how a particular jurisdic-
tion will define "single offense" in patchwork verdict cases.
Patchwork Verdict Cases
The best way to determine which offenses are single for patchwork
verdict purposes is to examine the relatively few cases dealing with the
issue, keeping in mind the theoretical framework sketched above.4 7
The reported cases support the theoretical conclusion that if the statutory
form is "Thou shalt not do A" and "Thou shalt not do B," or "Thou
shalt notdo A or B," the offenses A and B should be considered
separate and a patchwork verdict disallowed. For example, juries have
been required to find unanimously which clause of rule lOb-5 defend-
ant violated;48 whether defendant conspired to extort or attempted
to extort; 44 9 whether defendant housed or marketed stolen vehicles;
450
whether defendant failed after an accident to stop, or to give his name
and address, or to give necessary assistance;4 1 and whether defendant
had used or was addicted to narcotics in the jurisdiction.52
Although the form "Thou shalt not do X, meaning A or B" ap-
pears to offer the most leeway for interpretation, courts tend to find
that A and B are merely alternative means of committing the single
offense X.45 On the other hand, as discussed above, the form "Thou
shalt not do X" seems clearly designed to establish a single offense
and permit a patchwork verdict between substatutory means such as
reversed if evidence was lacking on either count; if the jury convicted separately on both counts,
double jeopardy would prohibit retrial on either count if a conviction was entered only on the
count which had no evidentiary support. The problem was resolved by requiring a general ver-
dict and interrogatories as to which form of murder the defendant had committed.
446. Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 911 (Alaska 1970) (the court found that special interrogatories
better served this purpose). See supra note 283.
447. For a *discussion of substantive criminal law policy relevant to the determination of
patchwork verdict issues, see supra text accompanying notes 355-375.
448. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
449. United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975) (both offenses forbidden by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1979)).
450. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
451. People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703, 265 P. 914 (1928).
452. People v. Thompson, 144 Cal. App. 2d 584, 301 P.2d 313 (1956).
453. United States v. Lennon, 246 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1957) (income tax evasion is single offense
despite allegations both of understating income and of claiming false deductions; court did not
explicitly discuss patchwork verdicts, although defendant tried to raise the issue); State v. Souhrada,
122 Mont. 377, 204 P.2d 792 (1949) (patchwork verdict among acts of negligence proper in
automobile involuntary manslaughter case). See supra note 382.
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A and B. Most courts so hold;"" and yet, surprisingly, some courts
forbid patchwork verdicts in this situation and insist upon unanimity
on a particular "act."
4"1
The latter courts fall into error because they substitute their own
vague platonic sense of what constitutes an "act" for a determination
of legislative intent as to the singleness of the offense. United States
v. Gipson" 6 is a good example. In Gipson, the defendant was charged
with several counts under a statute prohibiting receiving, concealing,
storing, bartering, selling, or disposing of stolen vehicles. The court
of appeals found that the enumerated acts fell within two "conceptual
groupings," "housing" and "marketing" stolen vehicles, and held that
a patchwork verdict was permitted among the acts within a particular
"conceptual grouping" but not between "conceptual groupings." The
court justified its use of "conceptual groupings," rather than separate
offenses, by stating that the jury must be in "substantial agreement
as to just what a defendant did."4 7
One problem with the Gipson approach is that the court's distinc-
tion between "housing" and "marketing" stolen vehicles does not seem
logically required. If the statute had simply prohibited "trafficking"
in stolen vehicles, the court of appeals would probably not have held
that a subdivision of the statute into two "conceptual groupings" was
454. State v. Bryan, 120 Kan. 763, 245 P. 102 (1926) (extortion by threats to accuse of crime
and threats to injure). See Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 848 (1949) (shipping misbranded drugs; single offense). Compare Bryan with Barker v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 89 Kan. 573, 132 P. 156 (1913) (patchwork verdict erroneous in civil case).
455. E.g., People v. Dutra, 75 Cal. App. 2d 311, 171 P.2d 41 (1946) (forbidding patchwork
verdict among alleged acts when statute forbade generally all acts which would encourage a minor
to lead an immoral life). See State v. Jackson, 242 Mo. 410, 146 S.W. 1166 (1912) (same); State
v. Frazier, 40 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. App. 1931) (similar result as to simultaneous possession of several
kinds of liquor). Compare the Missouri cases with the civil case of Holden v. Missouri R.R.,
108 Mo. App. 665, 84 S.W. 133 (1904) (patchwork verdict proper).
456. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
457. Id. at 457. Gipson elicited a number of student notes. Among them are: Detroit Note,
supra note 444; Harvard Case Comment, supra note 1; Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal
Procedure-Jury Instructions and the Unanimous Jury Verdict, 1978 WVis. L. Rzv. 339 [hereinafter
cited as Wisconsin Note]; Note, Application of Gipson's Unanimous Verdict Rationale to the
Wisconsin Party to a Crime Statute-Holland v. State, 1980 Wis. L. Rv. 597 [hereinafter cited
as Second Wisconsin Note]. The first Wisconsin Note was uncritical in its approval of the Gip-
son approach. The Detroit Note and Harvard Case Comment also approved the Gipson ap-
proach. The Detroit Note identified the issue as duplicity, and discussed the singleness of the
offense in that context. The Harvard Case Comment suggested that the Gipson approach, if
not tempered by common sense, would require unanimity on even the most insignificant details.
The Second Wisconsin Note rejected the "conceptual groupings" approach and suggested that
an anti-patchwork instruction should be given whenever (1) the alternative theories and evidence
in the case are such that the defendant may be convicted without jury agreement hat the evidence
is sufficient to convict on one or more of the prosecution's theories, or (2) the alternative theories
involve substantially different degrees of culpability or different degrees of harm to the victim.
Second Wisconsin Note, supra, at 611-12.
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necessary to assure that the jury determined just what the defendant
did. It seems unlikely that the issue would even have come to the court's
attention. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a court could determine
that "housing" and "marketing" are ultimate acts in some metaphysical
or constitutional sense, and thus prohibit the legislature from including
them in the single offense of trafficking.45
Another, more serious, difficulty with the Gipson approach is that
it provides no useful guidance for interpreting other statutes.59 Con-
gress had, after all, identified six culpable acts rather than two. The
statute at issue in Gipson at least enumerated the acts the court found
were conceptually grouped, but if the Gipson rationale is extended to
general statutory prohibitions, actual unanimity may be required as
to factual details when it is apparent from the form of the statute that
the legislature intended to prohibit a single offense which could be com-
mitted by several means.
Finally, once a rule is established that unanimity is required on "just
what the defendant did," hard cases will require unanimity on deeper
and deeper levels of specificity. The resulting precedents would be em-
barrassing at best and dangerous at worst. This danger was recognized
by a state court justice in reviewing an involuntary manslaughter
conviction:
I am wondering how far the jury is required to go in agreement
on the subsidiary facts. It must have concluded that [the defend-
ant] drove without due care and circumspection and it therefore
concluded that such driving caused the death of the deceased. Must
it also have come to unanimity on all of the specifications which
it is alleged the lack of due caution consisted of? If one of these
specifications could again be broken down into more refined and
different causes, must it also have come to unanimity as to one
or more of those causes? For instance, if it is alleged that a defend-
ant drove without having his car under control because he was
"spooning" with a girl and because under the influence of liquor,
must there be unanimity on the causes bringing about said lack
of control?... How far up the trunk and branches of the evidence
tree must this unanimity extend?46
458. See supra notes 360-362 and accompanying text and infra note 507.
459. Compare the analysis of Manson v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 40, 284 N.W.2d 703 (Ct. App.
1979) in the Second Wisconsin Note, supra note 457, with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's resolution
of that case on appeal. Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 309 N.W.2d 729 (1981) (reversing).
See United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 112, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal statutes prohibiting
mail fraud and interstate transportation of fraudulently taken property did not contain any "con-
ceptual groupings"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981).
460. State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357, 376, 68 P.2d 176, 185 (1937) (Wolfe, J., concurring
in the result).
19831
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
It is not clear, as the above hypothetical instance illustrates, why a
finding that the defendant lost control of his vehicle for a particular
reason is a superior determination of just what he did than a simple
finding that he lost control. Once actual unanimity is required at a
level of specificity deeper than the statutory langauge, the court is on
a slippery slope that will require actual unanimity even on trivial
details.'61
This danger is raised by cases like United States v. Pavloski.s2 In
Pavloski, the defendant was charged with embezzlement by forging
checks and by skimming union dues. The charges arose out of the same
series of transactions. The statute in issue simply prohibited embezzle-
ment and had previously been interpreted as creating a single, con-
tinuing offense. The Pavloski court upheld the conviction, but stated
that it would follow Gipson and reverse whenever the defendant pre-
served an objection to the jury instructions and a patchwork verdict
was a real possibility."63 This indication by the Seventh Circuit is not
supported by any evidence of legislative intent to preclude patchwork
verdicts among various methods of embezzlement.
The Pavloski approach should not be followed, and in fact is not,
when it is evident from the form of the statute that the factual details
in question are immaterial for unanimity purposes. It is even more
clear that Pavloski should not be followed when there is evidence of
legislative intent, above and beyond the statutory form, that the offense
be single and that patchwork verdicts be allowed. For example, larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses may be consolidated into a single
theft statute if the legislature is concerned that too many criminals are
escaping punishment because juries cannot agree on insignificant tech-
nicalities.64 Similarly, a legislature's demonstrable intent might be to
do away with the technical distinctions between principals, aiders/
abettors, and coconspirators, thus making patchwork verdicts proper.461
461. According to the Harvard Case Comment, supra note 1, at 502, a Gipson court must
use common sense rather than any kind of logic to decide at what level of specificity a patch-
work verdict should be allowed. Regardless of whether the Gipson ad hoc approach could be
successful in the long run, given the ratchet effect of stare decisis, the decision should be left
to the legislature.
462. 574 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978).
463. Id. at 936. The court affirmed in Pavloski only because those criteria were not met.
Compare State v. Utter, 92 N.M. 83, 582 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Ct. App. 1978). The defendant was
charged under a statute listing six means of committing fatal child abuse. The court affirmed,
stating that, in the absence of a forthrightly pro-patchwork instruction, it would be presumed
that the jury had reached actual unanimity on one of the acts.
464. State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1980); People v. Nor Woods,
37 Cal. 2d 584, 233 P.2d 897 (1951); People v. Hodges, 153 Cal. App. 2d 788, 794, 315 P.2d
38, 41-42 (1957) (change in jury instruction practice as to patchwork verdicts in theft cases).
465. See Wisconsin Note, supra note 457, at 348; Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 143,
280 N.W.2d 288, 293 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980).
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Jurisdictions that have anticipated or followed the Gipson/Pavloski
approach of defining "acts" on which actual unanimity must be reached,
instead of focusing on the "offense" and allowing patchwork verdicts
unless the legislature clearly intended to separate conduct into two of-
fenses, have invariably gotten into trouble. The problem commonly
arises when first degree murder is charged and the defendant ques-
tions the validity of a patchwork verdict between felony-murder and
premeditated murder. State murder statutes are typically in the form,
"Thou shalt not do X, meaning A or B." Most states interpret them
as creating a single offense with alternative mens rea or alternative
"theories" and allow patchwork verdicts.4 16 A few states have charac-
terized premeditated murder and felony-murder as separate acts and
have disallowed patchwork verdicts between them, with confusion in-
evitably resulting.467
During the mid-1970s, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided four
first-degree murder cases, none of which can be reconciled. The first
affirmed a general conviction on two counts because murder was a
"single offense"; the court apparently misunderstood the defendant's
patchwork verdict objection, merely stating that sufficient evidence was
presented to support a verdict on either theory.46 The second reversed
a conviction because there was no evidence of felony-murder, then added
in dictum that the case was also reversible because the instructions had
466. People v. Milan, 9 Cal. 3d 185, 507 P.2d 956, 107 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1973); People v. Sullivan,
173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989 (1903); State v. Hazelett, 8 Or. App. 44, 492 P.2d 501 (1972). Sullivan
was also quoted approvingly in patchwork-verdict cases arising in other contexts. See Blake v.
State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637 (1977); Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1978);
State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595, 621-22, 308 P.2d 183, 189 (1957) (semble). And for cases holding
that the two kinds of murder were merely methods of committing a "single offense" in contexts
other than patchwork verdicts, see supra note 385.
On the other hand, patchwork verdicts of murder may be thwarted where the jury has to
report its theory. See State v. Frye, 393 A.2d 1372 (Md. 1978) (to prevent felony conviction
from merging); People v. Hicks, 287 N.Y. 165, 38 N.E.2d 482 (1941) (law required jury to make
recommendation of life or death if it found felony-murder).
Compare Sullivan with Murray v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 96 N.Y. 614 (1884) (patchwork verdict
permissible in civil case); compare Hazelett and Reyes with Russell v. Oregon R.R. & Navigation
Co., 54 Or. 128, 141, 102 P. 619, 624 (1909) (patchwork verdict impermissible in civil case) (dictum).
467. One reason for this may be that if some jurors find premeditation but no felony, there
might be enough juror disagreement on the historical facts to create legitimate qualms about
whether defendant is guilty of anything. The situation is quite different if all jurors find a felony
has been committed but all do not agree on premeditation. In that event, a patchwork verdict
becomes automatically permissible for two reasons: (1) there is no disagreement on the historical
facts, but only on the defendant's mens rea; and (2) aside from mens rea, premeditated murder
has become a subsuming "greater" conclusion, in that all jurors finding it necessarily also find
felony-murder because even an intentional murder committed in the course of a felony is felony-
murder. Thus there is actual or constructive unanimity on felony-murder. See supra text accom-
panying notes 395-401.
468. People v. Fullwood, 51 Mich. App. 46, 215 N.W.2d 594 (1974), reh. denied, 393 Mich.
785 (1975).
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authorized a patchwork verdict. 69 The third affirmed a conviction over
a dissenter's argument that patchwork verdicts should be reversibly
erroneous.4 70 The fourth also affirmed a conviction, noting that there
was no manifest injustice and denying that any Michigan court had
held patchwork verdicts improper. The court went on to recommend
that anti-patchwork instructions be given in the future.47' Presumably,
Michigan trial judges and attorneys are still confused as to the state
of the law.
A similar state of confusion arose in Washington. In State v.
Golladay,4 " the state's highest court reversed a murder conviction
because no evidence of felony-murder had been produced, but added
an antipatchwork dictum. A year later, in 1971 a lower court fol-
lowed the dictum and struck down a first-degree murder conviction
for being piatchwork. '7 Three years later, the Washington Supreme
Court affirmed a conviction of first degree murder, stating that the
verdict only appeared to be patchwork because any juror finding murder
necessarily also found felony-murder under the facts of the case.,7
The court expressly reserved the general question of patchwork ver-
dicts between premeditated murder and felony-murder and suggested
that the Golladay dictum would not survive.4" In two more years, this
hint was borne out in State v. Arndt,47'6 a welfare fraud case, which
overruled the Golladay dictum and the cases following it. 7 7 In Arndt
the court returned to a focus on the singleness of the offense as deter-
mined by legislative intent. In 1982 the court reconsidered its position
in State v. Franco,"78 finding that Arndt was insufficient to meet the
constitutional requirement of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.7 9 The
469. People v. Olsson, 56 Mich. App. 500, 224 N.W.2d 691 (1974) (2-1), reh. denied, 393
Mich. 772 (1975).
470. People v. Embree (#1), 68 Mich. App. 40, 241 N.W.2d 753 (1976) (2-1), reh. denied,
399 Mich. 807 (1977).
471. People v. Embree (#2), 70 Mich. App. 382, 246 N.W.2d 6 (1976). Compare these cases
with the civil case Peer v. Ryan, 54 Mich. 224, 19 N.W. 961 (1884).
472. 78 Wash. 2d 121, 137, 470 P.2d 191, 201 (1970).
473. State v. Rogers, 5 Wash. App. 347, 486 P.2d 1125 (1971).
474. State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974). See also note 467 supra.
475. 84 Wash. 2d at 266, 525 P.2d at 737.
476. 87 Wash. 2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976) (patchwork verdict proper).
477. Id. at 378, 553 P.2d at 1331.
478. 96 Wash. 2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982).
479. Id., 639 P.2d at 1328. The court believed that the standard set forth in Arndt was in-
sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The
court established the following approach for distinguishing between the single offenses and alter-
native means of committing the same offense: (1) the court should identify the elements necessary
for the commission of the offense (allegedly broader than the "acts" of Arndt); (2) reduce each
alleged means to its essential Winship elements (i.e., the facts necessary to constitute the crime);
(3) compare the elements of the crime with the elements of the alleged means of committing
it. Id., 639 P.2d at 1329-30.
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Franco court reversed a conviction for driving while intoxicated because
a general instruction had been given, but the alternative means of com-
mitting the offense were not identical.8 0 Only if alternative means of
committing the same offense are synonymous (i.e., if the essential
elements of each means are identical) will patchwork verdicts be
allowed."'" It is not clear where the Washington court will draw the
line in determining if alternative means are identical.
The Utah court's flirtation with prohibiting patchwork verdicts among
different acts also ended in confusion. The trouble began in 1937 with
State v. Rasmussen,412 where a defendant convicted of involuntary
manslaughter challenged the propriety of a patchwork verdict among
several substatutory acts of negligence."83 The court affirmed the con-
viction despite a confusing vote configuration. The "swing" justice
assumed arguendo that patchwork verdicts are improper, but found
that the instruction did not authorize such a verdict. Six years later,
a conviction for involuntary manslaughter was upheld where a clear
antipatchwork instruction had been given." " Shortly thereafter, a first
degree murder conviction was upheld despite the absence of an anti-
patchwork instruction on the ground that the evidence of premedita-
tion was so strong that any error as to the instructions was harmless."s'
Finally, a defendant complained of an instruction permitting a patch-
work verdict between premeditated murder and murder with depraved
recklessness.88 The court denied that the validity of patchwork ver-
dicts had ever been decided and declined to decide the question at that
time by interpreting the challenged instruction as being antipatchwork.
87
One can fairly say that today the lower Utah courts are without
guidance.
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the appropriate method
for resolving patchwork-verdict questions is to first determine whether
480. If all are synonymous, then the charges are truly alternative means of committing the
same offense. Id., 639 P.2d at 1330. The only difficulty is that Winship provides no means
for determining which facts necessarily constitute the crime. See infra note 507.
481. The statute under which the defendant was charged prohibited driving while intoxicated.
In separate clauses, three ways of violating the statute were set out: (1) driving with a blood
alcohol count greater than or equal to 0.10%; (2) driving while affected to an appreciable degree
by drugs or alcohol; or (3) a combination of (I) and (2). Franco, id., 639 P.2d at 1330, citing
WASH. STAT. § 46.61.502 (1979).
482. 92 Utah 357, 68 P.2d 176 (1937).
483. For a discussion of other automobile involuntary manslaughter cases, see note 385 supra.
484. State v. Bleazard, 103 Utah 113, 133 P.2d 1000 (1943).
485. State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 115 P.2d 741 (1945).
486. State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946). This is not the type of disagree-
ment that could be resolved by wtnessing the historical facts; thus, a patchwork verdict should
have been allowed. See supra text accompanying notes 402-406.
487. Id.
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the legislature intended to create a single offense or many. Courts that
attempt to rely solely upon their own judgment to distinguish between
acts that may properly form a patchwork verdict and those that may
not frequently come to grief.
488
Two distinct types of crime deserve special comment: treason and
conspiracy. The Constitution prohibits conviction for treason unless
two witnesses testify as to the same overt act.419 It follows that no
patchwork verdict is permissible between different alleged overt acts.
This rule is strictly enforced by the courts, sometimes by requiring
answers to special interrogatories on each alleged act. 9° The Constitu-
tion does not seem to preclude a patchwork verdict on which two
witnesses are believed by the jury, however.
Proof of an overt act is also required in conspiracy cases. There,
too, no patchwork verdict is allowed among the alleged acts.49'
Moreover, there must be actual unanimity as to the law the defendant
conspired to violate, and the jurors must also agree that his alleged
coconspirators conspired to violate the same law. 92 In other words,
there must be actual unanimity on at least one object of the
conspiracy.4 93 Similarly, where the facts suggest two separate con-
spiracies, the jurors must unanimously agree on which conspiracy the
defendant participated.49 4
In sum, the rule of individualism allows patchwork verdicts among
methods of committing a single offense. The legislature has broad power
to define offenses as single, but it also has discretion to divide acts
into separate offenses among which patchwork verdicts are improper.
Except in special cases where unanimity is needless or impossible, the
courts should look to legislative intent to discover whether acts involve
488. The Wisconsin experience is also instructive. Compare the supreme court in Holland v.
State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980), and Manson
v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981). Also of interest are State v. Baldwin, 101
Wis. 2d 441, 304 N.W.2d 742 (1981) and Jackson v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 1, 284 N.W.2d 685 (Ct.
App. 1979).
489. U.S. CONST., art. 111, § 3.
490. E.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 937 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 918 (1949). Courts generally justify the use of such interrogatories or verdicts-upon-counts
as a means of preventing conviction upon an overt act for which there is insufficient evidentiary
support.
491. People v. Rehman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 158, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65, 90 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 947 (1968).
492. Id.; United States v. Echeverry, 698 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1983).
493. United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 391-92 (9th Cir.) (interrogatories), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1023 (1976); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 958 (1971).
494. United States v. Mastelotto, No. 81-1678 (9th Cir. May 19, 1983); United States v.
Echeverry, 698 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1983).
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a single offense or separate offenses. When legislative intent cannot
be divined from statutory history, form, or interpretation, courts should
be free to construe separate statutes as creating separate offenses in
order to effectuate reasonable doubt policies.
Implementation
Once the decision to allow or disallow patchwork verdicts in criminal
cases has been made, it must be implemented. If patchwork verdicts
are found to be proper, an explicit instruction to that effect would
probably overprotect the prosecution's interests, suggesting to the jury
that the judge favored conviction. A more appropriate course might
be simply to continue giving the traditional unanimity instructions.4"
The effect would be that juries would credit their own patchwork ver-
dicts in most cases, but where their disagreement on the historical facts
was so profound that they doubted whether the defendant had done
anything, they would refuse to convict. 96 Thus patchwork verdicts
would be operative except where most likely to do injustice.
If it is determined that separate offenses are involved and a patch-
work verdict must be prevented, implementation is trickier. Assuming
that defendant cannot compel election, his most likely course is an
antipatchwork instruction. Special verdicts or interrogatories would be
more effective in thwarting patchwork verdicts, but reverence for the
general verdict and untrammelled deliberations in criminal cases makes
some courts shy away from special findings.
4 97
On the other hand, the prejudice of special findings in criminal cases
is generally thought to run against the defendant.98 If he is not satisfied
with the instructions and is willing to ask for special findings regard-
ing the separate offenses,499 it is hard to see how the prosecution could
object. The findings, few enough in number that the jury's delibera-
tions would be unlikely to be skewed, would still tend to make nullifica-
tion less likely. Interrogatories have in fact been known to prevent patch-
495. Unless, through ambiguity, they suggest patchwork verdicts are directly forbidden. See
supra note 280.
496. See also supra text following note 327 (similar proposal for civil cases).
497. See, e.g., Bisno v. United States, 291 F.2d 711, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant charged
with concealing ten items of property from a bankruptcy trustee obtained antipatchwork instruc-
tion as to the items, but court did not err in declining to order special findings as to each item).
See supra text accompanying notes 190-211.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 190-211.
499. Cf. United States v. Umentum, 547 F.2d 987, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1976) (court suggested
that if defendant didn't like the ruling that the jury need not agree whether he possessed cocaine
or some chemical equivalent, he could have asked for a special finding), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
983 (1977).
1983]
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work verdicts.500 Some jurisdictions have instituted them to protect cer-
tain prosecution interests.3 0'
While there is nothing objectionable about allowing the defendant
the option of requesting antipatchwork interrogatories, they should not
be available, as was suggested in United States v. Spock,0 2 after a
general verdict has been returned. Sending a jury back for further
deliberations for this reason would affront traditional symbolism and
embarrass the jurors.
If there is judicial resistance to the idea of formal interrogatories
in a criminal case, the same effect can be attained by requiring verdicts-
upon-counts."3 In every case where the offenses are set out in separate
counts, verdicts-upon-counts are surely in order. If the separate of-
fenses somehow are encased in a single courit and the duplicity rule
can offer no remedy, the trial judge should have the discretion to split
the one count into several at the decision stage and require verdicts-
upon-counts as to them.
50 4
V. Constitutionality
The Supreme Court's unconcern with the incidents of jury trials in
state courts and (to some extent) in federal courts, along with its sym-
pathy for procedural devices that help relieve those courts' backlogs,
suggest that the Court is unlikely to strike down any procedural device
that encourages patchwork verdicts. If the validity per se of a patch-
work verdict were presented as a procedural question, as it typically
would be in civil cases, state courts would probably be given free rein
without even the embarrassment of a grant of certiorari. In a federal
civil case, the Court might offer guidance on the matter by construing
the federal rules or under its supervisory power; more likely than not,
the Court would approve patchwork verdicts, noting their "efficiency"
and their theoretical founding in jury theory.
In federal criminal cases, the Court is likely to approve patchwork
verdicts on single offenses because the reasonable doubt standard would
not be violated if each juror personally has found guilt beyond a
500. E.g., cases cited in notes 194, 197, 198 & 445 supra.
501. See Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 911 (Alaska 1970) (to preserve conviction if one theory
had no evidentiary support); State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 393 A.2d 1372, 1379 (1978) (to prevent
felony conviction from merging with presumed finding of felony-murder).
502. 416 F.2d 165, 183 N. 42 (1st Cir. 1969).
503. See supra note 445 and accompanying text.
504. This, in effect, is what was done in Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949). This result was reached through the use of interrogatories in Spock,
and there, too, the court of appeals reversed.
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reasonable doubt."' The unanimity rule, like the reasonable doubt
standard, applies only to the facts necessary to constitute the offense,"0 6
which are determined by the legislature. Ordinarily, the Court is deferen-
tial to such legislative determinations. Thus, the patchwork verdict issue
would ordinarily arise only as a question of statutory interpretation.
How the Supreme Court would interpret federal criminal statutes in
this regard is unclear, but the Court would probably defer to state
court interpretations of state criminal statutes.
This is not to say, however, that the Constitution does not place
any limits upon the conduct that may be encompassed within a single
offense, or, in other words, upon a legislature's power to set the level
of factual specificity on which a jury must agree unanimously.0 7 All
offenses can be committed in countless ways;5"8 therefore, a statute
cannot be unconstitutional merely because it proscribes many different
acts. Conceptual similarity, in terms of logical, historical, and/or lin-
guistic interrelatedness, instead appears to set the constitutional limits
of the single offense."9 As a rule of thumb, any acts that can be gathered
under a generic "label" can probably be made a single offense without
offending the Constitution. If, however, there is no general term en-
compassing all the acts within a purportedly single offense, the acts
will probably be found to be historically and logically distinct. For
example, a statute may provide "Thou shalt not murder or litter."
There is no generic abbreviation for the crime of murdering-or-littering;
thus, the legislature cannot constitutionally create a single offense of
murdering-or-littering that could be established by a patchwork verdict.
It seems clear that whatever constitutional limits are ultimately placed
on legislative power to consolidate conduct into a single offense, those
limits cannot be fully explained by the concepts of "vagueness" or
"notice." For example, there is no difference in the "singleness" of
an offense charged under a vague statute, "Thou shalt not be wicked,"
and a statute providing "Thou shalt not be wicked. Wickedness is de-
fined as [here the statute lists every act prohibited by Title 18 of the
United States Code.]" The acts listed in the second statute remain
505. "That rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the State,
nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt standard." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 362 (1972).
506. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
507. Id. In re Winship established that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was an essen-
tial element of due process. The prosecution must meet that standard of proof for every fact
necessary to constitute the charged crime. Id. at 364 (emphasis added). Winship is of little assistance
in determining what degree of factual specificity is necessary to satisfy the reasonable doubt
standard.
508. For example, murder may be committed by shooting, stabbing, poison, etc.
509. See, e.g., United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
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separate offenses, despite their inclusion in a single statute, for the
sufficient reason that, under our system of criminal law, they are in-
trinsically separate.
A final point to be made about the constitutional status of patchwork
verdicts in criminal cases is that a Supreme Court that has deconstitu-
tionalized the unanimity requirement in state cases in order to facilitate
verdicts may not see any difficulty in embracing patchwork verdicts.
Johnson v. Louisiana"'0 established that nonunanimous verdicts do not
violate the reasonable doubt standard because each of the majority
jurors is personally convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." '
Patchwork verdicts pose even less of a threat to the reasonable doubt
standard because every juror is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."1 2 Following Johnson, patchwork verdicts should be constitu-
tionally permissible within the jury size and unanimity limits set by
the sixth and fourteenth amendments.513
The same arguments will not be persuasive if the patchwork verdict
is between separate offenses. The possibility that the defendant was
not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any of the separate
offenses by the requisite number of jurors would require reversal of
the conviction." ' Such a possibility is unlikely to be found harmless
error."'
In sum, courts should not follow the suggestion of United States
v. Gipson1 6 that a patchwork verdict is unconstitutional if it is be-
tween distinct acts. Rather, courts should defer to legislative intent and
reverse a patchwork conviction only if the offenses were intended to
be separate or, in the rare case, if the legislature has attempted to make
a single offense out of offenses that are intrinsically separate.
Conclusion
Patchwork verdicts are a little-noticed but perhaps pervasive
phenomenon. There have been rather few reported decisions and almost
510. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
511. Id. at 361-62. See supra text at notes 14-21.
512. For a discussion of patchwork verdicts in the context of the reasonable doubt standard,
see supra text accompanying notes 355-369.
513. The outcome of the nonunanimity cases is formally irrelevant to the patchwork verdict
problem. Regardless of the size of the "unanimity unit," if an impermissible patchwork verdict
is possible, there can be no guarantee that either competing theory commands even as much
as a simple majority of the "unit" (i.e., there could be a 6-6 split, or if there are three issues
a 4-4-4 split, etc.). The error could not be presumed harmless. But if the competing theories
are immaterial and a patchwork verdict is permissible, all unanimity rules are satisfied by a
"unanimous" patchwork verdict.
514. See supra note 513.
515. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
516. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
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no academic commentaries on the issue. Often when the question first
is raised in a jurisdiction, several other cases raising it soon appear,
17
but many state courts have never considered the issue.
Certain principles are available to help courts decide patchwork-verdict
questions when they arise. Foremost among these is the rule of
individualism-that each juror should give his verdict as if he were
the sole judge of the case. The rule of individualism suggests that patch-
work verdicts are proper. The policies supporting general verdicts and
unfettered jury freedom support patchwork verdicts as well. The main
theoretical objections to patchwork verdicts are analogous to the
arguments made in favor of detailed special findings, which are not
everywhere well accepted.
In civil cases, where procedural considerations dominate, the rule
of individualism leads to the conclusion that patchwork verdicts are
proper in most situations. Similarly, in criminal cases patchwork ver-
dicts should be proper where only a single offense is charged. But where
the legislative intent is that the substantive criminal law create separate
offenses, a patchwork verdict among them should not be allowed.
517. See the Michigan, Washington, and Utah cases discussed supra in the text accompanying
notes 468-487.
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